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**Mind-Body Conversations:
Hypnosis, Meditation, and Poetry**

by

Sandra S. Roscoe

**A Dissertation Presented to the
School of Social and Systemic Studies of
Nova Southeastern University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

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TO STUART

My lover, dharma brother, and best friend

A Poem from Rumi

The minute I heard my first love story
I started looking for you, not knowing
how blind that was.

Lovers don't finally meet somewhere.
They're in each other all along.

--Rumi

A Mind Poet
Stays in the house.
The house is empty
And it has no walls.
The poem
Is seen from all sides,
Everywhere,
At once.

--Gary Snyder

Form and content rhyme; connection and
separation entwine.

--Douglas Flemons

As we reacquaint ourselves with our breathing
bodies, then the perceived world itself
begins to shift and transform. When we begin
to frequent the wordless dimension of our
sensory participations, certain phenomena
that have habitually commanded our focus
begin to lose their distinctive fascination
and to slip toward the background, while
hitherto unnoticed or overlooked presences
begin to stand forth from the periphery and
to engage our awareness.

--David Abram

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ABSTRACT

This study was a two-part investigation of hypnosis. The first part drew on Buddhist philosophy to theoretically explore the intrapersonal process of the hypnotized person. The second part drew on poetic traditions to research the interpersonal process between a hypnotist and a client. Both processes--the intra- and the interpersonal--were understood as conversations. The following questions were addressed: How can a poetic analysis of the conversation between a hypnotist and client provide aesthetic access to the hypnotherapeutic processes of change? And how can the conversation between the hypnotist and client alter the client's conversation within? This study focused on the interaction between these two conversations.

While theories of hypnosis are diverse and contradictory, most hypnotists have agreed that hypnosis has to do with how ideas are exemplified in changing body behaviors. Hypnosis is usually defined, however, in psychological (mind) or physiological (body) terms. Cartesian assumptions and the linear structure of language prevent it from being explained as the relation between mind and body. To avoid the dilemma of describing hypnosis in a nomenclature that reflects divisive suppositions, this study drew on traditions that lie outside Western sciences. Buddhist meditators have articulated the difference between ordinary thoughts and perceptions and the phenomenological

mind-body experiences that arise during meditation. Buddhist ideas were used to theoretically discuss the *intrapersonal* process, and the phenomenological mind-body changes that occur during hypnotic conversations. To examine the *interpersonal* process, poetic distinctions that literary critics might use to explore poetic texts were utilized to investigate the poetic qualities of hypnotic conversations. Poetic distinctions were combined with analytic techniques drawn from conversation and discourse analysis to examine a transcribed hypnosis session. Information gathered from interviews with the client were interspersed within the analysis.

Gregory Bateson (1979) posed an intriguing question about connecting different vantage points: "What bonus or increment of knowing follows from *combining* information from two or more sources?" (p. 71). This study proposed a similar question: What new understanding about hypnosis comes from juxtaposing a discussion about an intrapersonal, mind-body conversation within a hypnotized person with an interpersonal, mind-body conversation between a hypnotist and client?

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This study is a two-part investigation of hypnosis. The first part draws on Buddhist philosophy and meditative practice as a way of theoretically exploring the intrapersonal process of the hypnotized person. The second part draws on the tradition of poetry as a way of researching the interpersonal process between a hypnotist and a client. Both hypnotic processes--the *intra-* and the *interpersonal*--can be understood as *conversations*. This study focuses on the interaction between these two conversations. It asks the questions: How can a poetic analysis of the conversation between a hypnotist and client provide aesthetic access to the hypnotherapeutic processes of change? And how can the conversation *between* the hypnotist and client alter the conversation the client has *within*?

Gregory Bateson (1979) posed an interesting question about connecting different vantage points when he asked, "What bonus or increment of knowing follows from *combining* information from two or more sources?" (p. 71). This examination of hypnosis proposes a similar question: What new understanding about hypnosis can come from juxtaposing a discussion about the conversation within a person (the *intrapersonal* process) with the conversation between a hypnotist and client (the *interpersonal* process)?

Because I am interested in how the conversations between hypnotists and clients create hypnotic experiences,

and how these experiences alter the conversations that clients have within themselves, it would be fitting to begin this study with a transcribed extract from a hypnotist and client's hypnotic conversation. However, before doing so, I will contextualize the transcript with a discussion of therapy and hypnotherapy as conversation.

Following the discussion of therapeutic conversations and the presentation of the extract, I reflect on the diverse ways hypnotists might choose to explain the hypnotic interaction. Providing examples of the dissimilar ways hypnotists orient to hypnosis illuminates some of the tacit assumptions that most theorists share. Highlighting the presuppositions that shape different theoretical perspectives, in turn, points to how this study proposes a different approach to the discussion and examination of hypnosis. The transcribed extract and its subsequent discussion foreshadows some of the central ideas in this study. I discuss these ideas and the objectives of this dissertation in greater detail in the remaining pages of this chapter.

Therapeutic Conversations

In recent years, a number of psychotherapists and hypnotherapists have used the metaphor *therapeutic conversation* to describe the special kind of interactions that take place between therapists and clients (deShazer, 1993; Gilligan & Price, 1993; O'Hanlon, 1993; Parry & Doan,

1994; Tomm, 1989). Contextualizing many contemporary discussions about therapy as conversation is the postmodern, social constructionist's premise that there are many different perceptions of reality that can be interpreted in multiple ways (Efran, Lukens, & Lukens, 1990; Gergen, 1991; Gilligan & Price, 1993; Keeney, 1983; Parry & Dolan, 1994; Watzlawick, 1984). When the psychotherapeutic relationship is shaped by these assumptions, therapy is conceptualized by the therapist as a process in which therapist and client collaborate in "a conversation or exchange of stories" (Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 181).

Many of the different descriptions of therapeutic conversation are informed by the assumption that a person's experience is not simply an event but a "conversation about an event" (Efran et al., 1990, p. 44). For instance, pain is not merely an "accumulation of raw sensation" (Efran et al., p. 4), but "sensation filtered through" (p. 4) the conversations people have with themselves about painful sensations or events.

Therapeutic conversations enable clients to converse about the problematic stories they tell themselves and others in ways that will help them "generate options they were unable to realize by themselves or in other settings" (Efran et al., 1990, p. 60). What distinguishes therapeutic dialogue from everyday conversation is that its "primary function . . . is to break up patterns of activity

(including thinking) that aren't readily challenged in other contexts" (Efran et al., 1990, p. 184).

Descriptions of therapeutic relationships as conversations that "break up" rigid patterns of thinking and acting imply that therapists help clients elicit their own strengths and abilities, and, together with their clients, create a context for therapeutic change. According to Matthews (1990), "[T]herapy is a conversation" (p. 18) that has "the potential . . . [to construct] new meaning for all the participants" (p. 18). When therapy is viewed as a collaborative conversation, the therapist's "restrictive role of expert" (p. 19) changes to a facilitative role.

Hypnosis and the Interpersonal Conversation

An observer of hypnosis may regard the hypnotist's continuous stream of verbal talk vis-a-vis the hypnotized person's verbal silence as a monologue, and, thus, as very different from the verbal collaborative conversation between therapist and client during psychotherapy. It may appear to an onlooker that during hypnosis, the hypnotist imposes a singular point of view on a silent receptive person. It is important to remember, however, that there are many different modes of communication, and that verbal exchange is only one kind.

Meaningful responses may be imparted by non-verbal facial expressions, postures, gestures and intonations of the voice (Bateson, 1972). Thus, a close observation of the

hypnotist-client relationship reveals a collaborative exchange of verbal and non-verbal information. At times the hypnotist and client may interact verbally, and at other times the hypnotist may speak in time with (or in response to) the client's breathing. The hypnotist's word-sounds, silences, and intonations converse with the client's breathing and non-verbal behaviors--together they create a rhythmically patterned, conversational domain that engages mind and body in a recursive exchange of information.

Hypnosis and the Intrapersonal Conversation

The collaborative exchange of verbal and non-verbal information between the client and hypnotist facilitates a change in the conversation that a client has with his or her own mind and body. The client's self-reflective conversation mirrors a different kind of logic than the rules central to everyday thinking. According to Orne (1959), the primary attribute of hypnotic experience is "trance logic" (p. 259), which he defined as non-logic. Trance logic, maintained Orne, is exhibited when a person's "perceptions are fused in a manner that ignores everyday logic" (p. 259). Taking a similar view, Gilligan (1987) remarked that trance "gives rise to a non-conceptual and nonverbal experiential state of unity. It is a more primary inclusive way of relating than the separating, 'either/or' logic characterizing analytical, conscious processes" (p. 41).

While the notion of hypnosis as an intrapersonal and interpersonal conversation is the context for this study, there are many other diverse and sometimes contradictory descriptions of hypnotic phenomena. Submitting an extract from a hypnotherapeutic session at the beginning of this dissertation provides an opportunity to demonstrate these diverse views.

Extract From a Hypnosis Session

The following transcribed extract was chosen as an illustration of a hypnotic conversation that involved both verbal and non-verbal behaviors. The selected extract is from the hypnosis case that will be discussed and analyzed in this study. While the case description and background of the case will be depicted in Chapters Five and Six of this dissertation, a brief summary of the presenting problem will help contextualize the extract.

The client, Anna,¹ reported to the hypnotist, Dr. Douglas Flemons, that she was experiencing pain in the joints of her fingers, hands, and hips. One finger joint on her left hand was especially painful and swollen. Anna and Douglas met for five sessions; the hypnotic conversation presented in this section was extracted from the third session. During the first meeting with Douglas, Anna said that the pain in her joints had increased over the last six

¹ The client's name and details of the case have been changed to ensure her anonymity.

weeks. At the beginning of the second session, she reported no significant difference in the pain. Before starting the hypnotic work in the third session, Anna said that most of the week she had been feeling "crummier," and that the pain in her fingers had sometimes prevented her from "gripping," and holding onto things.

Approximately 30 minutes after the session had begun, Douglas began to gradually introduce Anna to the experience of hypnosis. After approximately 10 minutes, Anna appeared inwardly absorbed, and Douglas asked her to become aware of the sensations in her fingers.

Douglas: I would like to suggest that you let yourself float back to the time when you remember your hand, and particularly the left finger . . . the middle one . . . feeling light like it does right now . . . and when you arrive at that place, first let me know by moving your finger unconsciously.

Anna: [Up until now, both hands were resting on the thighs, with the fingers slightly apart. Fifteen seconds after Douglas finished speaking, 4 of the right fingers raised up momentarily, and then, barely curling, the fingers returned to the thigh, slightly turned under the palm.]

Douglas: And now I'd like you to move forward . . . to the first point that it felt different, and

when you get to that point, let me know by moving it unconsciously.

Anna: [After five seconds, right fingers move, stretch, separate, and then the thumb, index finger, and middle finger rub against each other. After a few seconds, they pause, coming together as if they are holding a writing instrument.]

Douglas: That's right. . . . And now, how does it feel?

Anna: [While maintaining the same position, the fingers continue to slightly rub against each other.] I'm holding a pencil.

Douglas: And where are you?

Anna: Sitting with my grandfather on the couch.

Douglas: Holding a pencil.

Anna: He's teaching me to write "a."

Douglas: The letter "a." Uh huh . . . A pencil . . . and you're holding it just like that.

Anna: [The fingers stretch, adjust themselves, and then come together and remain still, as if holding a pencil.] He keeps fixing it in my hand.

Douglas: Were you adjusting your pencil? And how is that when adjusting your finger?

Anna: [Thumb and middle finger lightly tap each other.] Helps me make the "a."

Douglas: And you feel . . . what's in that finger as
you make that "a?"

Anna: Pressure. Power.

Douglas: What's happening to your index finger as it
adjusts?

Anna: [Right index finger and thumb rub each other.]
My index finger points.

Douglas: Points?

Anna: . . . the way.

Douglas: Points the way for the "a?"

Anna: Yeah. [Right hand rests on thigh, three fingers
barely curl under, leaving the index finger
slightly stretched out straight.]

Douglas: And how does it feel?

Anna: [Index finger and thumb tap together.]
Smart.

Douglas: It feels smart. And does it feel as much
pressure as the other one?

Anna: [Fingers again return to rest on the thigh,
with index finger extended away from the other
fingers which are curled under the palm.] No, it's
more sure.

Experiencing a Hypnotic Session from Diverse Points of View

There are many different ways to describe this
transcribed interaction. Depending on their theoretical
orientations, hypnotists will emphasize different

distinctions by underscoring certain characteristics in this transcript, while ignoring others. Depending on their particular theoretical orientations, theorists will explain their perspectives and observations in the terminology of their psychological or physiological theories. For example, hypnotists who define hypnosis in psychological and, specifically, psychoanalytic terminology, might emphasize the patient's age regression as signifying a shift downwards in the service of the ego. Guided by the theoretical construct that early childhood memories are primitive regressions, psychoanalytic hypnotists might anticipate that at some point in the therapeutic relationship, the patient will negatively transfer the grandfather figure to the hypnotherapist. Jungian hypnotists might also underscore age regression, but they might explain it as the patient's return to the Unconscious, where the grandfather's image represents the archetypal Great Father.

Hypnotists who are rooted in a behavioral orientation would not demarcate age regression; rather, they would focus on the subject's observed behaviors, noting the number of times they occurred and the specific environmental conditions that stimulated the subject's responses. The client's behavior might be explained in terms of learning theory or conditioned responses to the hypnotist's verbal commands. Cognitive-behaviorists would also spotlight the subject's overt behaviors as responses to environmental

stimuli. These theoreticians might interpret the behaviors, however, as conditioned responses that are concomitant with the subject's selective attention, increased suggestibility, expectation, appropriate motivation, and inherent traits. Social-psychologists might characterize the client as an "actor" and the hypnotist as the one who gives the actor specific cues. What some theoreticians would call age regression, social-psychologists would explain as social-interaction or role-playing. In other words, in response to the hypnotist's suggestions and positive reinforcements, the "actor" might be described as imagining to experience age regression, since that is how good hypnotic subjects are expected to act in the hypnotic context.

Theoreticians who define hypnotic phenomena physiologically might approach the data in a very different way than theorists who explain hypnosis in psychological terms. Hypnotists who are rooted in a physiological orientation would employ sophisticated instrumentation to record the client's physiological variations during hypnotic interaction. These theoreticians might explain the effects of hypnosis and the alterations in physiology and neurophysiology in the nomenclature of medical science.

Other hypnotherapists, primarily interested, say, in hypnotist-client interaction, might notice the client's metaphorical expressions. They would be interested in noting some of the different ways the hypnotist cooperated with the

client by utilizing the client's metaphors. These hypnotherapists might focus on the hypnotist's repetition of what the client said ("pacing"), and then the way the client was "led" further into trance as the hypnotist ratified specific behavioral cues (body movements).

In the field of hypnosis research, experimental researchers might conclude after reading this transcript that there were insufficient data. An experimental researcher's focus of analysis would be different than what this hypnotic interaction provides. Clinical researchers who are primarily interested in examining the "overall treatment outcome" (Greenberg, 1986, p. 727) might also determine that they needed more data. Unlike qualitative process-oriented researchers who are concerned with small units of moment-to-moment therapeutic change, clinical researchers might suggest that they need to examine the whole "treatment intervention" (Greenberg, p. 727) (all five sessions) to examine and determine therapeutic outcome.

This illustration of some of the ways of approaching a hypnotic conversation reflects some of the diverse theoretical orientations among hypnotists. I discuss in greater detail different theories of hypnosis and the assumptions that shape the descriptions of hypnotic phenomena in Chapter Two.

Theories of Hypnosis

In Chapter Two, I delineate multiple theories of hypnosis by their predominant theoretical perspectives (psychological, physiological, interactional, and associational). I examine the descriptive metaphors that different theoreticians have used to articulate their theories, and the epistemological assumptions that inform these metaphors. I also chronicle some of the major issues that have divided the field.

Haley (1965) contended that disparate opinions among professionals have created a canon of literature that embodies "conflicting ideas and insoluble paradoxes" (Haley p. 74). Several theoreticians have sought to resolve the question of why there are so many different definitions of hypnosis. Some hypnotists have proposed that competing theories underscore the multidimensional nature of hypnotic experience. Others have maintained that opposing explications suggest contradictory ideas about human personality (Gilligan, 1987; Rossi, 1980a; Zeig, 1985a). Kirsch and Lynn (1995) have suggested that while some theorists have "remain[ed] as contentious as ever" (p. 846), and "a consensus about the nature of hypnosis has not been achieved" (p. 846), there are distinct similarities among their diverse points of view.

Similarities Among Different Perspectives

In spite of their differences, most hypnotists have agreed that hypnosis has to do with using ideas to alter body behaviors. Depending on their theoretical orientation, many theorists have explained this relationship between ideas and behaviors in predominantly psychological (mental/mind) or physiological (bodily/body) terms. Few hypnotists have combined both psychological and physiological perspectives in their definitions of hypnosis.

An implicit commonality among most theories of hypnosis is the assumption that there is an autonomous self. The implied self is usually identified with mind and thinking. Depending on their particular theories of human personality, hypnotists have made reference to the self via different terms and ideas (e.g., "ego," "actor," inherent traits," and so forth).

Identifying the experience of self with mind, and separating body and mind are traceable to the 17th century philosopher Rene Descartes (1641/1970). His influential thoughts about mind, body, and self have shaped many of the assumptions that influence Western psychological and medical sciences. Physicist Fritjof Capra (1982) pointed out that since most Western psychologists and physicians have adopted Descartes's "strict division" (p. 164) between body and mind, it is difficult for them to understand how mind and body interact. "The current confusion about the role and

nature of the mind as distinct from that of the brain" (p. 164) is due, said Capra, to Descartes's influence on how mind and body are conceptualized. Physicist Jeremy Hayward (1995) wrote that in contemporary society, "conventional science[s] teach that . . . mind and body are not one but forever separate. Actually mind and body have never really been separated" (p. 68).

Along with Descartes's ideas, language has been an instrumental influence in preventing people from considering body and mind as interconnected. Kemeny (1993) wrote that there is "one kind of intangible language [psychology] to describe mind and another kind of material language [medical science] to describe body" (Kemeny, p. 207). With two different languages, most people are prevented "from seeing . . . [that mind and body] are actually two manifestations of the same process, neither one more important than the other, and neither causing the other" (p. 207). What is needed "is to figure out ways to talk" (p. 207) about "mind and body as one and the same" (p. 207). The influence of Descartes's ideas, along with different languages to talk about body and mind, have shaped how hypnosis is defined. In Chapter Two, I examine how some hypnotists have sought to resolve the mind-body separation by positing a link that connects them (Cheek, 1994; Rossi, 1986, 1989).

Although Milton Erickson, for instance, did not explain the connection between mind and body, his work "was built on

the assumption that mind-body linkages exist. . . . That is, [that] mind can produce stimuli that affect the body, and vice-versa" (H. Erickson, 1990, p. 322). According to Milton Erickson, "hypnosis is a state of awareness" (H. Erickson, p. 322) during which the hypnotist communicates ideas to the patient who, in turn, uses these ideas in agreement with his or her "own unique repertory of body learnings" (H. Erickson, 1990, p. 322; Rossi, 1980a; Rossi & Ryan, 1986). In other words, he presupposed that the body learns and knows, and that mind-body "linkages were both psychophysiological and physiopsychological" (H. Erickson, p. 474).

While Milton Erickson's (1980) ideas about body and mind rejected the divisive logic of Descartes's, he noted that he did not have "the most useful concepts . . . nor the right terms" (Erickson, 1980, p. 323) to describe how body and mind are connected. The dilemma of not perceiving or not having the language to depict how mind and body are related can be avoided, said Francisco Varela (1976), by changing the context in which the problem is seen to arise (p. 131).

A Different Vantage Point

The mind-body problem that arises from trying to connect the division between mind and body is circumvented in this study by following Varela's advice: changing the context of the problem. In order to find a way of discussing the intrapersonal and interpersonal processes of hypnosis

with languages that describe mind and body as "two manifestations of the same process" (Kemeny, 1993, p. 207), I draw on two traditions outside of the Western psychological, medical, and linguistic sciences. To theoretically discuss the intrapersonal process of hypnosis, I develop ideas culled from Buddhist meditative traditions. To examine the interpersonal process, I employ concepts gleaned from poetic traditions.

The Intrapersonal Process

Some hypnotists have underscored the connection between hypnosis and meditation. In Chapter Three, I examine some of the different ways hypnotists have related the two traditions, and I delineate how this study differs from their approaches. While some hypnotists have suggested that hypnosis and meditation share similar techniques, the discussions have not provided an in-depth description of meditation.

In this study, I closely examine and define Buddhist meditation and the phenomenological mind-body experiences that arise with its practice. Buddhist meditators have described the experience of meditation as a different kind of logic from the rules central to everyday thinking. I discuss the transformational potential of Buddhist meditation in these terms, and how the practice of meditation connects mind and body in expanded awareness. I also submit that the meditator's depiction of the

phenomenological experience during meditation, and the change in perception of mind, body, and self, suggests a theoretical way of understanding the phenomenological experience of hypnosis.

Buddhist meditators perceive and define mind and body in relational ways. The meditator's description of the interdependence between thoughts and sensations provides a means to theoretically orient to the relational mind-body experiences during hypnosis. During meditation, the meditator's inward attention to the mind-body processes alters the relation between mind and body and the perception of self.

In the field of hypnosis, Haley (1965) maintained that hypnosis "distorts" (p. 279) or varies a person's perception of self. Flemons (1994a, 1994c) said something similar when he suggested that while in hypnosis, a person's relation with him or herself is changed. In this study, I suggest that a hypnotized person's changed relation with self (and with his or her perceived problems) is analogous to the meditator's altered perception of self.

The meditator's description of the nature of mind, body, and self during meditation provides theoretical access to conceptualizing the intrapersonal process of hypnosis (or the mind-body conversation *within*). It does not render, however, researchable categories to observe and analyze a hypnotized person's subjective experience of hypnosis. As

some hypnotists have pointed out, there is a significant difference between a person's self-report about hypnotic experiences and the understanding of how these experiences may have been produced (Woody, Bowers & Oakman, 1992). I address the issue of self-report and knowing how hypnotic experiences occur later in this chapter.

The Interpersonal Process

I am interested in investigating the interpersonal process of hypnosis by analyzing a hypnotic conversation between a hypnotist and client. Thus, I examine the characteristics of language and the patterns of interaction that are unique to hypnotherapeutic contexts.

Hypnotic conversations encompass verbal and non-verbal behaviors, and they reflect a different kind of logic than the reasoning of everyday discourse. In Chapter Four, I examine the assumptions that organize the linear structure of ordinary discursive prose in contradistinction to the "links and associations" (Valery, 1958, p. 71) that connect the recursive elements of poetic diction. Just as poetry fractures the syntax and grammar of conventional discourse, some hypnotists have suggested that hypnotic talk violates the rules of discursive prose (Roscoe, 1991; Watzlawick, 1990).

In Chapter Four, I review the literature on hypnosis by discussing how hypnotists and literary scholars have noted the poetic qualities in the hypnotist's speech and the

trance-like elements in the rhythms of poetry. I build on these ideas by continuing to investigate the relation between hypnotic talk and poetic diction. I also offer something different than what is discussed in the literature by examining the linguistic methods that poets use to create entrancing poems, and then I use these poetic distinctions to investigate a hypnotic conversation between a hypnotist and client.

Poetry originates not in abstract, separative thinking but in the multiple and rhythmical exchanges of information within the poet's mind and body. Poets know that even if poetry begins in the rhythms of their own bodies, it ends in the rhythms of their listener's body. Those who listen and participate in the poet's shared poetic sounds interpret the meanings into bodily feelings and movements. Poets use various linguistic techniques to engage mind and body in meaningful poetic experiences. In Chapter Six, I use a set of these poetic methods to highlight the relational ways a hypnotist used language to engage a client's mind and body in the hypnotic experience.

Just as hypnotists have recognized the association between poetry and hypnosis, poets and meditators have noted the relation between poetry and meditation. The underlying assumptions that connect these three diverse traditions--poetry, meditation, and hypnosis--suggest their relation to each other and permit their juxtaposition.

**The Assumptions that Connect Poetry, Meditation,
and Hypnosis**

Poetry, meditation, and hypnosis reflect a different kind of logic than the rules of reason that govern everyday thinking. The recursive elements of poetry and poetic experience, the meditator's perception of interdependent mind-body relations, and the depiction of hypnosis as non-conceptual, "experiential state of unity" (Gilligan, 1987, p. 41) suggests a *relational way of thinking and perceiving*.

When a relational epistemology is expressed in literature in the form of a narrative or story, "loose associations determine the flow[;] . . . one object symbolizes another; one feeling displaces another and stands for it; wholes are condensed into parts" (Goleman, 1995, p. 295). While stream of consciousness reflects an author's relational way of thinking in prose, the recursive characteristics of poetic diction mirror the poet's and meditator's relational ways of perceiving and knowing. Buddhist meditator and teacher Stephen Batchelor (1990) wrote that "non-poetic language, with its conceptual divisions, is restricted to the calculable world" (p. 78), whereas poetry is the means for expressing meditative insights since ancient times.

Poet Gary Snyder said that it is not surprising that poetic language "has been a part of Buddhism from early on" (Snyder, 1991, p. 2), from the songs of forest-dwelling

monks and nuns 2,500 years ago to the anthologies of Buddhist poets in contemporary America (Johnson & Paulenich, 1991; Tonkinson, 1995).

Meditation looks inward, poetry holds forth. One is private, the other is out in the world. One enters the moment, the other shares it. But in practice it is never entirely clear which is doing which. In any case, we do know that in spite of the contemporary public perception of meditation and poetry as special, exotic, and difficult, they are both as old and as common as grass. The one goes back to essential moments of stillness and deep inwardness, and the other to the fundamental impulse of expression and presentation. (Snyder, 1991, p. 2)

Perhaps one reason why some meditators find poetry the best language to express and present their experiences is that meditation and poetry are both "involved with the imagination, that human faculty that creates, envisions, or transforms a world" (Fisher, 1991). According to Gary Snyder (1991), poetry and meditation "take one out of the world" (p. 1) but they "also put one totally into it" (p. 1).

Meditation is not just a rest or retreat from the turmoil of the stream or the impurity of the world. It is a way of *being* the stream so that one can be at home in both the white water and the eddies. . . . Poems are a bit like this too. The experience of a poem gives both distance and involvement: one is closer and farther at the same time. (Snyder, 1991, pp. 1-2)

Hypnosis also engages one's creative and envisioning faculties. Like meditation, it is a private, inward experience of entering the moment, of "being at home in . . . the white water and the eddies" (Snyder, pp. 1-2). The hypnotic conversation between a hypnotist and client is like the experience of a poem: It imparts "both distance and

involvement" so that "one is closer and farther at the same time" (Snyder, 1991, pp. 1-2). Hypnosis, like meditation, facilitates a shift in perception, and, like poetry, the hypnotic conversation is a language of altered perceptions. When Frankel (1985) defined hypnosis as "the alteration of perception" (p. 21), he concluded that "what is not immediately conveyed by the brief phrase, 'altered perception' . . . is the artistry, the poetry . . . [that] seems to belong to the hypnotic situation . . . [which] is carried in the style, in the language, and in the ambience" (Frankel, pp. 21-22).

Different Intentions

I have highlighted some of the assumptions that connect the traditions of poetry, meditation, and hypnosis. There are, however, significant differences in these three traditions--they diverge from each other when it comes to intention. Hypnotherapists are contextualized by the therapeutic relationship and by the client's request to solve their problems. Meditators practice meditation in order to investigate what it means to be embodied, and with the intention of developing the necessary qualities of mind for learning how to think and perceive differently. Poets twist and turn the meanings of words and arrange them in rhythmical patterned relationships to create and evoke meaningful, poetic experiences.

The Intent of This Study

Because hypnotists, poets, and meditators have different intentions, I do not focus, in this study, on the hypnotist's therapeutic intentions. Instead of examining the hypnotist's theory of change, I attend to *how* the juxtaposition of various elements of a hypnotic conversation create meaningful hypnotherapeutic experiences.

When I discuss the *intrapersonal* process, I use the meditator's insights to suggest a way of orienting to the *how* of the phenomenological experience of hypnosis, but I do not discuss *what* it meant vis-a-vis a therapeutic theory of change. When I investigate the *interpersonal* process between a hypnotist and client, I examine their hypnotic conversation not by asking, "What was the hypnotist's intention?" but, rather, "How can a poetic analysis of the hypnotic talk help illumine to hypnotherapeutic processes of change? To facilitate the analysis of the interpersonal process, I draw some of my investigative methods from qualitative research traditions that examine processes of change and interactive patterns of communication.

Qualitative Research Methods

Earlier in this chapter, I briefly introduced the case that I analyze in this dissertation, and an extract from one of the hypnosis sessions. In Chapter Six, I examine the fourth of five hypnotherapeutic sessions between the hypnotist--Dr. Douglas Flemons--and the same client who was

introduced earlier. All five sessions were video-recorded and transcribed. In Chapter Five, I discuss the reasons for selecting the case, the hypnotherapist, and the session that I analyze in this study.

My major focus of interest in the analysis of the fourth session is the interactive patterns of verbal and non-verbal behaviors between Douglas Flemons and Anna. The data in Chapter Six is presented in a way that reflects some of their mind-body conversations. Their spoken words are transformed into written text, and then marked or "scored" according to variations in breath patterns, pauses, intonations, and repetitions. Similar to the extract in this chapter, descriptions of their body movements are included.

My approach to the analysis of the hypnotherapeutic session is analogous to Jerry Gale's (1989, 1992) examination of the patterned communications between a family therapist and a couple seeking marital therapy. Similar to his study, I utilize analytical methods that focus on the investigation on the client's and hypnotist's naturally occurring communicative interactions. However, I significantly diverge from Gale's analytical approach in two ways. First, in order to elucidate the hypnotic interaction from the client's "expert" point of view, I include information gathered from two follow-up interviews with the client. Second, because hypnotic conversations are significantly different from most therapeutic dialogues, I

apply a set of analytical strategies gleaned from poetic traditions that highlight some of the linguistic patterns that are unique to hypnotherapeutic interactions. While concepts from conversation analysis and discourse analysis focus the investigation of the hypnosis session on interactive patterns of communication, I use categories derived from the poetic tradition to accentuate poetic distinctions in the hypnotherapeutic talk.

In order to examine processes of change during the hypnotherapeutic conversation, I utilize concepts gathered from process oriented research. These ideas keep the investigation focused on small units of change. The set of criteria that I use to account for the trustworthiness of the analysis is discussed in Chapters Five and Seven.

A Two-Fold Analytic Approach

My approach to the analysis of the data is two-fold. Because I use poetic distinctions to learn something new about hypnotic talk, my method is abductive in nature (Flemons, 1995). Even though my examination of the data is, in part, guided by specific poetic categories, my orientation to the data is one of discovery and openness to unexpected possibilities.

In the analysis, I also utilize an inductive approach. Through repeated viewings, listenings, and readings, the transcribed hypnotic conversation is divided into small bits of interactive patterns of communication in order to

identify "previously unrecognized connections" (Flemons, 1995, p. 9) among the different bits of hypnotic talk. Categorizing and examining the patterned relations between bits of hypnotic conversation permits me to build "a meaningful, hierarchical set of relationships between data, categories of data, and categories of categories" (Flemons, 1995, p. 9). In this respect, inductive analysis enables me to describe processes of change. .

Self-reports

In hypnosis research, most hypnotists have regarded "fine quantitative data" (Barabasz & Barabasz, 1992, p. 173), which is produced from standardized procedures and statistical measurements, more reliable than "coarse qualitative" (p. 173) self-reports. However, other researchers have suggested that hypnotized persons are "experts" in regard to their internal experiences. Hypnotists have pointed out that introspective self-reports about "alterations in pain, visual and auditory experience, memory, and so forth [are] more or less intact" (Woody et al., 1992, p. 7). This does not suggest, however, that a person's "expert status" in reporting his or her experiences during hypnosis is the same as knowing how these experiences may have been produced. There is "a fundamental difference between reports of experience on the one hand, and [the] understanding of how reported experiences are produced on the other" (Woody et, al., pp. 5-6).

In Chapter Three, I use Buddhist meditation to theoretically describe the intrapersonal process or the phenomenological experience of hypnotized persons. Although I have self-reports that were gathered from two follow-up interviews with the client, they are not used as the focus of this study. In order to elucidate the client's perspective, the data from these interviews are interspersed throughout the examination of the conversation between the hypnotist and client. The analysis of this transcribed conversation is the subject of Chapter Six.

Now that I have articulated some of the central ideas in this dissertation, I will address the objectives of this study. I shall do so by returning to the question that was posed at the beginning of this chapter.

The Objectives of This Study

Guided by Gregory Bateson's (1979) question--"What bonus or increment of knowing follows from *combining* information from two or more sources?"--this examination of hypnosis asked, "What new kind of information can be created when ideas gleaned from meditative traditions are juxtaposed with information culled from poetic traditions?" What "bonus of understanding" (p. 72) can this amalgamation of information suggest about the intrapersonal and interpersonal processes of hypnosis in terms of mind, body, self, and hypnotherapeutic processes of change?

The objectives of this study are:

1. To survey the field of hypnosis by discussing some of the major issues that have divided hypnotists into opposing points of views, and by exploring the range of diverse and conflicting theories and theoretical orientations.
2. To identify the tacit assumptions that connect most theoreticians in spite of their divaricated opinions about the nature of hypnotic phenomena.
3. To distinguish the linguistic characteristics that have prevented conceptualizing mind and body as interdependently connected.
4. To develop concepts, drawn from Buddhist meditative traditions, that describe the mind-body processes and changes during meditation that give rise to an altered perception of self. These ideas form the background of thought for a theoretical conjecture about the intrapersonal process of hypnosis.
5. To develop a set of research distinctions gleaned from poetic traditions that can be used to highlight the recursive relation between mind, body, hypnotist, and client. These distinctions provide a way of analyzing and describing the linguistic patterns that are unique to hypnotherapeutic conversations. Combined with a set of analytical methods selected from qualitative research traditions, these poetic

categories give access to interactive patterns of hypnotherapeutic conversations and processes of hypnotherapeutic change.

6. To provide a "double description" (Bateson, 1979, p. 73) of hypnosis by the "blending of two unique vistas, two perspectives" (Abram, 1996, p. 125).

Before discussing and examining the intra- and interpersonal processes of hypnosis, I will establish the background of this study by surveying the literature on hypnosis. In the next chapter, I discuss different theories of hypnosis.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON HYPNOSIS

Some researchers believe that divergent explications of hypnosis stifle progress in learning about the complex nature of hypnotic phenomenon (Dixon & Laurence, 1992). Hall (1989) suggested that the problem is not multiple and contradictory theories of hypnosis, but quite the opposite. He argued that what some people refer to as theories are simply "collections of techniques" (Hall, p. 7). According to Hall, what is missing and needed in the literature is an "intrinsic, theoretical infrastructure" (p. 7)--one theory that will unify all techniques and perspectives. Cheek (1994) claimed that "there have been almost as many theories about what the theorist believes explains the phenomena of hypnosis as there have been people willing to commit their thoughts in printed form" (Cheek, p. 7). The problem with all these theories, said Cheek, is that they are only "descriptions of hypnosis" (p. 7). He maintained that only all-encompassing statements about hypnosis can "qualify as a satisfactory theory" (p. 7).

Divergent Theories of Hypnosis

Ernest Hilgard (1991) offered an alternative approach and resolution to the problem of divergent theories. He contended that "a universally accepted definition [of hypnosis] is elusive" (Hilgard, p. 86) because of improper empirical research designs, experimenter bias, and difficulties in delineating the domain of hypnosis. Hilgard

proposed a "neo-dissociation interpretation of hypnosis" (p. 83) which is both a theory of hypnosis and a theory of human psychology.

T.X. Barber (1969) supported the position that more rigorous empirical research designs are needed, since researchers get entangled in circular reasoning and irrelevant tautological theories. Contrarily, Kirmayer (1992) warned against the scientific approach to the study of hypnotic phenomena. He claimed that empirical perspectives are reductionistic and cannot measure the complexity of hypnosis.

Some researchers have maintained that hypnosis cannot be defined by the invariant characteristics suggested by empiricists and that hypnosis should be explained only in terms of historical and cultural relativity (Spanos & Chaves, 1991). Spanos and Chaves (1991) rejected the definition of hypnopsiasis (hypnotic experience) as a trans-cultural, universal experience bridging historical epochs; other hypnotists have claimed, however, that they can theoretically trace hypnotic practices and phenomenon among disparate cultures throughout history (Bates, 1993; Cheek, 1994; Edmonston, 1981; 1986; Goodman, 1988; 1990; Lankton & Lankton, 1989; Muthu, 1930; Rhue, Lynn & Kirsch, 1993; Rossi, 1986).

These multiple and varied explanations of hypnotic phenomena reflect the many perspectives of different

theoretical orientations (Gilligan, 1987; Kroger & Fezler, 1976; Lynn, Rhue & Weeks, 1989; Lynn & Rhue, 1991; Yapko, 1990). Since many diverse distinctions can be drawn about a single observation (Varela, 1979), and because every distinguishing characteristic cannot be included in a description of hypnotic phenomenon, no hypnotist can claim inclusivity. According to Udolf (1992), it is impossible for everyone to agree on a single theory of hypnosis.

Some hypnotists have suggested combining different theories into what they have called "synthesized models" (Hammond, 1990, p. 3), or "integrative hypnotherapies" (Hammond, p. 2; Fromm & Nash, 1992). Eclectic perspectives and synthesized models may appear to solve the problem of disparate theories of hypnosis, but they may inadvertently produce more confusion. Combined ideas drawn from different theoretical perspectives may be rooted in divergent and contradictory epistemological assumptions.

Milton Erickson, considered a maverick by many in the field of hypnosis and psychotherapy, avoided all systematic theories of hypnosis and psychotherapy (Haley, 1993; Havens, 1985a, 1985b; Gilligan, 1987; Kirmayer, 1988; Stern, 1985; Zeig, 1985). Erickson believed that hypnosis theories inevitably reflect the hypnotist's psychological theory of personality. According to him, psychological theories limit the hypnotist's ability to perceive each client's unique patterns of expression (Rossi, 1980a). Traditional theories

of hypnosis, remarked Erickson, were "a bedrock of hopeless imponderables" (Zeig, 1985, p. vi). When asked about his theory of hypnosis, Erickson would frequently respond that the best theory is to experience trance (Gilligan, 1987; Haley, 1993; Zeig, 1985).

Competing explanations of hypnotic phenomenon, said Gilligan (1987), are a function of the "multidimensional nature of hypnotic experience" (Gilligan, p. 39). Gilligan pointed out that trance experiences vary among different people. Since each hypnotic experience is different, certain characteristics may dominate in one trance but the same qualities may not be evidenced for the same person during other hypnotic episodes. The variabilities of hypnotic phenomenon account for the impossibility of formulating a single theory of hypnosis (Gilligan, 1987).

To some hypnotists, hypnosis is a mental "construct" (Araoz, 1985a; Matthews, Lankton & Lankton, 1993) that can be defined as a "state of mental functioning" (Matthews et al., p. 190), or as the hypnotic method that "create[s] that state" (Matthews et al., p. 190). Hypnosis can also be explained from a subjective perspective, or it can be described from an observer's point of view.

Although hypnotists may attempt to clarify the field with explanations about why there are so many different definitions of hypnosis, these interpretations are equally diverse and contradictory, and, therefore, they exacerbate

the controversy among hypnotists. In other words, meta-views do not necessarily offer the way through dissimilar descriptions of hypnosis, since they are as equally contradictory as diverse theoretical perspectives.

Some scholars have suggested that in spite of the wide diversity among theoreticians, most definitions of hypnosis reflect "three concurrent, overlapping components[:] . . . dissociation, absorption, and suggestibility" (Hammond et al., 1994, p. 2), with many differences in how the components have been described. These same scholars noted that "contextual variables" (p. 3) and "interactive features" (p. 2) are significant determinants for hypnotic responses. Therefore,

it is important to make distinctions between external influences, phenomenology, reports of the subject, technique, therapeutic strategy, theoretical and clinical orientation of the therapist, and differences in potential for a given individual experience of hypnosis. (Hammond et al., p. 3)

Many of the discussions about hypnosis have been polarized into a variety of different issues. Clinical researchers have expressed different concerns than experimental researchers. Some hypnotists have proposed that hypnosis is a special state, whereas others have suggested that it is nothing special. Perhaps the most notable dichotomy has emerged from descriptions and explanations of hypnosis in terms of psychological (mental, mind) or physiological (physical, body) phenomenon.

In the following survey of the literature on hypnosis, I investigate different theoretical orientations and their definitions of hypnosis. Some of the major issues that have divided the profession will be examined. In conclusion, I will offer some reflections on the literature by analyzing the metaphors used to define the theories and what these metaphors imply. I will address similarities among diverse theoretical perspectives, and I will highlight some of the epistemological assumptions that inform many theories of hypnosis. Before beginning the review of the literature, I will briefly discuss the use of metaphor as a method of analysis.

Metaphor: A Method of Analysis

It is because a metaphor has multiple parts
that we can use it to think with.

--Mary Catherine Bateson

Metaphors can be employed to examine the conceptual ground of different theories, since the articulation of them brings many tacit and unrecognized assumptions into relief (Metzner, 1987; Olds, 1992; Reddy, 1979; Soyland, 1994). All psychological, physiological, and social science theories are replete with metaphors that shape and limit the theoreticians' thinking (Brown, 1977; Gergen & Gergen, 1986; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Rosenblatt, 1994). Once we recognize what different theoretical metaphors highlight and eclipse, we can offer alternatives to provide new descriptive possibilities (Rosenblatt, 1994).

Over time and through habitual usage, people begin to believe that linguistic metaphors are reality. For example, the metaphor "mental illness" was originally fashioned by combining two descriptive metaphors, "physical sickness and mental incapacity" (Soyland, 1994, p. 106). The implications for diagnosis and treatment engendered by this metaphor are well documented (Szasz, 1974). Later in this chapter, I will examine the implications that arise when descriptive metaphors are taken as actuality. Therefore, it is important to clarify some of the assumptions that inform my use of metaphor as an analytical tool.

Hypnotist Andre Weitzenhoffer (1990) claimed that when he trained as a physicist, engineer and biologist, the word *metaphor* was never used in any of his readings, seminars, or discussions; he concluded, therefore, that the term had no "scientific status" (Weitzenhoffer, p. 346). Citing different examples of scientific terms used to describe the behavior of electrons (e.g., "potential barrier," "tunnel effect" and "potential well" [p. 346]), Weitzenhoffer asserted,

Why do physical scientists not point out that these are metaphors? Even with highly controversial subjects such as one encounters in the case of quantum theory, this has not happened. Would anyone seriously question their qualifications as scientists? If using metaphors is the scientific thing to do, then it would seem that some behavioral scientists are superior to the majority of physical scientists! (p. 346)

This study of hypnosis is not concerned with the "qualifications" of scientists. My objective is to bring

forward what physicist Jeremy Hayward (1984) described as the "conventionally agreed-upon belief structure" (p. 75) that in

any particular group of scientists forms an inseparable part of their practice of science and determines which observation will be acceptable to them and which will be rejected. From this point of view, then, science is not necessarily finding out "the truth," but is merely confirming or refuting its agreed-upon belief structures. (Hayward, p. 75)

Seeking literal definitions or "finding out the truth" (scientific realities) is a futile path to travel since there are no metaphysical, transcendental signifiers (meanings) contained in the words or in that which the words signify (Derrida, 1972/1982; Moi, 1985; Rorty, 1979; Watzlawick, 1984).

What we think of as literal depends on a variety of factors, including culture, the individual, the context, and the task. People often fail to acknowledge that certain knowledge and assumptions drive their judgments of the literalness of words, sentences, and concepts. (Gibbs, 1994, p. 78)

Along with Gibbs (1994), a number of scholars have suggested that "psychologists, like most scientists, often make the mistake of ignoring the metaphorical character of their own theories" (Gibbs, p. 177; Hayward & Varela, 1992; Olds, 1992; Soyland, 1994). It is important, therefore, to remember while reviewing the different theories of hypnosis that metaphors do not necessarily explain phenomena as they are.

A good example of misrepresented phenomena is the cognitive psychologist's use of computer metaphors to

explain the workings of mind (Dennett, 1991; Hayward & Varela, 1992; Soyland, 1994). What is not highlighted in the descriptions of mind as computer is the vast network of tacit, conceptual assumptions that are central to how computers operate but not relevant to how mind works. Computer metaphors suggest that mind functions like a recursive, feedback, information processing system, but it also implies that there is an "independently existing, stable . . . world" (Hayward & Varela, 1992, p. 100) outside of mind that is separate from the autonomous, sensory organism.

There's absolutely no doubt in any psychologist's mind that the world and the person exist independently of each other. No matter how interactively you describe their relationship, it is a relationship of two independent entities, each of which lasts through time in its own right. The mind considered as an information-processing device has the task of getting information about the outside world into itself, storing that information, and using it. . . . [T]he memory system is to represent (re-present) the world and store it inside the mind. (Hayward & Varela, p. 100)

The hazard of selecting specific metaphors to explain how something works is that the phenomena are often mistaken for the metaphor (Olds, 1992). As nouns, metaphors may imply "static" (Olds, p. 31) conditions, whereas the phenomena that the metaphor is supposed to describe may be changing processes. By underscoring some of the descriptive metaphors that theoreticians have used to explain hypnotic phenomena, some of the metaphor's hidden suppositions can be brought forward and analyzed. Examining hypnotic theories in terms

of their metaphors and assumptions points the way toward a new description of hypnotic phenomena that reflects a different set of assumptions.

Major Issues In the Field of Hypnosis

We should restrict ourselves to questions like, "Does our use of these words get in the way of our use of those words?" This is a question about whether our use of tools is inefficient or not, not a question about whether our beliefs are contradictory.

--Richard Rorty

Clinical Versus Experimental

Some hypnotists have suggested that the context in which hypnosis is practiced (clinical hypnotherapy or experimental laboratory research) conditions the way it is described (Coe, 1992; Kirmayer, 1992). Clinicians primarily concerned with developing the therapeutic relationship tend to encourage and ratify as many of their client's hypnotic responses as possible (Gilligan, 1987). Laboratory research designs and paradigms, however, often limit the researcher's interaction with the subject and exclude the subject's experience from the data (Orne, 1988). Kihlstrom (1992) and Kirmayer (1992) supported the view that clinicians include more descriptions of hypnotic responses in their definitions of hypnosis than experimentalists do. Kihlstrom (1992) suggested that many clinicians make "exaggerated claims" (p. 311) about hypnosis, "either out of ignorance of the experimental literature or out of an attempt to increase the motivation of their patients for treatment" (p. 311).

Experimentalists, said Kihlstrom, include less phenomena in their definitions and "ignore potentially useful insights from the clinic because they are based on uncontrolled observations and anecdotal evidence" (p. 311).

Coe (1992) asserted that clinicians and experimentalists are conditioned by different professional and economic factors that affect their explanation of hypnosis. Since clinical hypnotists require specialized, professional training, additional skills, certification, and mandatory licensure, it benefits them to assert that hypnosis is a special state. If hypnosis is considered something special, remarked Coe, then clinicians who acquire the additional training can justify charging higher fees for their services. Experimental hypnotists are not economically supported by clients since their salaries are dependent on universities and grants. Hypnotists who have no economic investment in describing hypnosis as something special tend to view it as a variety of purposeful and goal-directed behaviors similar to other forms of social and psychological acts (Coe, 1992; Sheehan & Perry, 1976). The experimentalist view may describe people as "acting" hypnotized instead of "being" hypnotized. According to some experimentalists, people act a specific way when they are expected to act that way (T.X. Barber, 1966; Chaves, 1968; Coe, 1989; Sarbin & Coe, 1972; Coe, 1992; Sarbin & Lim, 1963; Sutcliffe, 1961; White, 1941a, 1941b).

Nadon and Laurence (1994) claimed that the division between researchers and clinicians is a "disastrous state of affairs" (Nadon & Laurence, p. 85), primarily due to a lack of "mutual respect and dialogue" (p. 85) between professionals. The reason for the rift between professionals is "the fact that members of each group have, by and large, adopted fundamentally opposed rules of evidence for their positions" (p. 85). One scholar, reflecting on the poor communication between clinicians and researchers, wryly remarked, "Still and all, it is probably safe to say that meaningful dialogue between clinicians and researchers, while not lacking, is impoverished" (Lynn, 1994; p. 81).

Special State Versus Nothing Special

The inability among professionals to agree about the nature of hypnosis has had many variations. For example, some hypnotists have argued that hypnosis constitutes a special state, whereas others have claimed that it is nothing special (Bowers & Davidson, 1991; Sarbin, 1950; Shames & Bowers, 1992; Sheehan & Perry, 1976; Spanos, 1970, 1986, 1989). Sutcliffe (1961) asserted that some hypnotists have assumed a credulous point of view, whereas others have remained skeptical. Hypnotists who have believed that hypnosis is something special (an altered state of mind), have suggested that complex behaviors (for example, post hypnotic suggestions) are "elicited automatically and independently of conscious control and contextual demands"

(Spanos & Chaves, 1991, p. 68). The characteristics, abilities, and behaviors identified during hypnosis are described as dramatically different from ordinary abilities and behaviors. When hypnosis is viewed as a special state, these unusual behaviors are attributed to hypnosis (Hilgard, 1992; Orne, 1959, 1972, 1988; Sheehan & McConkey, 1982; Shor, 1990; Weitzenhoffer, 1972, 1989).

Hypnotists who have espoused the position that hypnosis is nothing special have described hypnosis in terms of expected behaviors. If in any context a person is expected to act in ways that are appropriate to that context, it follows that in the hypnotic context a person is expected to act hypnotized. In other words, hypnotic behavior is no different than any other kind of learned, social and psychological behavior. Although hypnotized persons may report changes in their subjective experiences, the changes are attributed to contextual variables rather than to psychological states (Sheehan & Perry, 1976).

Orne (1988) believed that the "state versus non-state" controversy could be resolved by his "theoretically neutral" (Orne, p. 37) empirical research design that "transcends all other designs" (p. 37). According to Orne, his "rigidly scientific real-simulator research design" (p. 37) can tell the difference between persons who fake being hypnotized and those who are fully engaged in the role of hypnosis. Orne suggested that in both instances, "simulators" and "reals"

(p. 37) act like they are hypnotized. "Fakers" (p. 37) pretend, however, to act hypnotized out of eagerness to please the hypnotist, whereas "reals" (p. 37) act their roles with conviction. Even though hypnotized persons may appear to play all-consuming roles, Orne (1988) claimed that his real-simulator research design can differentiate between pretenders and real actors. The question that Orne did not address in his research is how his "rigidly, scientific" research design can be "theoretically neutral" (p. 30) when scientific designs are theoretically laden with assumptions.

Psychological and Physiological Theories

Even though there is a proliferation of diverse descriptions of hypnosis, most hypnotists have described hypnotic phenomena in either psychological or physiological terms. There are a few hypnotists who have combined psychological and physiological terms into what might be called psychophysiological metaphors.

Presuppositions condition our fundamental ways of knowing, thinking, speaking and experiencing; they define the boundaries of what we are able to perceive even though we may not be aware of their influence (Bateson, 1972; Bateson & Bateson, 1987; Bruner, 1986, 1988; Donaldson, 1991; Hayward, 1987; Keeney, 1983; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). Divisions are implicit in our language--in the grammar, syntax, and cultural or communal construction of meaning (Gergen, 1991). Although

divisive assumptions may not inform the most widely held views in current scientific and philosophical thinking (Dennett, 1991), they are deeply entrenched in the way we think, act and speak and the way we perceive mind and body.

Although there are a number of different ways theories of hypnosis can be organized, I separate them into two categories--psychological theories and physiological theories. I group the psychological literature into three orientations: psychoanalytic; behaviorist and cognitive-behaviorist; and social psychological. I arrange physiological theories according to hypnosis and its effect on physiology, and the neurophysiological changes during hypnosis. The rationale for these groupings, or sub-categories, is to identify some of the predominant metaphors used in the descriptions of hypnosis. By examining these descriptive metaphors, I am able to pinpoint some of the assumptions that inform them. This is not to suggest, however, that these particular groupings represent a comprehensive review of hypnosis schools, or that within each theoretical orientation there is a singular, or unified perspective among the different authors.

Following the discussion of psychological and physiological descriptions of hypnosis are a series of concluding remarks ("Reflections on the Literature") that address the different theoretical metaphors and what they may infer.

Psychoanalytic Perspectives

Psychoanalytic theories of hypnosis have characterized hypnosis with abstract, linear, archeological, mechanistic metaphors. Hypnotic behaviors are often explained as the manifestations of hidden ego states. For instance, Fromm (1992) defined hypnosis as a special psychological condition, an "adaptive regression in the service of the ego" (Fromm, p. 134), a "shift downwards along the primary process, secondary process axis" (Fromm & Hurt, 1988, p. 13). Meares (1961) claimed that "normal mechanisms" (p. 712) such as identification and role-playing become "primitive regressions" under the influence of hypnosis. According to Meares, hypnosis is a "regression to the primitive mode of mental functioning in which ideas are accepted uncritically by the primitive process of suggestion" (p. 712).

Solvey and Milechnin (1957) correlated the experience of hypnosis with early childhood. They related positive hypnotic experiences with the positive experiences an infant child has when cared for by a mother; negative hypnotic experiences parallel disapproving experiences with authoritarian parents. Nash (1991) suggested that

hypnosis is a condition during which a subsystem of the ego undergoes a topographic regression, resulting in characteristic changes in the experience of self and other. These changes may include . . . an enhanced capacity for regression in service of the ego. (p. 175)

He concluded that "transference phenomena [are part of] several aspects of this shift in ego functioning" (p. 175).

Smith (1991) explained hypnosis in terms of the "relational capacities of the ego" (Smith, p. 90). Since the formation of the "ego" (p. 90) is determined by the "outcome of positively or negatively charged relations to objects experienced during the first 2 to 3 years" (p. 90), these "object-relational organizations" (p. 90), or "psychic organizations" (p. 93), define the degree of "regressive transference" (p. 93) the patient experiences during hypnosis.

The psychoanalytic theoretician often describes the hypnotist-patient relationship in dynamic (energy) terms. Energy metaphors imply that the hypnotist controls, while the patient submits and transfers repressed, dissociated states. According to Spiegel (1967), "regressive transference" (Spiegel, p. 1228) is an intense, interpersonal relationship between the hypnotist and patient in which the patient's "executive control" (p. 1228) abandons control through regression to a "dissociated state" (p. 1228). Some hypnotists have claimed that a "subsystem" of the hypnotized person's ego is temporarily controlled by the hypnotist (Fromm, 1972; Gill & Brenman, 1959; Nash, 1991; Spiegel, 1959; Watkins, 1987).

Watkins (1993) defined hypnosis as a "focusing and dissociative process" (p. 233) that enables the hypnotist to attend to "one segment" (p. 233) of the patient's "personality and temporarily ablate or dissociate away other

parts" (p. 233). Through hypnosis, said Watkins, the "segmentation of personality" (p. 232) is manifested as different "ego states" (p. 233). Watkins defined an ego state as "an organized system of behavior and experience whose elements are bound together by some common principle" (p. 233).

When one of these states is invested with ego energy, it becomes "the self" in the here and now. We say it is "executive," and it experiences the other states (if it is aware of them at all) as "he," "she," or "it," because they are then currently invested with object energy. (p. 233)

Watkins divided ego states into large and small, and then organized them around different dimensions (for example, "built around the age of 10" [p. 233]), or around "patterns of behavior toward father and authority figures" (p. 233). Since hypnosis is a "form of dissociation," said Watkins, "it is not surprising to find that good hypnotic subjects often manifest covert ego states in their personalities without being mentally ill" (pp. 233-234). If ego states are evidenced only through hypnosis, remarked Watkins, "we do not consider this as a true multiple personality" (p. 233).

The acceptance of the notion of "ego states" among different hypnotists is apparent in several of the professional publications that support this position (Edelstein, 1982; Newey, 1986; Phillips, 1993; Torem, 1987). A 1993 special issue of *The American Journal of Clinical*

Hypnosis was specifically targeted to address ego-state hypnotherapies.

Schneck (1953) and Ferenczi (1965) used Freud's sexual metaphors drawn from Greek mythology and drama to explain the hypnotic relationship in Oedipal terms. Schneck contended that patients respond to hypnosis as if they were in a "sexual situation," a "parent-child symbiosis" or "symbolic death" (p. 151). Ferenczi described hypnosis as both "maternal" (nondirective) and "paternal" (directive) (p. 151).

A somewhat different interpretation of hypnosis, but one that reflects the notion of segmented personalities, is the definition of a Jungian psychologist. Explaining his ideas about hypnosis with analytical, mechanistic, transcendent and mythological metaphors, Hall (1989) claimed that hypnosis evokes transcendent functions (aspects of the Archetypal Self) that separate patients from their pathological complexes, and, thus, allows them to continue individuation. As Hall saw it, mind is divided into mechanical, orderly functions with the biological brain as a substrate of the mechanistic mind. He suggested that hypnotic behaviors, or the patient's "hypnotic mode" (p. 70), depend on the interaction between mind and brain.

Behavioral and Cognitive-Behavioral Perspectives

Behavioral theories of hypnosis divide and isolate observable behaviors into identifiable and quantifiable

units (Soyland, 1994). The hypnotic relationship and hypnotic behaviors are explicated in mechanistic metaphors, usually in terms of control, conditioned responses, and linear and causal effects.

Magonet (1972) defined hypnosis as a series of repeated suggestions and conditioned reflexes; however, Kline (1962) claimed that hypnosis is more complex than simple, stimulus-response reactions. According to Kline, hypnosis is a "compactly agglutinated state within which stimulus function may become radically altered and reality-regulating mechanisms become more flexible and capable of a multi-functional transformation" (Kline, p. 88). The mechanisms that regulate reality ("perceptual constancy" [p. 88]) are replaced during hypnosis "by a multiplicity of perceptual, organizing devices" (p. 88).

Weitzenhoffer (1989) defined hypnosis in terms of "increased suggestibility" or "hypersuggestibility" (Weitzenhoffer, p. 400). He believed that the hypnotic "suggestion [is an] ideational" (p. 402) communication from the hypnotist "which evokes a non-voluntary response" (p. 404) in the subject. In other words, the hypnotist communicates an "essential idea or ideas" (p. 402) to the hypnotized person, who, in turn, has (or does not have) the "potentiality," "capacity," [or] "ability . . . for developing a state of hypnosis" (p. 405). If the hypnotist's suggestion is received by the subject, it will be "clearly

reflected by the behavior, either at the level of experience or at the level of actual behavior" (Weitzenhoffer, 1990, p. 35).

Smyth (1981) and Salter (1973) explained hypnosis in terms of conditioned responses and expectations. They asserted that hypnosis is a learned phenomenon, a form of conditioning that is dependent on previous experiences with hypnosis, or on a person's expectation of being hypnotized. Corn-Becker, Welch and Fisischelli (1959) concluded that hypnosis, like all other behaviors, is a set of expectations that are the effect of previous experiences, not only with hypnosis but in all areas of life. According to these researchers, people act the way they do because repeated experiences create the expectation that certain authority figures will do what they are reported to do: the mechanic will fix the car; the teacher will teach the class, and the hypnotist will hypnotize the patient. In other words, these hypnotists proposed that hypnosis is dependent on a person's set of preconceived assumptions, which prepares the person to respond to the expected suggestions of the authority figure, the hypnotist.

Kirsch (1993) defined hypnotic behaviors as no different than ordinary behaviors since they are affected "by the same variables" (Kirsch, p. 153) that affect behaviors in non-hypnotic contexts. According to Kirsh, since hypnotic and ordinary behaviors are influenced by the

same variables, "whatever can be done with hypnosis can also be done without it" (p. 158). From a cognitive-behaviorist's point of view, cognitive-behavioral interventions (imagery, relaxation, and so forth) used during therapy to restructure cognitive behaviors are similar to hypnotic interventions that restructure "dysfunctional thoughts or beliefs" (p. 157) during hypnotherapy.

Tosi and Baisden (1991) offered a theory of hypnosis that privileged the hypnotized person's "cognitive control over the affective, physiological, and behavioral functions" (p. 155). These hypnotists claimed that during hypnosis, a person develops specific skills that enable the restructuring of cognitive functions. Tosi and Baisden maintained that,

under hypnosis, the person employs imagery to focus on negative states, while at the same time learning to identify accompanying irrational ideas or cognitive distortions. Next, the individual imagines a more favorable or constructive emotional/physiological/behavioral sequence and concurrently experiences more rational and realistic thoughts associated with the more positive outcome states. (p. 164)

Some hypnotists have discussed posthypnotic suggestions in terms of behavioral, conditioned responses (Alexander, 1968; Crasilneck & Hall, 1975; Zimbardo, Maslach & Marshall, 1972). Crasilneck and Hall (1975) suggested that there are many similarities between hypnotic phenomena and conditioned reflexes. However, they also pointed out that it is impossible "to determine by observation" (p. 11) whether a posthypnotic suggestion is due to being "implanted by

hypnosis or by classical conditioning," (p. 11) since a "strongly accepted posthypnotic suggestion behaves in a manner almost identical to a conditioned response" (p. 11).

Kroger (1977; 1991) combined behavioral and psychodynamic metaphors in his explication of hypnosis. Rejecting the idea that hypnosis is "sleep, trance or a state of unconsciousness" (Kroger, 1991, p. 115), Kroger believed that it is "a process along the broad, fluctuating continuum of awareness wherein *selective attention to relevant signals or suggestions are attended to with concomitant inattention to irrelevant ones*" (p. 115). Selective attention occurs when there is "appropriate motivation, a favorable mental set, ritual, or misdirection of attention, belief, confidence, and expectation" (p. 115) that needs to be "catalyzed" (p. 115) by the "imagination or experiential background" (p. 115). When these characteristics are present, Kroger believed, "faith-laden suggestions" (p. 115) will be "accepted uncritically" (p. 115), without resistance. He concluded, "conviction of cure leads to cure, and individuals get cured in the manner by which they expect to be cured. Nothing could be simpler" (p. 115).

Social Psychological Perspectives

Hypnosis is frequently explained by social psychologists using sociological and theatrical metaphors (Sternberg, 1990). For example, persons are described as

"actors" (Spanos & Coe, 1992, p. 103) who "enact" (p. 103) or "construct" (p. 103) their environment; they are "active, exploratory, manipulating, creating, *doing*" (Sarbin & Coe, 1972, pp. 116-117). The hypnotic relationship between hypnotist and subject or client is usually described as a specific kind of social interaction (Kirsch, 1993). A social psychological perspective attributes hypnotic behaviors to the subject's inherent characteristics, or to the subject's ability or inability to respond to the hypnotist's suggestions and positive reinforcements (Kihlstrom, 1985). Since most social psychologists have claimed that hypnosis is nothing special, they tend to describe it as social learning, and hypnotic behaviors as learned, just like any other kind of behavior (Spanos & Coe, 1992; Sutcliffe, Perry & Sheehan, 1970).

From a social-psychological perspective, hypnotic behaviors are themselves social artifacts. Rather than reflecting the essential characteristics of an invariant "trance state," these behaviors constitute rule-governed, context-dependent social actions that are rooted in the shared conceptions of hypnosis held by subjects and hypnotists in particular historical circumstances. (Spanos & Coe, 1991, pp. 128-129)

Sarbin and Coe (1971) explained hypnosis in terms of "role enactment" (Sarbin & Coe, p. 5). They suggested that hypnotized persons act out specific roles that are influenced by "cues" (p. 5) emitted by the hypnotist's professional competency and by positive reinforcement. Accordingly, subjects' expectations to perform as good hypnotic subjects enable them to do what is suggested by the

hypnotist. Hypnosis, defined by these researchers, is "the social psychology of believed-in imaginings" (p. 4).

Sheehan and McConkey (1982) maintained that hypnosis, "like any other cognitive event[,] . . . basically involves the processing of information by the individual within a particular social context" (p. 251). These hypnotists conceptualized hypnosis as a "relatively discrete state of consciousness that can involve shifts in quality of mentation over time" (p. 69). Their primary research interest was to determine how different assessment instruments "measure[d] the manifestations of that consciousness in as accurate and sensitive a manner as possible" (p. 69).

In their review of assessment strategies, Sheehan and McConkey noted that researchers have usually utilized the data from experimental tests as the primary data; if postexperimental clinical interviews were conducted, they were designed for the purpose of clarifying and interpreting "the mechanisms underlying [the subject's] behavioral performance" (p. 76). These researchers claimed that phenomenological information, or "qualitative evidence" (p. 76) gathered by hypnotists during these interviews was usually considered "secondary information," (p. 76) whereas empirical measurements of the subject's performance during hypnosis were considered the primary data.

Sheehan and McConkey designed an assessment strategy that they called the "Experiential Analysis Technique [EAT]" (p. 77). EAT adapted the qualitative research method, Interpersonal Process Recall, and generated data in the form of phenomenological reports that were collected from subjects after they were exposed to a series of standardized, hypnotic procedures. Immediately following hypnosis, subjects were asked to recall their hypnotic experiences while viewing a video-recording of their session. Sheehan and McConkey used these reports as their principal research data. Since they were interested in measuring changes in the quality of thinking over time, the post-hypnotic interviews were analyzed and categorized into different "modes of cognizing[---] . . . concentrative, independent, and constructive" (p. 90)--which they correlated with specific hypnotic procedures. Based on their hypnotic testing and EAT interviews, they suggested that "susceptible" (p. 247) individuals have specific styles of cognitively responding to hypnotic suggestions.

Because a large portion of T.X. Barber's (1969, 1984) research has focused on hypnotic suggestions and creative responses, his research and theories of hypnosis are explained in terms of conditioned responses, subject motivation, attitudes and expectancies, and the subject's abilities and inabilities (T.X. Barber, 1969; T.X. Barber, Spanos & Chaves, 1974; Sheehan & Perry, 1976). After

designing a series of experiments to simulate the behaviors usually associated with hypnosis (for example, post-hypnotic suggestions, regression, amnesia, hallucinations), T.X. Barber (1979) concluded that describing hypnosis as a special state does not account for the elicited behaviors attributed to hypnosis. He wrote that the hypnotic relationship between a hypnotist and subject is analogous to the relationship between an actor and member of the audience. According to Barber, a "good" (p. 217) hypnotic subject is willing to cooperate with the suggestions of the hypnotist in the same way a "good" (p. 217) audience member imagines or cooperates with whatever the actor suggests.

Although Wagstaff (1991) identified his work with other social psychologists who defined hypnosis as social-psychological, or cognitive-social, his explanatory preference was "for the rather ugly label[,] 'nonstate, sociocognitive'" (p. 363). Wagstaff blamed the concept of hypnosis as a special state as the "singly most responsible [reason] for holding back progress in understanding the nature of hypnotic phenomena" (p. 363). He concluded that hypnotic experiences are more the "product of experimental procedures [than] something measured by them" (p. 389). According to Wagstaff, hypnosis should be explained as a "label for a context or situation" (p. 390) rather than a "'state' or brain process" (p. 390). He questioned the value of telling, or "leading people to believe" (p. 390) that

they are hypnotized, or allowing people to pretend that they are hypnotized. This approach, he concluded, was not a "particularly useful way of enabling them to talk about difficult problems" (p. 390). What is "lost or gained" (p. 390), asked Wagstaff, "by telling subjects that hypnosis is compliance with imagination" (p. 390)? He proposed that theorists should adopt words that are common to "mainstream psychology" (p. 390) instead of using the word "hypnosis [which is an] ambiguous [notion] . . . left over from a bygone era" (p. 390).

Hilgard (1991; 1992) claimed that he embraced the language of various psychological schools by positioning himself as a functionalist. He described functionalists as "eclectic experimentalists [who are] tolerant but critical, [and who prefer] continuities over discontinuities or topologies" (Hilgard, 1991, p. 84). In his "neodissociation" (p. 83) theory of hypnosis, Hilgard asserted that since the loss of familiar associative processes can be thought of as "dissociation," (p. 83) then "most phenomena of hypnosis can be conceived as dissociative" (p. 84). Hilgard maintained that the assumptions that contour his explanatory theory include: a) "multiple cognitive processing systems or structures [that are] arranged in hierarchical order" (p. 93); b) a "central control system" (p. 95), or "executive ego" (p. 95) that plans, monitors and controls "subordinate cognitive systems" (p. 95); and c) "subordinate cognitive

systems" (p. 95) that interact with each other but which also can also become isolated from each other.

Hilgard explained hypnosis in terms of consciousness that is dissociated from normal, cognitive pathways. According to him, the hypnotist's suggestions constrain the subject's "ego autonomy" (p. 97). By taking away the subject's control, the hypnotist influences "the executive functions themselves" (p. 98) and changes "the hierarchical arrangements of the substructures" (p. 98). Hilgard claimed that when the hypnotist causes the subject's monitoring system or "executive ego" (p. 98) to change, "perception and memory are distorted, and hallucinations may be perceived as external reality" (p. 98).

Hilgard asserted that his neodissociation theory of hypnosis explained the "hidden observer phenomenon" (p. 92). What happens in the hypnotic context, said Hilgard, is a division of information that facilitates the separation between cognitive structures. A person becomes unaware of certain data when cognitive structures divide, or when the "central control structure" (p. 99) ("executive ego" [p. 99]) splits into two egos--"participating" (p. 99) and "hidden observer" (p. 99). Accordingly, the participating ego "fractionates" (p. 99) and "relinquishes the everyday reality orientation" (p. 99) while the "hidden observer" (p. 99) remains objective and well oriented to reality. In hypnosis, the "barriers" (p. 99) that caused this separation

between primary and secondary control systems are broken, and the information that was unavailable to consciousness can be reported.

Physiological Perspectives

Rooted in the medical model, physiological theories of hypnosis use biological metaphors to explain hypnotic phenomenon. Perhaps Raginsky (1962) best expressed the fundamental assumption of the physiological perspective when he asserted that psychological theories of hypnosis may have their value, but "any theory of hypnosis must of necessity be a biological one" (p. 94).

Theoreticians who have adopted a physiological perspective to define hypnosis have usually focused their discussion on the effects of hypnosis on human physiology and on the changes in brain function during hypnosis. Hypnotists who have examined hypnotic phenomenon in the terminology of brain physiology have usually suggested that the brain is an analogue of the mind.

Some of the early researchers who studied hypnosis in terms of brain function thought that mind emerged from the brain's activity and that mind was a higher order that "control[led] lower-order neurophysiological phenomena" (Sheehan & McConkey, 1982, p. 8; Sperry, 1976). With the advent of new technology for recording brain activity, contemporary researchers in hypnosis and brain physiology have suggested that brain activity is analogous to cognitive

or psychological processes (Crawford & Gruzelier, 1992; Gruzelier, 1990; Lubar, Gordon, Harrist, Nash, Mann & Lacy, 1991; Meszaros & Revesz, 1990).

Early research in hypnosis and physiology has led some researchers to conclude that all theories of hypnosis should embrace psychological and biological functions. West (1960) defined hypnosis as "controlled dissociated states" (p. 674) that are maintained through the "parassociative mechanism mediated by the ascending reticular system" (p. 674). Hypnotized persons, said West, exclude all incoming information other than the hypnotist's suggestions, which are inserted into "the restricted area" of the brain (p. 674). Spiegel and Spiegel (1978) described hypnosis as a "psychophysiological state of aroused, receptive focal concentration with a corresponding diminution in peripheral awareness" (pp. 33-34). Schneck (1953) believed that hypnosis is a primitive form of psychophysiological awareness that eliminates consciousness by limiting the ability to differentiate between self and environment. He defined hypnosis as close to the most primitive, biological state of organic functioning.

Crasilneck and Hall (1975) asserted that their "psychostructural" (p. 29) theory of hypnosis associated psychological and subjective factors with "measurable structural factors" (p. 29).

We anticipate that eventually techniques of research in the central nervous system will permit an extension of psychostructural theory in terms of neurophysiology. The waking brain, with which the ordinary ego state of waking consciousness is associated, relies for consciousness on the brain-stem structures, including the thalamic connections and projections onto the cortex of the reticular-activating system. (p. 30)

Hypnosis, according to Kroger's (1977) theory, is an altered state of consciousness that connects "sensory or cognitive stimuli with either sympathetic or parasympathetic reactions and effects" (p. 153). The explanation of hypnosis, said Kroger, "involves saturation of one or more of the primary exteroceptive systems (auditory, visual, or tactile) combined with a directed inhibition of normal proprioceptor sensations and interoceptor awareness of visceral activity" (p. 153). In other words, he concluded that "hypnosis selectively rearranges certain stimulus-response cues so that they do not produce undesirable autonomic reaction patterns" (p. 153).

Hypnosis and its effect on physiology.

Most theories that emphasize physiological descriptions of hypnosis do not address the hypnotist-subject relationship. The majority of studies that have examined hypnosis from a physiological perspective have described the effect of the hypnotist's suggestions on the hypnotized person's physiology. Focusing only on the changes occurring within the hypnotized person, many hypnotists have developed studies that examine individual, physiological alterations

or "characteristic differences between persons entering hypnosis" (Banyai, Meszaros & Csokay, 1985, p. 98).

Some hypnotists who have explained the effect of hypnosis in biological terms have described changes in peripheral vasomotor responses, surface body temperatures, cardiovascular responses, neuroendocrine and respiratory functions, and perceptions (Agosti & Cameron, 1965; Holroyd, 1992; Kraemer, Lewis, Triplett, Koziris, Heyman & Noble, 1992; Reid & Curtsinger, 1968; Selitskii, Karlov & Sviderskaya, 1992; Timney & T.X. Barber, 1969). Researchers who have discussed hypnosis in terms of its effect on cardiorespiratory factors have claimed that hypnotic suggestions can significantly increase variables (heart rate, oxygen consumption and ventilation) (Agosti & Camerota, 1965; T.X. Barber, 1966; Erickson, 1977; Morgan, 1970; Morgan, 1972; Morgan, Koichi, Weitz & Balke, 1976). Clawson and Swade (1975) explained the effect of hypnotic suggestions on increasing, reducing, or stopping the blood flow in various diseases and injuries. Surgeons have also discussed the effect of hypnosis on reduced blood loss, or inhibited bleeding during dental surgery (Burrows & Dennerstein, 1988; Finkelstein, 1991; Henry, 1980; LaBraw, 1970; Lucas, 1965) and gastrointestinal hemorrhages (Bishay, 1984).

T.X. Barber (1984) affirmed that hypnotic suggestions (what he calls "believed-in suggestions" [p. 99]) induce

many body changes that are mediated by alterations in blood flow.

Believed-in suggestions, which are incorporated into ongoing cognitions, affect blood supply in localized areas, and the altered blood supply, in turn, plays a role in producing phenomena such as localized inflammations, the cure of warts, the enlargement of mammary glands, the production of blisters and bruises, and the reduction of burns and bleeding. (pp. 100-101)

Researchers have examined the effects of hypnosis on plasma, (specifically Peptide F, a polypeptide [compound of amino acids] that has opiate-like effects) (Kraemer, Lewis, Triplett, Koziris, Heyman & Noble, 1992), and on the white blood cell count (Bongartz, 1990). Guerra, Guantieri and Tagliaro (1990) measured beta-endorphin plasma levels in subjects before and during hypnosis to examine the hypnotic effect on the behavior of neuropeptides. Other researchers have discussed the effect of hypnosis on the neuromuscular system of striated muscles (Pajntar, Roskar & Vodovnik (1990), and refractory fibromyalgia (Haanen, et. al, 1991).

A number of hypnotists have reported hypnotic effects on perceptual processes. Weitzenhoffer (1951) suggested that hypnosis improved eyesight in persons with nearsightedness, and Sheehan (1982) discussed the effect of hypnotic suggestion on monocular visual acuity in myopic students. Erickson (in Rossi, 1980b) described alterations in the auditory processes in terms of hypnotic deafness, and Crawford (1979) explained the hypnotic effect on auditory sensitivity to magnified tones. Numerous studies have

defined how hypnosis affects kinesthetic and tactile sensations (Barabasz & Barabasz, 1992; Brown & Fromm, 1986; 1987; Edelson & Fitzpatrick, 1989; Freeman, MacCaulay, Eve, Chaberlain & Bhat, 1986; Hilgard & Hilgard, 1983; Spinhoven & Linssen, 1989; Wadden & Anderton, 1982). Barabasz & Lonsdale (1990) discussed the effect of hypnosis on high and low susceptible subjects vis-a-vis olfactory stimulation.

Several hypnotists have measured physiological responses during sleep and hypnosis; they have claimed that hypnosis is analogous to the experience of sleep (Cheek, 1994; Evans, 1979; London, Hart & Leibovitz, 1969; Horvai, 1960) or to the state between sleep and wakefulness (Mavromatis, 1987). Based on his studies of relaxation and hypnotic responses, Edmonston (1991) argued that hypnosis is not sleep, but "anesis" (p. 207). According to Edmonston (1991), "anesis" (p. 207) is the cognitive and physical relaxation that "precedes, facilitates and is the prerequisite to all other aspects of hypnosis" (p. 207) since it "enhances disinhibition, appropriate attitudes and motivations, reduced ego functioning, dissociations, role playing and hypersuggestibility" (p. 207).

Alexander (1968) defined the crucial features of hypnosis in the nomenclature of "conditional reflex physiology" (p. 159). Rejecting what he called "traditional, excessively simple psychotherapeutic" (p. 159) theories of hypnosis, he believed that Pavlovian physiology explained

"most of the variegated phenomena of the trance and of the particular psychological set which hypnotic psychotherapy provides" (p. 157). Building his theory on Pavlov's early studies of conditioned responses in dogs, Alexander claimed that hypnotic states are produced in humans through "repetitive monotonous stimuli" (p. 159). The hypnotist's repetitious suggestions, he noted, inhibits nervous functions and affects the "reciprocal release of those nervous functions which deal with the automatic functions and emotions as well as the inner life of the person (the idiotropic system)" (p. 159).

There are few studies in the literature on hypnosis that have discussed the physiological effects of hypnosis from an interactional perspective. Some theoreticians have pointed to the behavioral and subjective differences among hypnotized persons as indicators that "non-verbal elements of communication . . . play an important role in the interaction between hypnotist and subject" (Banyai, Meszaros & Csokay, 1985, p. 98). Attributing the non-verbal elements to psychophysiological variables, studies have been conducted by researchers who recorded both the hypnotist's and subject's electro-physiological responses, behavioral manifestations, and subjective experiences during hypnotic interactions (Banyai, et. al, 1990). Calling their interactional focus a new "social psychophysiological approach" (Benyai, et. al, p. 54), Benyai, Meszaros and

Csokay (1985) defined hypnosis as an altered state of consciousness that is the result of reciprocal, behavioral interactions between the hypnotist and subject, as well as ever-changing physiological responses. Simultaneous recordings of the hypnotist's and subject's physiological indicators--respiration, ECG, EMG, EOG, GSR, and bilateral fronto-occipital EEG leads--demonstrated that when the subject's muscular tension relaxed (reflected in the EMG and EEG), the hypnotist's muscular tension also relaxed; when the subject's right hemispheric activity increased, left hemispheric activity was elevated in the hypnotist (Benyai, Meszaros & Csokay, 1985). Five years later, some of the same researchers were not able to replicate the earlier study's correlations between the hypnotist-subject hemispheric activities. They attributed their different findings to the complex activities in brain physiology (Benyai et al., 1990).

Hypnosis and brain physiology.

Hypnotists who have explained hypnosis in the terminology of brain physiology use many of the same sophisticated techniques and theories that are employed by brain researchers in the analysis of underlying "neurophysiological processes of cognitive functioning" (Crawford & Gruzelier, 1992, p. 227). Contemporary brain researchers have posited explanatory theories that describe psychological behaviors neurophysiologically, making use of

neurophysiological technology. When hypnotists have utilized brain recording instruments to research and discuss hypnosis, they usually have defined hypnotic behaviors based on data from the following tests: "computerized electroencephalographic frequency analysis (EEG), EEG topographic brain mapping, positron emission tomography (PET), regional cerebral blood flow nuclear (rCBF), single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT), and nuclear magnetic resonance imaging" (Crawford & Gruzelier, p. 227).

Kraines (1969) developed his studies of hypnosis and cerebral physiology from Pavlov's early research on physiology and conditioned responses. He defined hypnosis as a "highly labile state of physiologic inhibition and excitation of the cerebral cortex" (p. 45) that in turn "alters cerebral physiology" (p. 45). According to Kraines, during hypnosis, the area of cortical excitation--including the "excited cortical cells, all of the component fibers, association tracts, and correlating subcortical nuclei" (p. 51)--is stimulated. He attributed the depth of hypnotic states to the "level of diffusion and intensity" (p. 51) and physiological inhibition in the cerebral cortex.

Most of the research on hypnosis and brain physiology has examined neurophysiological differences between "high and low hypnotizable [people] in nonhypnotic (waking) or hypnosis conditions" (Crawford & Gruzelier, 1992, p. 227). For example, researchers have examined subjects before and

after hypnosis for shifts in brain activity from left to right hemisphere. They have explained the changes in hemispheric activity as a shift from logical and sequential cognitive processes toward imagistic and holistic thinking (Beaumont, Young & McManus, 1984; Carter, Elkins and Kraft, 1982; Crawford, 1986; Crawford, 1989; Crawford, Crawford & MacDonald, 1983; Crawford, Wallace, Nomura & Slater, 1986; Levine, Kurtz & Lauger, 1984; Macleod-Morgan, 1985; Sackeim, 1982). Hypnotic behaviors have been defined according to the hemisphere that controls emotions and imagery, whereas waking behaviors have been discussed in terms of the hemisphere that controls speech and logical thought (Carter, Elkins & Kraft, 1982; Crawford, 1986; Crawford, Wallace, Nomura & Slater, 1986; Frumkin, Ripley & Cox, 1981; Levine, Kurtz & Lauger, 1984; Sackeim, 1982). The examination of "hemispheric specificity" (Macleod-Morgan, 1985, p. 169) in terms of high and low hypnotizable subjects led Macleod-Morgan to conclude that "highly hypnotizable subjects show more specific lateralization during right and left hemisphere tasks than do low hypnotizables" (p. 169).

Hypnotists also have examined hypnotic phenomenon in terms of visual discrimination by measuring alpha and beta power in the brain's right parieto-temporal region, and in the frontal-temporal and occipito-parietal regions before and during different hypnotic tasks (Meszaros & Revesz, 1990; Lubar, Gordon, Harrist, Nash, Mann & Lacy, 1991).

Attempts among researchers to identify electro-cortical correlates for specific hypnotic behaviors by recording differences in bioelectrical activity in the hypnotized person's cerebral cortex or in the alpha and beta power of the frontal-temporo and occipital-parietal brain regions (Beaumont, Young & McManus, 1984; Lubar, et. al, 1991; Meszaros & Revesz, 1990; Perlini & Spanos, 1991; Sarbin & Slagle, 1979) have led some to design what they have called a "more complex and theoretically sound neuropsychophysiological model of hypnosis" (Crawford & Gruzelier, 1992, p. 229).

With the influence of neuropsychophysiology (the field of research that studies the relationship between brain structure and psychological or mental functions [Andreasen, 1984]) shaping theories of hypnosis, Crawford and Gruzelier (1992) are "quite confident that the behavioral differences related to hypnotic susceptibility are correlated with and influenced by neurophysiological mechanisms" (p. 229). These researchers interpret the correlation between hypnotic susceptibility and neurophysiological mechanisms as "support for a trait view of hypnotizability, accompanied by perhaps even a heritability component" (p. 229). In other words, one of the assumptions that informs neuropsychophysiological theories of hypnosis is that the brain's activity is analogous to thought, emotions, and psychological behaviors.

Ornstein and Sobel (1987) used the catching phrase, "brain minds the body" (p. 7) to epitomize this presupposition.

Interactional Perspectives

Unlike many psychological or physiological theories of hypnosis that have ascribed hypnotic effects to either the hypnotized person or to the skill of the hypnotist (Diamond, 1989), interactional theories define hypnosis in terms of the client-hypnotist relationship (Benyai, Meszaros & Csokay, 1985; Banyai et al., 1990). Joseph Barber (1991) pointed out that

focusing on subject characteristics, such as hypnotic responsiveness or defensiveness, is essential to our inquiry about hypnosis; still, a narrow focus only on the subject can prevent us from attending to the essentially interactive nature of the phenomenon of hypnosis. . . . The experience and behavior of the hypnotized subject affect the experience and behavior of the hypnotist/researcher, creating a feedback interaction. (J. Barber, pp. 258-259)

In other words, hypnosis cannot be ascribed exclusively to either the hypnotized subject or to the hypnotist, but it develops in the unique interaction between the two. Theoreticians who have discussed hypnosis from an interactional or relational perspective have not looked for linear, causal relationships in the different manifestations of hypnotic phenomenon, but have considered "hypnosis as an ever-changing process . . . [and have looked] for the interdependence of its elements" (Banyai et al., 1990, p. 53).

Stephen Gilligan (1987) pointed out that "trance always occurs in a relationship context in which neither hypnotist nor subject can be considered independently of each other" (p. 10). From an interactional point of view, the client's hypnotic responsiveness is not simply a manifestation of specific genes, abilities, inabilities, expectations or resistances, but it reflects the hypnotic relationship--hypnotist and client create the rapport necessary for trance experience. The client or subject brings "interest" (Gilligan, 1987, p. 9) and "motivation" (p. 9) to the hypnotic relationship, and the hypnotist offers "sensitivity" (p. 9) and "flexibility" (p. 9).

Since the primary focus in interactional theories is on the hypnotic relationship, the metaphors that characterize hypnosis reflect relational ideas, such as communication and cooperation. Many of the descriptions of hypnosis from an interactional viewpoint focus on the process of doing hypnotherapy rather than discussing why hypnosis works. There are further comparative comments on relational explanations of hypnosis vis-a-vis psychological and physiological theories in the section *Reflections on the Literature*, that follows this discussion of interactional theories.

The Hypnotic Relationship

It takes two to know one.

--Gregory Bateson

Gilligan (1987) defined hypnosis as "an experiential process of communicating ideas" (p. 14). "Effective hypnotic suggestions or ideas" (p. 15), wrote Gilligan, stimulate "ideas or distinctions" (p. 15) that are already a part of a person's "field of self-identification" (p. 15). Since a person is always absorbed in ideas, it is up to the hypnotist to "identify and utilize those absorbing ideas as the basis for hypnotic development" (p. 15).

Essential to the hypnotic relationship, according to Gilligan, is the cooperative rapport between the hypnotist and client. Clients bring their unique understandings, abilities, strengths, and experiential histories to the relationship. The hypnotist "cooperates" (Gilligan, 1989, p. 328) by utilizing the client's resources and capabilities and by being flexible and adaptable to each situation. "Each is seen as possessing essential resources that when operating together, provide an extra dimension in much the same way that two eyes focusing together yield perceptual depth" (p. 328).

When the hypnotist is guided by the principle of cooperation, trance is not something that happens only to the client, but is an interpersonal, phenomenological experience that affects the therapist as well. Gilligan (1987) remarked that when the hypnotist is absorbed in

"experientially relating with the client" (p. 78), he or she may experience a number of characteristics common to trance: "tunnel vision, motoric inhibitions, and 'body tinglings'" (p. 78). The hypnotist's "externally oriented trance" (p. 78) aligns with the client's internally oriented, "experiential, nonconceptual involvement" (p. 49) that allows "both parties to become increasingly receptive to each other" (p. 11). Thus, Gilligan's definition of hypnosis as an "experiential communication of ideas" (p. 14) is an interpersonal experience shared by both hypnotist and client.

Some hypnotists have proposed discarding the notion of trance unless it is understood and experienced as an interpersonal process (O'Hanlon, 1987; Zeig & Rennick, 1991). If trance is defined in terms of objectified behaviors, it gets in the way of recognizing that hypnosis can be described from multiple perspectives. Zeig (1988) maintained that objectivists need to find, know, and quantify "the real thing" (p. 356). According to Zeig, hypnosis is a "qualitative" (p. 356) experience that occurs between (i.e., interactively) and within (i.e., subjectively) the hypnotist and client. Since hypnosis is a qualitative experience, it can be defined in "multiple ways that reflect complex and changing psychodynamic, interpersonal, and situational variables". (Zeig & Rennick, p. 278).

Hypnosis is a multifaceted phenomenon that entails a system of interaction between people. Perhaps by widening definitions to take into account a variety of perspectives, we can demystify hypnosis and place it into the realm of interesting interpersonal processes of influence. (Zeig & Rennick, pp. 278-279)

Jay Haley's (1965) theory was one of the earliest explanations to widen the description of hypnosis to account for more than one person's perspective. Haley did not discuss the subjective point of view. Any theory of hypnosis, he claimed, should be confined to describing observable behaviors, since subjective experiences can only be inferred by the observer. Instead of analyzing individual, isolated behaviors, he enlarged the range of description by examining patterns of communication between the hypnotist and subject.

First, Haley (1965) expanded the concept of hypnotic suggestion, which many hypnotists have commonly understood as "the presentation of an idea" (p. 274). He pointed out that when suggestion is conceptualized in this way, it implies "an isolated unit unrelated to the relationships between two people" (p. 274). Instead of interpreting the idea of hypnotic suggestion in separative terms, Haley defined it as suggestion and response--an ongoing, interactional "class of messages" (p. 274) rather than an isolated unit.

Second, based on Gregory Bateson's relational ideas about communication, Haley explained the hypnotic relationship in terms of communicative behaviors exchanged

between persons. All behaviors between two people, for example, are symmetrical (competing), complementary (dominant-submissive; giving-receiving), or meta-complementary (when one person permits or forces the other to behave in a way which defines the relationship).

Third, Haley classified the communicative behaviors between hypnotist and client not only as complementary, symmetrical, and metacomplementary, but also as double-layered. In other words, a person not only acts or behaves, but he can also qualify his actions. Haley gave the example of the hypnotist who "tells the subject to do something and at the same time tells him not to do it" (1965, p. 279). The subject responds and, at the same time, says that he is not responding.

From Haley's perspective, the interactional pattern looks something like this: the hypnotist tells the subject to do something; if the subject willingly does it (defining the relationship as complementary), the subject is then challenged by the hypnotist to act symmetrically. If the subject resists the hypnotist's request (defining their relationship as symmetrical), the hypnotist counters the subject's resistance by putting her or him in a "secondary" or complementary position. By countering each of the subject's responses, the hypnotist prevents the subject from "taking control" of the relationship, which means the

hypnotist is always in the "meta-complementary role" (1965, pp. 274-275).

According to Haley, trance behaviors are the result of a) the subject's inability to define the contours of the hypnotic relationship; and b) the subject's double-layered communications: accepting and acting on the hypnotist's requests and denying that he or she is doing so. Thus, the subject's inability to ultimately define the relationship with the hypnotist's paradoxical messages, maintained Haley, creates a variety of subjective "perceptual and somatic" (1965, p. 286) experiences that distort the subject's "perception of himself, the world, time and space, and the behavior of other people" (p. 286).

The "rich and complex interchange" (Haley, 1965, p. 279) of communicative behaviors between hypnotist and client that Haley described is rooted in the hypnotist's readiness to utilize or "respond strategically to any and to all aspects" (Zeig, 1992, p. 256) of the client and environment. Zeig defined hypnosis as "a state of response readiness" (p. 256). Hypnotists respond to clients by being "ready to seize the moment, capturing and utilizing whatever happens" (p. 256); and, in turn, clients readily respond to hypnotists' subtle cues. Zeig further described the hypnotherapist in terms of actively participating "in the process of co-creating" (p. 257) with the client a client-oriented change.

He or she is a companion traveler--not a tour guide who metacomments on the inadequacies of patients who repeatedly step into ruts of inefficiency in the process of traversing the rocky paths of life. The therapist is actually with the patient for a few steps--not merely asking the patient to understand flaws. (Zeig, p. 257)

Yapko (1990) explained the hypnotic relationship in terms of "leader and follower" (p. 64). "The relationship is one of mutual interdependence, each following the other's leads while, paradoxically, at the same time leading" (p. 64). Defining hypnosis in terms of response-readiness, or as a process of following and leading means the hypnotist accepts and utilizes whatever the client brings to the hypnotic relationship. Hypnosis or trance is a result, wrote Yapko, of the "relationship where each participant is responsive to the sensitive following and leading of the other" (pp. 64-65).

In the terminology of neurolinguistic programming, the interactional process of "leading and following" is called "leading and pacing" (Grinder & Bandler, 1981, p. 35). Neurolinguistic programming was first proposed by Bandler and Grinder (1975, 1976, 1979) as a psychotherapeutic-linguistic model derived, in part, from the hypnotherapeutic work of Milton Erickson. Some of the concepts of neurolinguistic programming, such as "pacing and leading" (p. 35), have been adopted and used by different hypnotists to depict the hypnotist-client relationship in interactional

terms (Gilligan, 1987; Griffith & Griffith, 1994; Matthews, Lankton & Lankton, 1993; Slosar, 1982).

In his "locksmith model" (p. 243) of hypnosis, Joseph Barber (1991) compared the interaction between hypnotist and client to the process of unlocking a bolted door. The hypnotic relationship releases the client's "not-conscious processes" (J. Barber, p. 243) in order to

alter assumptions, meanings, perceptions, memories, and learned associations. . . . As a process, hypnosis circumvents ordinary defensive processes, as well as normal nondefensive cognitive structures that serve as the healthy function of keeping out-of-conscious material or automated cognitive connections out of awareness. (J. Barber, p. 243)

The hypnotherapeutic relationship, continued Barber, "creates a safe context for internal change . . . which in a positive feedback loop facilitates the further development of the relationship, and so on" (J. Barber, p. 244). According to Barber's model, unlocking the client's natural capacity for curative change requires that each "hypnotic process and . . . relationship . . . be varied idiosyncratically" (J. Barber, p. 244) in order to fit with the client's unique learnings and individual characteristics.

Although Araoz (1985b) did not specifically focus on interactional, communicative patterns between hypnotist and client, he claimed that his "New-Hypnosis" (p. 256) theory is relational, since it is "the quintessence of client-centered therapy" (p. 256). According to Araoz, the hypnotic

relationship is an "existential meeting" (p. 256) place where the hypnotist acts as "a facilitator for the other's existential awareness" (p. 256). The hypnotist is a "presence [who] facilitates [the client's] here-and-now experience and awareness of self" (p. 256). By becoming fully involved in the client's "current awareness" (p. 256) (without being intrusive), hypnotists encourage their clients "not to verbalize but to experience" (p. 260). Clients are encouraged

to stay with whatever is happening to them at the moment. . . . In New Hypnosis there is very little "conversation" as such. Clients are instructed to *focus* on some inner realities, to experience them with greater self-awareness; clients do not talk about problems. Only after they have had the opportunity to experience fully should verbalization take place. (p. 260)

Araoz maintained that hypnotists should get their clients to become more aware of their expressions and physical gestures by getting them to "stay with it" (p. 260). According to him, clients experience their expressions and gestures "more fully" (p. 260) when hypnotists ask them to repeat or exaggerate the specific body behavior when it happens. Magnifying a gesture or expression in this way is for the purpose of triggering and releasing subconscious material.

Connections Between Mind and Body

Hypnotists who have explicated hypnosis in interactional terms have often accentuated the connection between mind and body in their discussions of hypnosis and in their descriptions of the hypnotic experience. "The

holistic nature of the mind-body relationship" (p. 58), remarked Yapko (1990), is a recursive exchange between behaviors and their "emotional counterparts" (p. 58) and emotions and their "behavioral counterparts" (p. 58). During hypnosis, the person who is mentally or inwardly absorbed experiences a number of physical, emotional, and sensory changes. Yapko said that mind and body are "incredibly close" (Yapko, p. 63). Therefore, he found it mysterious "how the medical establishment was able to successfully separate mental involvement from physical treatment for so long" (p. 63).

Hypnotherapist Yvonne Dolan (1991) suggested that her work with clients who have experienced sexual abuse has challenged her to find a method which allows a client "to establish . . . or reestablish . . . a positive identification with her body" (p. 164). For instance, during hypnosis, Dolan may invite her client to recollect an experience when there were feelings of safety, or "pleasant, sensuous body feelings" (p. 167). She may also encourage the client to have a "dialogue" (p. 167) with her body.

The client imagines that each body part has a voice of its own. She is asked to imagine what story the body part has to tell about her life, what gifts the body part has to offer her, and what the body part needs from her. She converses with the body part, offering whatever messages of comfort and healing are needed and receiving whatever information comes forth from the body parts' imagined voice. (p. 169)

Gilligan (1989) expressed the view that hypnosis is a "very effective tool for reconnecting a person with direct

experience of bodily feeling" (p. 330). Clients who describe their problems in terms of feeling alone, isolated, depressed, and anxious are often "stuck in an unchanging bodily state" (p. 330). For instance, persons may say they feel an "overwhelming sense of emptiness" (p. 330) which they describe as a dark heaviness in the solar plexus. A hypnotic intervention can be used, said Gilligan, to "reactivate and vary bodily sensations" (p. 330) by first absorbing the person's attention and then shifting it across different areas of the body.

This reorganizes awareness in the body from a diffuse yet chronic feeling of a symptom area, to a shifting and alive pattern of sensations in different parts of the body. This brings the experiential body back into relationship in the world, a crucial development for a person wanting to change. (Gilligan, p. 330)

Rossi and Cheek (1988) concluded that a client's mind-body healing and problem-solving is dependent on the communication network between hypnotist and client, mind and body. They explained that when the hypnotherapist focuses on "facilitating the patient's own inner resources ideodynamically . . . cure and problem solving manifest themselves as a natural healing process" (Rossi & Cheek, 1988, p. 79).

Based on his research in information theory, biochemistry, and molecular biology, Rossi proposed a theory of therapeutic hypnosis and the psychobiology of mind-body healing using cybernetic, psychobiological metaphors (Rossi, 1993). To grasp his concepts is no easy task, as Rossi

himself remarked. It requires knowledge in a diversity of fields, ranging from genetics and molecular biology to phenomenological research in hypnosis, psychoanalysis, and psychosomatic medicine (Rossi, 1993). Although Rossi's mind-body theory of hypnosis is complex, it will be helpful for the discussion on mind and body at the end of this chapter to address some of its defining characteristics.

According to Rossi (1993), "messenger molecules and their receptors" (p. 299) are the bridge that connect and heal mind and body--they are a part of a natural, cybernetic recursive loop of "information transduction from environment to mind to molecule" (p. 299). Information transduction is a concept that explains how "something as insubstantial as 'mind'" (p. xv) can communicate with "something as solid as our own flesh and blood" (p. xv). The process of "information transduction" (Rossi, 1989, p. 36), or how "information is changed from one form into another" (p. 36) takes place, Rossi believes, at different transition points --"the sociocultural, the mind-brain, the brain-body and the cellular genetic" (Rossi, 1993, p. 303).

Rossi posited that information from the environment is received and transduced by messenger molecules and their receptors through different physiological functions. During times of stress, "memory, learning, and behavioral symptomatology" (Rossi, p. 304) are learned and encoded by the mind-body complex due to the release of stress hormones

and information substances (messenger molecules-receptors). When the particular stress is alleviated, the symptoms disappear, but when stress is re-introduced, the mind-body reacts by releasing the information substances that re-evoke the symptoms that were learned during the initial period of stress. The molecular encoding of "state-dependent memory, learning, behaviors" or "SDMLB" (p. 313), Rossi believed, is the "psychobiological common denominator" (p. 313) that explicates not only trauma and stress, but also psychosomatic symptoms and the effect of catharsis in psychoanalysis. Therapeutic hypnosis, Rossi concluded, "may be conceptualized as processes of *accessing* and *utilizing* state-dependent memory, learning, and behavior systems that encode symptoms and problems and then *reframing* them for more integrated levels of adaptation and development" (p. 314).

Associational Theory of Hypnosis

Particularly relevant to this study of hypnosis, which bridges two diverse traditions in order to explain hypnotic phenomena, are the ideas of Douglas Flemons (1991, 1992, 1994a, 1994b; 1994c). Flemons developed his associational theory of hypnosis by linking two different traditions-- systems theory and Taoism--to formulate a set of ideas that he used to discuss hypnosis as a relational activity. Although it is not within the scope of this study to detail the many assumptions that inform Flemons' understanding and

practice of hypnosis, it is important to highlight two premises that are fundamental to his thinking and acting as a hypnotist (Flemons, 1994a). Since his theory of hypnosis is referred to in one of the later chapters, it is necessary to underscore the traditions that informed his thinking. The metaphors that he used to describe hypnosis are examined in the Reflections on the Literature section which follows this discussion.

Central to his ideas about hypnosis is Gregory Bateson's explanation of information as "'differences that make a difference'" (Flemons, 1994a, p. 11). For something to be "accessible to consciousness" (p. 7), wrote Flemons, it needs to be contrasted with something else, since the perception of an idea, or object "begins with the drawing of a distinction, with the noting of a difference" (Flemons, 1991, p. 1). To distinguish anything, "whether it be an idea, a shoe, an idea about a shoe, an idea about an idea . . . entails *separating* it from what it isn't, delimiting it by inscribing a boundary between it and something else" (Flemons, 1994a, p. 7). The very act of noting a distinction by marking a boundary that divides an object (or idea) from what it is not, not only separates it but also connects it to "something other than itself" (p. 7).

Turning to Taoism to describe how separations are connected, Flemons (1991) observed that Taoists "never dichotomized their contraries" (p. 47) but they identified

the boundary that divides opposites as the same boundary that connects them. The boundary that opposites "share exists by virtue of their relationship" (p. 47); thus, "in order to know" (Flemons, 1994a, p. 7) something, "we must both *distinguish* and *contextualize*. . . . Contextualizing an object involves connecting it to something other than itself, thereby creating a relationship" (p. 7).

Pivotal in his theory of hypnosis is the notion that "relationships create contexts--they impart meaning" (p. 7). Unless these relationships are noticed, and/or named, they remain outside of conscious awareness. "Given that conscious awareness works by making separations, by distinguishing entities for scrutiny, it only makes sense that which remains undistinguished would lie outside its purview" (Flemons, 1994a, p. 29). "Out-of-conscious-awareness-connections" (p. 29) do not lessen their influence since they "can become the contexts of conscious choices and actions" (p. 29).

An example of how hypnotherapists can be unwittingly swayed by the connections that are formed outside of their client's and their own conscious awareness is depicted by the "interesting dilemma" (Flemons, p. 20) that confronts all psychotherapists. Flemons noted that

clients generally come in asking for help in obliterating or making vanish--negating--some unwanted aspect of their lives. . . . To the degree that therapists sign on to help clients make a problem

disappear, they risk participating in further gluing together clients' efforts for change and the problems themselves. (Flemons, p. 20)

A consciously construed or "logical" orientation to problem-solving might suggest that if there is a problem, then the solution to the problem is to get rid of it. Attaching "no" to a problem, and then deducing "by virtue of its negated identity" (p. 18) that it can be separated out, or obliterated and made into a "discrete non-entity" (Flemons, p. 18) will not work since distinguishing a boundary to separate the problem from "no" problem is the same boundary that connects them. Flemons described it in this way:

The invocation of "no" marks a boundary; it creates a distinction (A/not A) that underscores the to-be-negated term in mind (A) as the necessary juxtaposition to its negative opposite (not-A). Thus, attaching "no" to unwanted thoughts, feelings, memories, behaviors, etc., not only does not eliminate them from consciousness, it tags and highlights them. (p. 19)

The way for hypnotherapists to respond to their clients, without complying with their get-rid-of-my-problem-requests, is to alter their relationships to their problems. Instead of maintaining their clients' connections with their problems by attaching "no" to their problem behaviors, hypnotists dis-connect their clients from their problems by re-connecting them to their predicaments in different ways. Whereas one cannot defect from defects, it is possible to defect from defection, to run away from running away--that is, to stop running, turn around, and find imaginative ways to bring defect to effect (i.e., effect in the sense of "accomplishment" or "fulfillment"). (Flemons, 1991, p. 116)

The logic that informs the hypnotist's way of thinking and working, concluded Flemons, is to

create associated dissociations between the client and his or her problem by first establishing a context of connection, where therapist and client can be of one mind, and then proceeding to experiment with all the changes in relationship that can occur when boundaries can be played with and new associations made (either in or out of awareness). (Flemons, 1994a, p. 48)

The boundaries that are usually given relevance in the "everyday waking state" (p. 42) are the "consciously imposed divisions between the conscious mind and the body, thoughts, and emotions" (p. 42). When the hypnotist "speak[s] in time with a client's breathing, a relationship develops for the listener (which is generally not consciously noted) between the patterned presentation of ideas and one of his or her significant body rhythms" (p. 42). In other words, when hypnotists minimize the significance of their clients' "consciously imposed" dissociations between mind and body, and increase the relevance of their unconscious associations between mind and body, the phenomenon of "associated dissociation" (p. 43), or trance occurs.

A significant difference between Flemons' associational approach to hypnosis and all other theoretical orientations is that Flemons (1994a), unlike most hypnotists, does not begin with the assumption that there is an isolated, autonomous "self." "Associatively dissociated" effectively describes the notion of self in relation to the hypnotist-client relationship. The various practices that hypnotists

use to connect with their clients (speaking in time with their breathing; mirroring their patterns of speech), gradually changes the clients' usual perception of self. "Intense rapport" (Flemons, 1994a, p. 15) alters the boundaries that ordinarily separate the experience of self from others. Just as passionate love may erase the sense of self that separates lovers, "[t]he 'loss of self' experienced in hypnotic relationships and other relationships characterized by intense rapport . . . is really no loss at all, because self is not hermetically sealed inside our heads in the first place" (Flemons, 1994a, p. 15).

Reflections On the Literature

The review of the literature has illustrated many divergent and conflicting interpretations of hypnotic phenomenon. In the beginning of this chapter, I discussed how dissimilar theories of hypnosis have created confusion for many hypnotists, and how certain issues have "dichotomized [the field] into two warring camps" (Kirsch & Lynn, 1995, p. 846). In the following sections, I examine the literature from a different vantage point, by underscoring what some of the diverse theoretical points of view have in common.

Polarized Points of View

In the polarized discussions among hypnotists (clinical versus experimentalist, special state versus non-state, and

trait versus non-trait), one of the poles in the polarized relationship becomes the primary focus, and that which connects the poles often goes unnoticed. For instance, in the bifurcated discussion between clinicians and experimentalists, where do hypnotists who practice in both contexts locate themselves? Hypnotists who are both clinicians and experimentalists may find it impossible to connect the either/or stance of each orientation when defined in terms of opposition to the other.

In the controversy among hypnotists about whether there is such a state as "trance," what do hypnotists consider the defining characteristics that have to be present (or not present) before certain behaviors are specified as trance? Do all the same characteristics, or hypnotic behaviors, have to be evidenced in every hypnotic experience, and to what degree do they have to be present? (D. Flemons, personal communication, September, 1991). In the trait versus non-trait debate between hypnotists, some theoreticians have suggested that hypnotic responsiveness does not need any special capability or competence, while other theorists have maintained that it requires special skills and stable personality traits. When discussions among hypnotists are shaped by these polarized views, then the descriptions of hypnotized behaviors have to be defined in categorical terms of this or that, which in turn limits the possibility of examining the same behaviors in terms of this and that. A

polarized view is rooted in the assumption that hypnotic characteristics or behaviors can be divided and studied as isolated phenomena. In other words, separating behaviors into either/or categories may prevent hypnotists from attending to the questions: When this behavior or hypnotic characteristic is present, what else is also present? And what do these relationships tell us about hypnosis?

Commonalities Among Diverse Perspectives

Kirsch and Lynn (1995) pointed out that from 1960 to 1986, theories of hypnosis were categorized into "opposing factions" (Kirsch & Lynn, p. 847). However, new and revised theories have significantly altered the theoretical landscape so that "the field can no longer be portrayed as simple dichotomies" (Kirsch & Lynn, p. 847). These scholars have suggested that the new generation of researchers and clinicians have "dispel[ed] the myth of warring camps" (p. 846). Instead of emphasizing the differences among theories of hypnosis, contemporary theoreticians are beginning to accentuate the similarities.

For example, Kirsch and Lynn (1995) suggested that the "special state versus nothing special" debate is best described in terms of a continuum. At one end of the continuum are theorists who propose that hypnosis is different from all other states of consciousness, while at the other end are theoreticians who may use the term "state" to describe hypnosis but not to explain it. Included in this

last group of theorists are those who have acknowledged the term "state" and ignored it, and those have completely rejected the notion of a hypnotic state. In between the two extreme ends of the continuum are the hypnotists who maintain that hypnotic trance is an altered state but not the only kind of trance or altered state. Teasing apart the "trait versus non-trait" debate, Kirsch and Lynn (1995) concluded that hypnotists may differ in how much influence they attribute to individual differences (trait) and contextual variables (non-trait), but most of them have acknowledged that hypnotic responses are determined by both.

How ideas are exemplified in body behaviors.

In spite of their wide range of theoretical differences, the general agreement among hypnotists is that hypnosis has to do with how ideas are exemplified in changing body behaviors. Many theorists have suggested that hypnosis is a method, or a situation in which a hypnotist suggests to a client (or subject) changes in perceptions, thoughts, feelings, sensations, or behaviors. Others have maintained that hypnosis is an process of communication between a hypnotist and client, and that the hypnotist stimulates ideas that are already a part of the client's mental processes and bodily understandings.

The phenomenological experience.

Whether theoreticians explain their theories in primarily psychological, physiological, or interactional

terms, most of them have concurred that the hypnotic experience is phenomenological. Phenomenological experience, defined by the philosopher and ecologist David Abram (1996), involves perceiving "the world as it is . . . in its felt immediacy" (Abram, p. 35). Defined by Gilligan (1987), the phenomenological experience of hypnotized persons is such that they "directly experience things as they are" (Gilligan, p. 49). There is little need for hypnotized persons to logically understand or conceptually analyze experience. Thought processes typically become less critical, less evaluative, less verbal, and less abstract; concurrently, they grow more descriptive and image-based, more sensory, and more concrete (Gilligan, p. 49).

Although some theoreticians might reject the assertion that hypnotized persons think differently than persons who are not hypnotized, most of them have recognized that there is a significant difference between a person's introspective report about his or her hypnotic experience and the understanding of how that experience occurred. This suggests that some part of the hypnotized person's cognitive processes is outside of (or different from) conscious awareness or abstract logical thinking.

The implied notion of self.

Although it has not been expressed by theoreticians, there is a tacit assumption that underlies most theories of hypnosis, and that is the implied existence of an autonomous

self. Hypnotists have referred to the concept of self as an "ego," "participating ego," "hidden observer," "executive ego," or "actor," or they have insinuated its existence by suggesting stable and inherent personality traits. The notion of an autonomous self which is based on the perception of an inherently existent self is fundamental to most Western psychological traditions.

Although Haley (1965) indirectly addressed the notion of self when he said that hypnosis "distorts" the perception of self, Flemons (1994a, 1994b) directly addressed the concept of self in his associational theory of hypnosis. He suggested that the association of "intense rapport" (Flemons, p. 15) between hypnotist and client "alters the boundaries that ordinarily separate the experience of self from others" (p. 15). Ideas about self are examined and developed in greater detail in the following chapters of this dissertation.

Benefits of Different Points of View

Scientifically oriented studies of hypnotic phenomenon have lifted the mysterious shroud that once enveloped hypnotic practices. Ideas that hypnosis produced automatic behaviors, animal magnetism, and possession have given way to empirically-based explanations of hypnotic responses. Different scientific studies have demonstrated many psychological and physiological benefits from the use of hypnosis. These studies, in turn, have attracted the

interest of an increasing number of researchers and clinicians who have continued to investigate its value as an enhancement to therapeutic efficacy (Brown & Fromm, 1987; Fromm & Nash, 1992).

Hypnotists who have oriented to hypnosis from a psychoanalytic perspective have advanced hypnotic research in the areas of primary process thinking, imagery, and reexperiencing dreams (Brown & Fromm, 1986; Eisen, 1993; Fromm & Kahn, 1990). Behavioral and cognitive-behavioral theoreticians have moved the study and practice of hypnosis from the realm of conjecture into laboratory and clinical settings in order to closely monitor and analyze observable behaviors. Hypnotists who are rooted in social-psychological theories have brought attention to the context in which hypnosis occurs; their contextual orientation has, in turn, de-mystified the hypnotist-client relationship. Studies that focus on physiological and biological changes during hypnosis have expanded hypnotic research into the fields of behavioral and surgical medicine, neurophysiology, and immunology. Results from these studies have provided medical practitioners with data that indicates hypnosis is a viable alternative (or adjunct) to some drug therapies.

Theoretical Metaphors: Implications and Problems

Although the metaphors that hypnotists have used to define hypnosis have provided a wide range of descriptive possibilities, they obfuscate understanding once they are

reified. For instance, theoreticians who have explained hypnotic behaviors in psychoanalytic nomenclature have suggested that the alterations in body behaviors are due to hidden "dissociated," "primitive," "primary" and/or "topographic" "ego states." The metaphor "ego states" is a linguistic device that describes patterns of human behaviors. Defining hypnosis in terms of "ego states" becomes problematic if they are regarded as conditions that actually exist. If "ego states" are considered real, the logical implication is that they can be reduced (less ego) or increased (self-esteem) (Flemons, 1989). Notions of an "executive ego" might suggest that there is an entity (albeit, a mental entity) that either controls mental subsystems, or relinquishes control through "transference" to the hypnotist.

Psychoanalytic metaphors, such as "primitive modes of mental functioning," "topographic regressions," "segmented egos," "ego subsystems," and "positively and negatively charged psychic organizations," imply that mind is layered or structured, a storehouse of memories and conflicts, filled with competing, atavistic drives. Descriptions that imply that hidden or unexposed events are the cause of exhibited behaviors (Bruner, 1990) might also intimate that a person's behaviors are controlled by mental forces.

Behaviorists have defined hypnotic responses by categorizing them as observable behaviors that vary

according to stimulus-response chains. For instance, they have explained how hypnotists' "repeated suggestions" stimulate "conditioned reflexes" in their clients and subjects. Cognitive-behaviorists have ascribed hypnotic behaviors to mental activities, but they have explained mental concepts in terms of physical behaviors. These hypnotists have described cognitive states (such as "learning," "motivation," and "expectation") as observed behavioral "responses" that are "conditioned" by the hypnotist's "suggestions." The stimulus-response, descriptive metaphors imply a uni-directional, cause-effect relation between hypnotist and client, and they intimate that the hypnotist's suggestions somehow control the client's hypnotic response. Cognitive-behavioral metaphors, such as "learning," "motivation," and "expectation," while intended to be explanatory, might insinuate that hidden "traits" exist somewhere inside the person waiting to be "stimulated" by external variables.

Social psychologists have attributed the changes in body behaviors during hypnosis to social learning ("conditioned responses," "learned behaviors"). These theoreticians have defined hypnotic behaviors as "enactments" and "constructions" that reflect personality traits or mental constructs. They have defined hypnotized persons as "actors," who act on their social environments; their actions are conditioned by previously learned

behaviors and context-dependent "expectancies." A social-psychological explanation might suggest that traits (past learning experiences that are now stabilized traits, like "attitudes," "motivations," and so forth) not only exist, but they are essential for the "actor" to act hypnotized. Metaphors that describe the hypnotist's language as "suggestions," and their behaviors as "emitting cues" and giving "rewards" and "positive reinforcements" to "actors" who "enact" and "cooperate" in appropriate ways like "good" hypnotized subjects, might imply disingenuous and manipulative behaviors.

Metaphors that have explained hypnosis in terms of "processing systems," "primary and secondary control systems," "sub-systems" "monitoring systems," and so forth, imply an interactive, feedback relation between ideas and behaviors, mind and body. They might also denote, however, a perfunctory "input" and "output" relation between various elements in the hypnotic experience. For instance, these metaphors intimate that a hidden mechanistic "intelligence" ("hidden observer phenomenon") that controls hypnotic behaviors is located somewhere in the cognitive "structure."

Explanations of hypnotic behaviors in the nomenclature of physiology, neurophysiology, and biology may appear reductionistic if the connections between ideas and behaviors, mind and body, hypnotist and client/subject are explicated only in physiological terms. Bio-medical

metaphors rooted in the Cartesian paradigm imply mechanistic cause-effect relations between mind and body. These metaphors could also suggest that biological functions control behaviors and that they regulate perceptual reality.

Uni-directional, causal metaphors that are used to explain human cognitive and communicative behaviors during hypnosis become problematic since they do not describe interactive relationships. For example, metaphors that imply hypnotic behaviors are caused by the hypnotist's suggestions do not describe how the hypnotized person's behaviors, in turn, affect the hypnotist. These metaphors might lead one to believe that only the hypnotist is responsible for creating the hypnotic experience.

Descriptions of hypnosis that suggest that a client's "resistance" has to be "overcome" by a sufficient amount of "appropriate motivation," "a favorable mental set," "more confidence," and "increased expectation" encourage the notion that the responsibility for being "cured" rests with the client. In other words, only if certain aspects are present in the client's personality will the hypnotist's "faith laden suggestions" be "accepted uncritically." In this description, if there is no "cure," the client is missing some or all of the above characteristics.

Metaphors that suggest uni-directional and uni-lateral control are the metaphors of hard sciences. These are often challenged by systemic scholars when they are used to

explain mental or biological processes (Bateson, 1972; Flemons, 1989, Keeney, 1983). Bateson (1974) wrote,

In principle, all metaphors derived from a physical world of impacts, forces, energy, etc., are unacceptable in explanations of events and processes in the biological world of information, purpose, context, organization and meaning. (pp. 26-27)

Hypnotists and clients, and mental and physiological processes are living systems. Flemons (1989) suggests that employing "a lineal, quasi-physical metaphor drawn from the world of quantity as an explanatory device for the recursive, patterned world of living systems" (p. 58) cannot describe how the various elements that compose mental and biological systems interact. Linguistic metaphors that imply uni-lateral control cannot describe the relation between elements of a living system except in terms of doing something to one or to the other. Flemons wrote that "the idea of control depends on the lineal punctuation, 'I manipulate you,' as if all the action happens in only one direction" (Flemons, p. 61).

In other words, metaphors that define the hypnotist's behaviors as "suggestions, "cues," "rewards" or "positive reinforcements" may suggest how the hypnotist acts but they do not account for how hypnotized person's behaviors influence the hypnotist's actions. Physiological descriptions of hypnosis that depict how neurophysiology

alters other physiological and biological functions do not necessarily explain how the changes in bodily functions modify brain physiology. When metaphors of the hard sciences (impacts, forces, quantity) are employed to describe "a problem of pattern (e.g., the nature of the relationship between [people])" (Flemons, 1989, p. 60) descriptive limitations are imposed.

Interactional theories.

Unlike the metaphors that describe hypnosis by emphasizing how one side of the relationship affects or controls the other, interactional or communication metaphors accentuate agreement, or "cooperation," between both sides of the relationship. While psychological and physiological theoreticians have underscored the separations among the various elements that compose hypnotic experiences, interactional hypnotists have highlighted the connections among hypnotic phenomenon. Instead of imputing specific meanings to behaviors (suggesting, for example, that behaviors are caused by "primitive regressions," and so forth), interactional theoreticians have defined hypnotic behaviors with metaphors that imply communication.

Interactionally oriented hypnotists have described hypnotic behaviors as "symmetrical," "complementary," and "metacomplementary." In other words, behaviors are not isolated and separated from the hypnotic context but they are considered reflections of the interpersonal relationship

between hypnotists and clients. By utilizing metaphors of communication, these hypnotists have avoided the dilemma of using quantitative values (that are implied with physical science metaphors) to describe qualitative experiences (since communicative metaphors tend to generate descriptions in qualitative terms).

From an interactional perspective, hypnotists do not do anything to their clients (for example, put "suggestions" in their minds, or "control" their behaviors) but hypnotists and clients together create a context for inner exploration and discovery. Whether trance is experienced is not the sole responsibility of the client, since trance is conceptualized and experienced by hypnotists as "interpersonal." Clients do not have to increase their repertoire of behaviors by "acting hypnotized," since they already bring to the hypnotic relationship (as do the hypnotists) their unique histories of phenomenological potentialities (experiential mind and body learnings, capabilities, resources).

Rather than depict hypnotic relations in unidirectional, cause-effect terms, communication metaphors imply interaction. Metaphors such as "dialogue," "pacing," "leading," and "mirroring" imply rhythmical exchanges of information between participants. When the hypnotic relationship is contextualized by communication, hypnotists do not define their role as one of "governing" someone else's behavior through suggestions or authority. From a

relational perspective, the hypnotist's function is to provide the necessary constraints and boundaries for multiple, creative, hypnotic possibilities to occur (Flemons, 1994c). Relationally oriented hypnotherapists may "guide" their clients to "engage in dialogues" with different body parts. Through questions, hypnotists may direct their client's awareness to various body sensations, and then "lead" them to expand that awareness to other parts of their bodies (Gilligan, 1987).

Associational theory.

While interactional hypnotherapists have defined hypnosis with metaphors that highlight hypnotist-client interactions, Flemons explained the "logic" of hypnosis with metaphors that imply relational, recursive communicative activities within and between all aspects of the hypnotic process (Flemons, 1994a, 1994b). Unlike interactional theories that have defined hypnosis mostly in terms of how hypnotists and clients communicate, or how hypnotherapy is done, the parsimonious associational theory of "associated dissociations" maps the "how" of interpersonal hypnotherapeutic relationships, intrapersonal experiences of trance phenomenon, and processes of mind and body.

Using the *association between two ways of knowing and perceiving phenomenon* (for example, Taoism and systems theory), Flemons has examined and described hypnotic behaviors by attending to the *relation between all aspects*

of the hypnotic experience. While psychological and physiological theoreticians have used metaphors that imply separations, and interactive theoreticians have introduced metaphors that denote connections, Flemons has defined hypnosis with a different set of linguistic descriptors. He uses associational metaphors to accentuate *both* separations and connections, as well as the recursive relations between separations and connections.

For instance, Flemons has defined mental processes in relational terms. He has maintained that an idea or object can be "accessible to consciousness" (Flemons, 1994a, p. 7]) only when it is distinguished (or separated) from that which it is not. And, "in contrast, contextualizing an object involves connecting it to something other than itself, thereby creating a relationship" (Flemons, 1994a, p. 7). The recursive relation between "these two operations-- separating to distinguish, and connecting to contextualize-- are the warp and woof of all mindful activity" (Flemons, p. 7).

In describing the relation between clients and their problems, the metaphor "associated dissociation" implies that before clients can separate (dissociate) from their problems they need to connect (associate) with something else that engages their attention. These metaphors suggest that when clients become fascinated with something else and then turn back to their problem, they find themselves

"associatively dissociated." In other words, the problem that had once occupied their interest is now "boring, trivial, a non-issue" (Flemons, 1994b, p. 2).

Epistemological Assumptions: Descartes's Influence

Since most hypnotists have agreed that hypnosis has to do with how ideas are exemplified in altering body behaviors, it is important to foreground the assumptions that inform many theoretician's ideas about body and mind. Most theories of hypnosis are rooted in Western psychological and medical science traditions which are steeped in Cartesian assumptions. Thus, some of the definitions of hypnosis that were discussed in this chapter reflect Descartes's ideas, such as the certainty of scientific or analytically derived knowledge, mind and body as separate and essentially different, and the identification of mind with self (Berman, 1984; Descartes 1641/1970).

The majority of hypnosis research is grounded in Descartes's ideas about the certainty of knowledge derived from analytical methods of investigation. Empirical studies divide and isolate complex phenomenon into constituent parts, "arranging them in their logical order" (Capra, 1982, p. 59). This method of analysis is the same kind of analytical method that Descartes used in his introspective inquiry into "What is body? What is mind?" (Berman, 1984; Capra, 1982; Descartes 1641/1970).

Descartes's analytical self-reflection led him to surmise that body and mind are made up of different substances. The body which is extended in space (matter) is different than non-spatial mind. Radically doubting "all traditional knowledge, the impressions of his senses, and even the fact that he has a body" (Capra, 1982, p. 59) Descartes made his famous pronouncement, "*Cogito, ergo sum*," "I think, therefore I exist" (Descartes, p. 419). Identifying himself with his thinking mind, Descartes believed that mind is superior to body. The notion that mind is self is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. It is sufficient to say at this time, however, that the identification of self with mind permeates most Western psychological and medical traditions, which, in turn, influence how hypnosis is explained.

In the Cartesian paradigm, the "I" (nonspatial, thinking mind) causes the body to respond. The problem of how it is possible for a non-spatial mind to influence a spatial body is known in Western traditions as the "mind-body problem" (Campbell, 1984, p. 1), or, as Gregory Bateson wryly remarked, the dilemma that occidental cultures "have invented and played with and built up language around" (Bateson & Rieber, 1989, p. 320).

Descartes attempted to explain how mind communicates to the body in terms of "animal spirits" (Churchland, 1988, p. 7) located in the pineal gland (Dennett, 1991; Wilson,

1969). In the tradition of Descartes, many Westerners have continued to propose different theories about mind's influence on the body, with interpretations that range from epiphenomenalism (brain activity causes mental phenomena); to materialism (since there is only one substance, physical matter, mind and brain are the same) (Churchland, 1988; Dennett, 1991). Confronted with the problem of connecting mind and body, hypnotherapist Ernest Rossi (1990) has suggested that in spite of all the different explanations, "the ultimate mystery of mind-body integration is still intact" (Rossi, p. 448).

Healing the mind-body split.

Based on his extensive research on mind-body healing, Rossi (1986; 1993) asserted that contemporary scientists possess a concept that will bridge material body and non-physical mind.

Until recently, no satisfactory solution was available because we had no concept to bridge mind and matter. Today we have the concept, though we do not yet know how to use it very well. Information is the new concept of our age that can bridge mind and matter; this is the basic insight of cybernetics . . . and current molecular biology. (Rossi, 1990, p. 446)

Although Rossi's ideas about body and mind were discussed earlier in this chapter, it is important at this stage in the dissertation to address his hypothesis of the connecting link. This discussion of how Rossi has dealt with the mind-body problem paves the way to introducing in the

next chapter a different description of body and mind that is not rooted in Cartesian assumptions.

Stated simply, Rossi proposed that the link which allows mind and body to communicate is "information transduction" (Rossi, p. 447). Mental information is converted to cellular-genetic information (and vice-versa) through "information substances and their receptors" (p. 446) in all the cells. It appears, however, that Rossi's hypothesis begins with the premise that mind and body are made up of different substances that need to be connected through a "common denominator that bridges the mind-brain gap, the so-called Cartesian dichotomy between mind and body" (Rossi, 1993, p. 137).

While Rossi has proposed a conceptual link that connects mind and body, there is still the dilemma of trying to combine the two different languages that describe them. As Kemeny (1993) pointed out, there is a psychological language to describe mind, and a biological language to describe body. Since these two languages have no way of connecting, mind and body cannot be described as "two manifestations of the same process" (Kemeny, p. 207). Some psychotherapists have intimated that an alternative approach to traditional and pervasive ideas rooted in separation is to consider the mind-body division a "socially negotiated interpretation rather than a reflection of an objective reality" (Griffith & Griffith, 1993, p. 311). If the

separation between mind and body is only a belief and not a reality, then the mind-body division can be re-negotiated, or re-experienced as connected. Building on the ideas of Western language philosophers, Griffith and Griffith have suggested that concepts of self, mind, and body are self-stories or self-narratives that are formed through social relations with others. The interpretation of these stories (concepts about self, body, and mind) can be changed through constructing new narratives, or by developing new "plot lines" (Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 182).

From A Different Vantage Point

In his discussion of the mind-body problem, Francisco Varela (1976) pointed out that a change in the perception of the mind-body relation requires a change in "the context in which the problem is seen to arise" (Varela, p. 131). When assumptions reflect Cartesian dualities, body and mind are described in spatial terms, in the terminology of substances and non-substances. The mind-body problem that arises from trying to connect these divisions was avoided in this study by adopting Varela's advice to change the context of the problem. This was done by employing descriptions of body-mind that reflect a way of knowing (an epistemology) that is not dependent on Cartesian reasoning.

The Focus of This Study

Having reviewed the literature on hypnosis and establishing that mind and body are central to its explanation, I am now going to diverge from the theories, metaphors, and assumptions discussed in this chapter in the following ways. Instead of attempting to resolve separations by hypothesizing a link that connects two different substances, or by constructing new narratives to re-negotiate mind-body concepts, I have discussed hypnosis by drawing on traditions that are different from Western psychological, medical, and linguistic sciences.

1. I have examined the phenomenological experience of mind-body from a Buddhist meditator's perspective. This discussion was used for a theoretical conjecture about the intrapersonal, phenomenological experience of hypnosis.

2. I have examined the mind-body relationship from a poet's perspective. This discussion was used to develop researchable categories with which to investigate and describe the interpersonal process of hypnosis. I have used these categories to study and analyze a transcribed hypnotherapeutic session by focusing on the interactive linguistic patterns of communication between a hypnotist and client.

In the next chapter, I explore Buddhist meditation, the phenomenological experience, and the intra-personal process

of hypnosis. In the chapters that follow Chapter Three, I investigate and analyze the interpersonal process. The concluding chapter of this dissertation brings the Buddhist meditator and poet together in order to see what "bonus of understanding" (Bateson, 1979, p. 72) about hypnosis can arise from combining information from these two unique points of view.

CHAPTER THREE

BUDDHIST MEDITATION

In the last chapter, different theories of hypnosis were discussed by highlighting the metaphors hypnotists have used to describe hypnotic phenomena. I suggested that in spite of their dissimilar definitions of hypnosis (hypnotic experience), most theoreticians have agreed that hypnosis has to do with how ideas are represented in changing body behaviors. I also suggested that most theories of hypnosis imply the existence of an autonomous self.

In this chapter, I examine mind, body, and the notion of self from a Buddhist meditator's perspective. I will use the ideas developed in this chapter to provide a theoretical conjecture about the intrapersonal process of hypnosis. While these ideas do not provide research categories with which to investigate a hypnotized person's subjective hypnotic experience, they do suggest a hypothetical way of orienting to the phenomenological experience of hypnosis.

Since Buddhist meditators do not directly address the kind of therapeutic issues that are specifically targeted for change in the hypnotherapeutic context, their descriptions of meditative experiences can not be used to research the process of hypnotherapeutic change. However, I intend to return to the issue of therapeutic change in the last chapter of this dissertation after studying the interpersonal process of hypnosis.

This chapter begins with a survey of some of the different ways hypnotists have discussed hypnosis and meditation. An introduction to Buddhism and Buddhist ideas about the formation of perceptions follows the literature review. Meditation is discussed as one of several self-reflective methods that develop concentration, expand awareness, and alter perceptions. The introductory discussion of Buddhism is followed by an in-depth examination of one particular method of meditation or mental training, an approach called mindful meditation. The transformational potential of mindful meditation is examined, and the Buddhist depiction of the patterned cycle of conditioned thoughts and actions is described. In the conclusion, I discuss how these ideas might be utilized as a way to theoretically conceptualize the phenomenological experience of hypnosis.

A Review of the Literature: Hypnosis and Meditation

In the last thirty years, increased interest among Western psychotherapists in the therapeutic benefits of Eastern meditation practices has generated a number of research studies (Berwick & Oziel, 1973; Goleman, 1988; Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Locke & Colligan, 1986; Moyers, 1993; Murphy, 1993; Pelletier, 1992; Shapiro, 1980; Tart, 1969/1990). Some researchers have made the claim that hypnosis and meditation share specific characteristics. For example, meditation and hypnosis are both self-induced (S.

Fisher, 1991; King & Citrenbaum, 1993; Meares, 1982-1983; Sanders, 1991) and they use similar focusing techniques such as concentration on the breath (Alman & Lambrou, 1992; King & Citrenbaum, 1993), or on a specific object (Deikman, 1990; Davidson & Goleman, 1977), or phrase (Sanders, 1991).

Several hypnotists have recorded that hypnosis and meditation have similar effects on the body. For instance, meditation and hypnosis induce relaxation (Benson, 1975; 1991; Edmonston, 1991; Sachs, 1982; Udolf, 1992) or other specific physiological indices, such as alterations in autonomic variables, muscular tension, EEG and breathing (Brown, 1977; Fromm, 1977; Meares, 1982-1983; Naruse, 1982; Van Nuys, 1973; Walrath & Hamilton, 1975).

King and Citrenbaum (1993) have suggested that self-hypnosis and meditation are the same:

While many teachers of meditation like to claim that meditation and trance are fundamentally different, meditation does produce a trance experience. The intention of the experience may be different for a person practicing Zen meditation as opposed to a patient doing a prescribed self-hypnotic experience as part of his or her psychological or medical treatment, but both people still experience trances. (King & Citrenbaum, p. 8)

In his early work with Milton Erickson, Ernest Rossi (Erickson, Rossi & Rossi, 1976) compared therapeutic hypnosis with meditation, as defined by its Latin root, *meditari*, which, according to Rossi, means "being moved to the center" (Erickson et al., p. 267). Rossi suggested that meditation and hypnosis are instances of when "passive

consciousness" (p. 267) is moved to the center, to the unconscious "where it . . . achieve[s] wholeness" (p. 267).

Instead of distinguishing similarities between hypnosis and meditation, some hypnotists have underscored the differences between them. For instance, Shapiro (1984) wrote that meditative states are usually ineffable, beyond verbal description, while hypnotic states are not. Sanders (1991) concluded that meditators are more interested in communicating with gods, or with practicing selflessness than they are with specific ideations, while hypnosis emphasizes the content of thought, or the meaning of "images, dreams, affects, reveries" (Sanders, p. 22). Hilgard and Hilgard (1983) refused to compare what they perceived to be very different phenomena. These researchers believed that when hypnosis is compared with Eastern religions and "such offshoots as secular meditation groups" (Hilgard & Hilgard, p. 189) it threatens the scientific status of hypnotic research.

Contrary to Hilgard and Hilgard's counsel, Rossi (Rossi & Cheek, 1988), in his more recent research, not only hypothesized about the connection between hypnosis and meditation, but proposed that researchers empirically measure them in terms of ultradian rhythms or psychophysiological rest-phase behavior rhythms. Future research, suggested Rossi, could focus on meditators in order to study the hypnotic technique of ideodynamic

signaling (Rossi & Cheek, 1988). Walters and Havens (1993) adopted a different orientation than Rossi. Instead of studying meditators to learn about hypnosis, these hypnotists suggested that hypnosis (what they call "hypnotic scripts" or guided meditations) could be used to stimulate profound meditative states (that is, transcendental enlightenment, mystical cosmic consciousness or complete detachment of body from mind).

Wolinsky (1991) claimed that ordinary consciousness is equivalent to a trance state. Complete dispassion or non-identification with the body, mind, and world--what he called the "no-trance state" (Wolinsky, p. 35)--was comparable to therapeutic, hypnotic trance. Wolinsky based his theory of trance and "no-trance" on his reading of Hindu philosophy and cosmology. Hindu texts have described Maya or Delusion as the trance-like state that prevents humans from realizing their transcendental, divine essence. For Wolinsky, therapeutic hypnotic trance (metaphysical detachment from the ordinary consciousness of mind and body) is the same as Eastern meditation.

The natural state, the no-trance state, the therapeutic trance state, and meditative state are all different words describing a similar phenomenological experience. This natural state has no boundaries that separate the individual from the rest of the cosmos. Pain and problems arise only when we leave this state and identify ourselves with limiting ideas. (Wolinsky, p. 39)

From this discussion on hypnosis and meditation, one might assume that all forms of meditation are fundamentally

the same. The descriptions generally found in the literature define it in terms of techniques (breathing, one-pointed concentration) and/or effects (passivity, dispassion, calmness, a mystical-transcendental-cosmic state, a detached-from-body-and-mind trance-like condition). Unique to the literature in hypnosis was a study by Davidson and Goleman (1977) that reviewed the literature on meditation and hypnosis in terms of the functional role of "attentional processes" (Davidson & Goleman, p. 291). What is unusual about this study is that these researchers distinguished between two different types of meditation, concentrative and mindful. They defined *concentrative meditation* as "focusing . . . attention on a single-target percept" (p. 297), and *mindful meditation* as "the maintenance of a particular attentional stance toward all objects of awareness" (p. 297). There is no indication in the literature, however, that different types of meditative methods promote different experiences.

Reflections on the Literature

Perhaps one reason why most of the literature on hypnosis provides only partial descriptions of meditation is because meditation research "has been enormously crude in this country" (Kornfield, 1990, p. 9). The American Buddhist teacher and psychologist, Jack Kornfield (1990), remarked,

Early on, [research] focused a great deal on psychophysiological measurements. Most of it assumed that meditation was a single state, which is a fundamental error. There is no such thing as a single

meditative state. There are probably a hundred or a thousand different meditative states. You don't study the ocean by looking at a small part of San Francisco Bay. There are many states, they are induced in a variety of different ways, and they have different kinds of colors, flavors, levels and effects. (Kornfield, p. 9)

In Buddhist traditions, meditation is the primary method for examining human psychology, and the essential practice for mental well-being (Goleman, 1991). According to Buddhist traditions, the best approach to mental health is "the sustained effort to retrain attentional, perceptual habits" (Goleman, p. 92). The emphasis in Buddhist practices is not on the effects of meditation that may or may not occur but on the protracted practice of learning how to think differently. Many Western psychotherapists, however, conceptualize meditation in causal terms; they tend to focus on how meditation causes changes in mental and physiological responses (Berwick & Oziel, 1973; Claxton, 1987; Clifford, 1984; Goleman, 1988; Shapiro & Walsh, 1984; West, 1987).

This review of the literature indicates that a number of hypnotists have noted significant parallels between hypnotic methods and meditative techniques. Most hypnotists have not defined, however, which meditation they are discussing, despite there being a "panoply of techniques, schools, [and] traditions" (Goleman, 1988, p. xxi). Comparing and contrasting hypnosis with partial and

sometimes inaccurate descriptions of meditation does not necessarily elucidate hypnosis, but, indeed, may obfuscate it.

Buddhism

Buddhism originated in India approximately 2,500 years ago with the teachings of Gautama Sakyamuni, the historical Buddha. Sakya was the name of the region, and the particular tribe of people into which Gautama (the name given at birth) was born. "Muni" in Sakyamuni, is the Sanskrit word for scholar or sage. "Buddha" means the "awakened one" (Schuhmacher & Woerner, 1989, p. 46), or the one who is free from the habitual patterns of thinking and acting that perpetuate suffering. The life and teachings of Gautama Sakyamuni, the Buddha, inspired many people for centuries to practice the dharma, or the way of the Awakened Ones.

As the Buddha's teachings (or *dharma*) spread through India and the world, they were adapted to each region's unique cultural and historical situation (Cho Yang, 1991; Dumoulin, 1988; Harvey, 1990; Kitagawa, 1989; Snelling, 1991; Thurman, 1991). The different interpretations of the *dharma* developed into variant schools of Buddhism. While all the schools are rooted in the fundamental teachings of the historical Buddha, they each emphasize different aspects of the *dharma*.

Schools of Buddhism

For instance, in China, the school of Ch'an (which in Japan, became the school of Zen) stressed concentrated meditation, koan study, and mind-to-mind transmission from teacher to student. In Southeast Asia, the *Theravadin* tradition (which is rooted in the earliest recordings of the historical Buddha's teachings) emphasized study, monasticism, and meditation. Tibetan Buddhist schools accentuated the development of logical reasoning and scholarship, *mantra* (the Sanskrit word for repetition of a sacred phrase), Hatha Yoga, and meditation.

There are further description of some of these practices (e.g., koan study, Hatha Yoga, and meditation) later in this chapter. However, it is important to underscore at this point that despite the interpretive and cultural variations, most of the core doctrines that inform different Buddhist schools (and practices) remain unchanged today (Dumoulin, 1988; Fields, 1992; Harvey, 1990). An example that highlights the uniformity of fundamental precepts throughout diverse traditions is Buddhist meditation. Regardless of the distinct cultures where Buddhism is practiced, the two major systems of meditation taught by most schools are the same meditations that the Buddha taught 2,500 years ago.

The practice of *Samatha* (the Sanskrit word for serenity) meditations develops concentration, whereas

Vipassana (the Sanskrit word for insight) meditations cultivate understanding and wisdom. In the Buddha's system of meditation, however, serenity practices are subordinated to the practices of insight. In serenity meditations, meditators concentrate on a single object which is "abstracted from actual experience" (Nanamoli & Bodhi, 1995, p. 35). In insight meditations, meditators endeavor to "contemplate the ever-shifting flux of experience itself in order to penetrate through to the . . . nature of bodily and mental phenomena" (Nanamoli & Bodhi, p. 35). The Buddha experienced during his own meditations that the most advanced stages of serenity meditations are insufficient for changing the fixed patterns of thought and action that are at the root of suffering. Therefore, he incorporated some of the serenity techniques into the practice of insight meditation. According to the Buddha, one is awakened from suffering through insight into the changing nature of phenomena.

Insight meditation (or the meditation that leads to insightful awareness) is practiced by most Buddhist traditions under the rubric of *mindful* meditation. Mindful meditation, and the insights gleaned from its practice, are examined in greater detail throughout this chapter.

American Buddhism

In the last forty years, American Buddhism has gradually and consistently been "hammering out" (Fields, p.

379) its own unique shape, with a particular emphasis on practices that mirror different aspects of the culture. American Buddhist teachers reflect the concerns of their society by integrating their teachings with contemporary psychological, feminist, and ecological perspectives (Fields, 1992; Gross, 1993; Halifax, 1993; Klein, 1995; Tonkinson, 1995; Tsomo, 1995; Tworikov, 1989).

Especially relevant for this study of hypnosis is the literature that bridges Western psychotherapy and Buddhist psychology. Psychotherapists who have examined the psychological underpinnings of traditional Buddhist texts have suggested that the ancient techniques of meditation, analytical inquiry, and explications of human personhood are especially relevant to the psychotherapeutic context (Carrington & Ephron, 1975; Claxton, 1987; Crook & Fontana, 1990; Brown, 1986; Engler, 1986; Epstein & Lieff, 1986; Fenner, 1995; Kasamatsu & Hirai, 1973; Katz, 1983; Keefe, 1975; Kondo, 1960; Lesh, 1970; Maupin, 1962, 1990; Russell, 1986; Shafii, 1973; Shapiro, 1984; Shapiro & Zifferblatt, 1976; Stroebel & Glueck, 1977; Walrath & Hamilton, 1975; Walsh, 1993).

The Formation and Change of Perception

Most Western psychotherapists posit the existence of a self or ego. According to Buddhists, it is common among all human beings to experience an "authentic sense of self" (Hayward & Varela, 1992, p. 112). They warn, however, that

this sense of self should not be mistaken for an "inherently existent self" (Hayward & Varela, p. 112), since one of the central teachings of Buddhism is that "there is no coherent or essential self" (p. 109). Misperceiving what feels like a self for a real, autonomous self is concomitant with a particular way of thinking and perceiving phenomena (Deikman, 1982; Fontana, 1986; Leifer, 1987; West, 1987). For example, when Descartes identified himself as *res cogitans*, a thinking "thing," he distinguished himself as logical, abstract thought; he objectified phenomena and demarcated them as separate from himself, the one who perceives. From a Buddhist's perspective, what Descartes identified as his autonomous self was the observing aspect of his mind. Buddhist teachings describe this reflective capacity of thought as "the source of the sense of personal identity or the conception of self" (Kalupahana, 1987, p. 30).

In Buddhist traditions, the investigation of the nature of self requires the development of one's ability to perceive differently from the "conceptualized" (Cleary, 1990, p. xiii) and "imagined" (Cleary, p. xiii) perceptions (that reflect separative, abstract reasoning). Without cultivating a different method for perceiving phenomena, mind is inhibited from "the freedom and . . . development of which it is potentially capable" (Cleary, pp. xii-xiii).

Abstract thinking restricts "the range of experience available to the perceiver" (Cleary, pp. xii-xiii).

Parallel with all Buddhist philosophical discussions are descriptions of various practical methods that develop concentration and expand awareness. In most Western traditions, concentration usually implies mental focus, whereas in Buddhist traditions, concentration denotes the activation of mind *and* body. For instance, Hatha Yoga (the union of mind and body through concentration on the breath and specific physical postures) is practiced by some Tibetan schools of Buddhism as an aid to meditation. When practiced correctly, Hatha Yoga harmonizes and equalizes various mind-body functions, while expanding introspective capabilities (Cho Yang, 1991; Dumoulin, 1990/1992; Evans-Wentz, 1958; Feuerstein & Bodian, 1993; Kutz, Borysenko & Benson, 1985; Mishra, 1987).

Chinese and Japanese schools of Buddhism utilize koan study as another method that systematically trains the practitioner to expand awareness. The study of a koan (a paradoxical phrase from a teaching or an episode from the life of a Buddhist master) requires the gathering of mind and body in focused attention (Aitken, 1990; Looi, 1994; Sekida, 1985). In the preparatory stages for koan study, the practitioner often employs mindful meditation through one-pointed attentiveness to breath. This practice, in turn, provides the "pivotal foundation" (Looi, p. xxvii) for

doing koans. When attention is sufficiently developed to be able to concentrate without distraction, koan work begins.

The study of koans

frustrates the intellect[,] . . . dismantles the customary way of solving problems and open[s] up new dimensions of human consciousness. . . . All through our lives and educations, we've been taught to use our minds in a particular linear and sequential way. . . . That's the way we pass examinations, solve problems and riddles, and work our way to success. When it comes to the creative process and spiritual questions, a whole different kind of consciousness is involved. That consciousness is not linear and sequential. All of us possess it. Somehow our education has minimized or completely excluded it, and that is very limiting in our lives. (Loori, p. xxvii)

The particular meditation practice that is discussed in this study of hypnosis is mindful meditation. Practiced by most Buddhist traditions, mindful meditation is another method that "frustrates" abstract thinking and "opens new dimensions of consciousness."

Common among the diverse methods of Yoga, Koan study, and mindful meditation is the practitioner's attention to the interface between thoughts and bodily sensations for the purpose of involving the whole human organism in the practice. It is only when body and mind are actively engaged through attentive awareness that phenomena are no longer perceived "as objective realities in themselves, but rather mental constructions made of selected data filtered from an inconceivable universe of pure sense" (Cleary, 1990, p. xxii). Assumptions that reflect this view discern phenomena as "products of interactions and conditions" (Cleary, p.

xxiii) in which the perceiver is interdependent with that which is perceived; body and mind are not separate, but "the human being is at once . . . with the body and the mind united in a whole" (Dumoulin, 1990/1992, p. 88).

Buddhist Practices and Hypnosis

The pragmatic methods that Buddhists employ to focus attention on the interface between mind and body are essential to the examination of the intrapersonal process of hypnosis, since it is through these practices that perceptions are changed. Although hypnotists may not necessarily be interested in the investigation of self, they are invested in methods that alter fixed patterns of thinking and perceiving, and the assumptions that mirror these patterns.

Buddhist Mindful Meditation

The instant is the bird that is everywhere and nowhere. We want to trap it alive, but it flaps its wings and is gone in a spray of syllables. We are left empty handed. Then the door of perception opens slightly and the other time appears, the real time we had been seeking without knowing it: the present, the presence.

--Octavio Paz

There is no specific word for meditation in Sanskrit or Pali. The closest word is "bhavana" (Schuhmacher & Woerner, 1989, p. 34) which means "mind development" (Schuhmacher & Woerner, p. 34). Mark Epstein (1995), a Western psychotherapist and Buddhist scholar, said that

the lack of such a word is probably no accident, for it is not meditation, per se, that is important to the Buddha's psychology; it is the development of certain critical qualities of mind, beyond that which we accept as the norm, that is essential to the Buddha's teachings. (Epstein, p. 105).

While the Buddha may not have considered meditation the only method that develops and expands discriminative qualities of mind, he did "set forth a comprehensive system . . . designed to train the mind to see with microscopic precision the true nature of the body, feelings, states of mind, and mental objects" (Nanamoli & Bodhi, 1995, p. 40). According to scholars, there are two fundamental approaches to meditation that encompass most meditative practices (Epstein, 1995; Goleman, 1988, 1991; Kornfield, 1993; Nanamoli & Bodhi, 1995). One method focuses the practitioner's attention on the development of serenity and concentration, while the other expands the meditator's insight and understanding. In the Buddhist system of mental training, "the role of serenity is subordinated to that of insight" (Bodhi, p. 38). According to the Buddha (Nanamoli & Bodhi, 1995), it is only through moment-to-moment contemplation of mental and bodily phenomena that one is able to expand awareness and surmount pain and grief.

Central to all Buddhist tenets is the cultivation of mindful attention, which is sometimes referred to as the

analytical inquiry into what it means to be embodied. Descartes's approach to the study of mind and body was to pose the divided questions: What is mind? What is body? Buddhist meditators do not contextualize their examination of mind and body with these, or other divided questions--the practice of mindful attention is a self-regulated, attentional strategy of moment-to-moment awareness of thoughts and sensations as they arise. Although mindful meditation is often practiced by meditators while in a seated position, it does not necessitate a special body posture. It does require, however, "the clear and single-minded awareness of what actually happens to us and in us at the successive moments of perception" (Nyanaponika, 1962, p. 30).

There is no specific attempt in mindful meditation to find or change anything; the meditator only observes thoughts, feelings and sensations as they arise. According to Daniel Goleman (1991), a Buddhist Western psychologist, "the strategy is a sort of aikido approach" (p. 95), where the meditator neither seeks to achieve anything nor tries to push anything away. Although there are many different kinds of meditations that have specific purposes for developing awareness, mindful meditation is specifically germane to the discussion of the intrapersonal process of hypnosis, since the development of mindfulness brings attention to the multiple ways mind and body, or "mental and physical

events[,] are connected one to another" (Kornfield, 1990, p. 14).

Gautama the Buddha, who is sometimes referred to as the first psychologist (Kalupahana, 1987), taught his followers that many of their unconscious assumptions which constituted the foundation of their perceptions were inaccurate (West, 1987). The Buddha said that the root of suffering is the misconception that there is an individual self or a "body-identified mind" (Ross, 1980, p. 24) that is separate from everything else. In order for people to find out for themselves about the assumptions which shape not only what they think, but how they think and feel, the Buddha proposed mindful attention as the first step in "cleansing the doors of perception" (Claxton, 1986, p. 24).

The Buddha, for the first time in the Indian tradition, presented a system of meditation or reflection that could be cultivated by almost anyone interested in a solution to the problem of suffering in the world The Buddha's description of this method . . . simply emphasizes the importance of what may be called the 'radical empiricist' approach to an understanding of human experience, thought and life. (Kalupahana, 1987, pp. 73-74)

Said differently, the correct way to approach Buddhist meditation is with the attitude of a scientist and researcher, who excludes any experience "that is not directly perceived" (Kalupahana, p. 75), and who includes only those experiences and the "relations that connect experiences" (p. 75) that are observed.

Transformational Potential

Buddhist teachings assert that the habitual, reactive, discursive mind that sets itself apart from the rest of phenomena is the fundamental cause of suffering. Mindful meditation is an opportunity for the meditator to learn about separative mind without blindly reacting to its dictates.

Meditators are often presented with an interesting dilemma, however, that comes from wanting to change reactive mind. In their attempts to become peaceful and quiet, they will try to push away the ceaseless discourse of habitual, reactive thought (which only incites more thinking). Mindful attention presupposes that practitioners assume a non-reactive stance, one that neither pushes away the unpleasant thoughts and sensations, nor holds on to them. Thus, in Buddhist traditions, meditators are instructed to observe their thoughts and to chunk them all together into the category "thinking," regardless of whether they are pleasant, unpleasant, or indifferent. The meditator is advised to do the same with all the different body sensations--to lump them together into the category of "sensing." If one thought or sensation is consistently persistent, the meditator is instructed to "notice how it begins and what precedes it" (Kornfield, 1993, p. 100). Kornfield (1993) offered this advice:

Notice if there is a particular thought or image that triggers this state. Notice how long it lasts and when it ends. Notice what state usually follows it. Observe whether it ever arises very slightly or softly. Can you see it as just a whisper in the mind? See how loud and strong it gets. Notice what patterns . . . or tension[s] reflect this state in the body. Soften and receive even the resistance. Finally, sit and be aware of your breath, watching and waiting for this [thought], allowing it to come and go, greeting it like an old friend. (p. 100)

This manner of observing and naming alters the habitual, automatic reaction to and identification with pleasurable and non-pleasurable sensations and thoughts. The practice of neither pushing away nor holding on reconnects meditators with their fixed and rigid patterns of thinking and sensing in a new way. Instead of becoming lost in the story-line of restless, chattering thoughts and body sensations by trying to push away that which is unpleasant, the meditator "interrupts the flow" (Varela et al., 1991, p. 25). Altering relationships to habitual thoughts and reactions gives rise to changing the usual boundaries that divide body and mind, self and other.

The transformational potential of meditation is concomitant with the development of this special kind of attention that neither pushes away the unpleasant nor holds on to the pleasurable thoughts and feelings, but rather sees them as they are (Epstein, 1995; Kabat-Zinn, Lipworth, Burney, & Sellers, 1985; Kornfield, 1990). This non-reactive attention, in turn, cuts away at "the chain of habitual thought patterns" (Varela et al., p. 27) and promotes a new

kind of awareness, a more "panoramic perspective" (Varela et al., p. 26).

As the meditator again and again interrupts the flow of discursive thought and returns to be present with his breath or daily activity, there is a gradual taming of the mind's restlessness. One begins to be able to see the restlessness as such and to become patient with it, rather than becoming automatically lost in it. Eventually, meditators report periods of a more panoramic perspective. This is called awareness. (Varela et al., pp. 25-26)

With increased awareness, the meditator attends to more subtle phenomena, such as the experience of divided mind and body and the autonomous self. The Buddhist monk and teacher, Thich Nhat Hanh (1988), declared, "When mind becomes the object of its own observation, is that which is seen mind itself or only a projection or reflection of mind?" (Hanh, p. 46). In the Buddha's teachings on *The Four Foundations of Mindfulness*,² the meditator is instructed "to go deeply into the object and observe it" (Hanh, 1988, p. 38). "Observe the body in the body, observe the feelings in the feelings, observe the mind in the mind, observe the objects of mind in the objects of mind" (Hanh, p. 47).

The special kind of attention that observes "the body in the body" and "the mind in the mind" is an "embodied

² The Buddha's teachings on *The Four Foundations of Mindfulness* (the *Satipatthana Sutta*) is a part of the *Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha*. *Satipatthana* is the Pali word for "direct path." *Sutta* (Pali) means teaching. The *Satipatthana Sutta* is one of the most important teachings in the Buddhist canon. Nanamoli, B., & Bodhi, B. (Trans.), (1995). *The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha*. Boston: Wisdom Publications.

reflection in which mind and body are brought together" (Varela et al., 1991, p. 27). In other words, the kind of observation that Buddhists teach is very different from the "abstract disembodied activity" (Varela et al., p. 27) practiced by Descartes when he asked, What is mind and what is body? When Descartes investigated body as separate from himself (the self that he identified as his mind), he examined his concept of body which was extended in his concept of space. What he saw, in other words, was a "projection or reflection" (Hanh, 1988, p. 46) of his conceptual thoughts about body and space. Mindful observation is different, since the observing mind is not separate from mindful attention. "Mindfulness is the observing mind, but it does not stand outside the object of observation. It goes right into the object and becomes one with it" (Hanh, 1990, p. 125). The transformational potential of mindful awareness culminates when the boundary that divides mind and body, subject and object, dissolves; the observer and that which is observed become one.

When mindful attention is manifested in a person's words and actions, it prevents the usual sense of self-consciousness (Epstein, 1995; Schuster, 1979) that divides mind and body and that perceives the self as separate from everything else. Mindful words and actions reflect a special kind of authentic spontaneity that comes from the awareness that "there is no need to posit an intermediate agent who

performs them" (Epstein, p. 111): thinking, speaking, and acting reflect each other. Gautama the Buddha said in the *Dhammapada*, (a collection of verses spoken by the Buddha),

We are what we think
 All that we are arises with our thoughts.
 Speak or act with a pure mind
 And happiness will follow you
 As your shadow, unshakable. (in Kornfield, 1993, p. 283)

Let us take a closer look at what meditators begin to see when they closely attend to the moment-to moment interrelationship of thought, impulse to act, nerve feeling and movement of the body, and how "one moment arises condition-dependent on another" (Kornfield, 1990, p. 14).

In the following sections, I examine the meditator's change in attention from the content of thought to the process of thinking. I have also discussed the change in the perception of body, mind, and self (from spatial and solid to temporal and patterned) by examining the meditator's description of mind and body as interdependent, multiple aggregates.

From Content to Process

Associated with the practice of mindful meditation is the change that occurs in the nature of how the meditator attends to moment-to-moment thoughts and sensations. The development of mindful attention brings about a shift in focus from the content of thought to the process of thinking. Goleman (1991) suggests that learning how to regulate and alter attention from what one thinks, (the

content of thought) to how one thinks (the process of thinking) is the primary difference between Western and Buddhist approaches to mental development or mental health. Western psychotherapy, said Goleman (1991),

focuses on the content of consciousness. It does not attempt the more radical transformation posited in the Buddhist approach which focuses on the process of consciousness. Buddhism seeks to free the individual from negative states of mind by altering the workings of perception and cognition. (Goleman, p. 100)

From Spatial and Solid to Temporal and Patterned

Negative states of mind, according to Buddhist teachings, arise with the perception of divided mind and body. Although we have been discussing the division between body and mind in terms of Descartes, the experience of mind separate from body is common to most people. Many of us know that during our day-to-day activities, the mind can be absorbed in making plans or recollecting some incident of the past without any awareness of what the body is doing; we often drift along the surface of different experiences, never fully engaged in what is happening. According to Buddhist teachings, for most people everyday mind is a "continuous stream of becoming" (Kalupahana, 1987, p. 24), "a chain of linked associations" (Mangalo, 1993, p. 131), a flow of cognitions (memories, fears, plans, regrets, hopes, fantasies) which are triggered to react by contact with the world through sense and imagination (Gyatso, 1991; Kalupahana, 1987; Inizuino, 1987).

Most of the time, our thoughts are not only wandering, disconnected from the awareness of our body, but we automatically identify with every thought and sensation. Day-to-day mind "is in a constant state of reactivity" (Goleman 1988, p. 30), prompted by the impulse to push away pain and to hold onto pleasure. In the practice of mindful meditation, the meditator begins with everyday mind as the natural starting place for developing the attentional posture which, in itself, alters automatic and reactive thinking. According to Buddhist teachings, habitual, reactive abstract thinking lies at the root of the perception of divided mind and body.

As mindful attention develops, the meditator experiences a change in perception of body and mind from a spatial sense of self to the experience of self as patterned relationships (Epstein, 1995; Kornfield, 1990). Most people experience themselves in spatial terms, "as an entity with boundaries, layers, and a core" (Epstein, p. 138). In the beginning stages of meditation, the meditator identifies with the "observing self," which is aware of thoughts and bodily sensations. As mindfulness increases, so does the awareness of the ever-changing patterns of thoughts and sensations.

Rather than promoting a view of self as an entity or as a place with boundaries, the mindfulness practices tend to reveal another dimension of the self-experience, one that has to do with how patterns come together in a temporary and ever-evolving organization. (Epstein, p. 142)

Meditators tell us that the experience of body and mind is actually "a composite of various aggregates, a series of psychophysical reactions and responses [that have] no fixed center or unchanging ego-entity" (Ross, 1980, p. 16).

Speaking about a meditator's experience during meditation, the Buddhist teacher, Jack Kornfield (1990), said:

What seemed like a solid world of the senses and of the self begins to break down. You see the self simply as *moments of physical experience together with the mental reaction to that experience* [italics added]--that's all there is. A rising in pairs. This is sometimes called the insight into pairs. (Kornfield, p. 14)

The meditator develops insight into temporal "moments" of physical sensations and mental reactions rising together in patterned relationships. This points the way to a different description of mind and body than the depictions that reflect abstract, separative thinking and a body located in space.

Mind-body: Multiple Aggregates

Rather than discuss mind and body as two separate entities, the Buddha described them as interconnected parts of a larger whole. *Namarupa* [mind(*nama*)body(*rupa*)] is the Sanskrit word the Buddha gave to the experience of being embodied, or to the psychophysical personality (Kalupahana, 1987). Although *namarupa* may appear to represent independent polarities (*nama* and *rupa*), the Buddha

was not prepared to assume that mind (*nama*) can have independent status or existence. It is always associated with a body or a physical personality.

There could be no consciousness or mental activity unless it is located in such a personality. (Kalupahana, p. 15)

Prolonged meditation allows the meditator to experience what is called, in Buddhist teachings, "rising and passing" (Kornfield, 1990, p. 15).

Here, it feels like the body and mind become a waterfall, or a shower. . . . You experience your body and mind as tiny pings of sensation, thought or memory, disconnected from one another, all arising and passing, like raindrops hitting a puddle. Your sense of solidity dissolves. (Kornfield, p. 15)

The phenomenological experience of dissolving solidity marks the meditator's shift from a spatial to temporal perception of embodiment, as well as the beginning of more advanced meditative practices. It is important to remember that the fundamental purpose of all Buddhist meditations is to liberate the practitioner from limited and rigid assumptions.

When thoughts become stilled and the meditator's attention is "steady, collected and present" (Kornfield, p. 13), the meditator becomes aware of a patterned sequence of mind-body events that is usually not apparent in everyday consciousness. "In the subtlest states of consciousness," notes Kornfield, "it is as if attention were a microscope that could reveal the most elemental moments of consciousness, perception and action" (Kornfield, p. 31). These "elemental moments" are described in great detail in the third part of the Buddhist canon, in the text called the *Abhidharma* (Schuhmacher & Woerner, 1989).

The *Abhidharma* in Pali means the "Special Teaching" (Schumacher & Woerner, p. 1); it constitutes the basic psychological teachings of Buddhism based on Gautama the Buddha's insights into the experience of human embodiment. It serves as a pointer to the analytical and systematic investigation of the nature of self (Goleman, 1988; Gyatso, 1990; Hanh, 1975; Harvey, 1990; Kalupahana, 1987; Varela et al., 1991). The fundamental premise of the *Abhidharma* is that there is no abiding self but only "an impersonal aggregate of processes that come and go" (Goleman, p. 117); the notion of self arises from the "intermingling of these impersonal processes" (Goleman, p. 117).

Just as when the parts are set together
 There arises the word "chariot,"
 So does the notion of a being
 When the aggregates are present. (The Buddha in
 Samyutta-Nikaya, 1972, p. 35)

In Western psychology, personality is often identified as a singular organism that is comprised of body and mind. According to Buddhist teachers and scholars, the misconception of most people is the conviction "that there is an 'I', a self, an ego, that is solid and separate from everything else" (Goldstein & Kornfield, 1987, p. 145).

But actually this sense of "I" is made up only of the process of identifying: "This is me. This is what I do. I like this," . . . and so on. It is created entirely by thought and has no substance. It's just thought-bubbles. (Goldstein & Kornfield, 1987, p. 145)

The *Abhidharma* does not hypothesize an "I," or a "self," "actor," "executive ego," or "hidden observer";

rather, it reveals a series of mindbody events that are called "the five aggregates" (Kalupahana, 1987, p. 17). Aggregate means an "assemblage," or a "collection," which suggests that each individual aggregate combines "a multiplicity of elements" (Macy, 1991a, p. 164; Macy, 1991b). The five aggregates are form, feeling, perception (or impulse), disposition, and consciousness. Form is defined as six sense organs (ear, eye, tongue, nose, touch and mind) and their objects of sense. Written as a singular word, *namarupa* (mindbody) exceeds singularity, representing as it does these multiple, interrelated, interdependent constituents.

Form.

The Buddha's description of body or material objects is always in terms of experience; there is no discussion of material phenomena except as it is encountered by a person (Kalupahana, 1987). For instance, it is meaningless to speak of the earth as if it is separate from the experience of solid, rough, hard or soft, and so forth. It is equally inexplicable, said the Buddha, to speak of the human body as an objective entity separate from its function or the way in which it is affected (Kalupahana, 1987).

Form also describes the body in terms of six sense organs and their corresponding objects of sense. The sense organ is not defined as separate from its object since sensory experience requires both organ and object. The six

sense organs and their corresponding objects are: eye and material form; ear and sound; nose and fragrance; tongue and taste; touch and tangible object; mind and concepts (Goleman, 1988; Kalupahana, 1987; Varela et al., 1991). The inclusion of mind and concepts as the sixth sense organ and its object implies that there is no separation between body and mind, since mind as an organ is neither separate nor superior to the other five organs.

The description of sense (mind and concepts, sight and material object, etc.), suggests that there is no delineation where body ends and begins. If each sense organ is dependent on a corresponding object in the environment, the notion of a self-contained body (enclosed in a "bag of skin" [Loori, 1992, p. 161]), separate from, and independent of, the environment is no longer feasible.

In Buddhist discussions of the five aggregates, the focus is not on "material stuff" or "mind stuff," but on the contact that occurs when each sense organ meets its object. Mindful attention to the moment of "contact" reveals to the meditator that along with each "moment of seeing is the moment of knowing it, a moment of hearing, and the knowing of it, and so on. Consciousness and each particular sense experience arise in pairs" (Kornfield, 1990, p. 31).

In most depictions of the five aggregates, consciousness is usually discussed last since it reflects all the other aggregates. In order to explain its dependent

relation with sense organs and their objects, I will depart from this tradition and define consciousness next.

Consciousness.

Consciousness is the experience that arises with each contact of sense organ and its object. With eye and visual object arises visual consciousness; with ear and sound arises auditory consciousness; with nose and odor arises olfactory consciousness; with tongue and taste arises gustatory consciousness; with touch and tangible object arises tactile consciousness; with mind and concepts arises mental consciousness (Kalupahana, 1987).

In the West, consciousness is usually ascribed to mental activity but not to other sensory experiences (Hayward & Varela, 1992). If consciousness is equated only with mind, it fosters the assumption that body is without consciousness. In Buddhist analysis of mindbody, however, consciousness arises with each instance of sensory contact. According to Buddhist logic, the discriminatory process that occurs in each sensory experience is the same whether it is the mental sense organ and its object, or eye, ear, nose, tongue, and touch and their respective objects. In each instance of contact between the sense organ and its object, consciousness is developed through the process of exclusion. "You perceive what something is by excluding what it is not" (Gyatso in Hayward & Varela, p. 190).

A unique function of the mind sense organ that is not available to the other five organs of sense is the mind's capacity to "reflect" on, or to conceptualize, other objects of sense. Just as thoughts or concepts are objects of mind, so are hearing, smelling, tasting, and so forth, objects of mind. "This reflective faculty" (what is called "mano" in Buddhist terminology), "is also the source of the sense of personal identity or the conception of self" (Kalupahana, 1987, p. 30). Buddhist texts are careful to point out that mind, in its reflective capacity, functions in the same way as the other five sense organs with their objects of sense. In other words, consciousness of self, or the "feeling of self" (Kalupahana, p. 31) is the experience that arises with each contact of mind (*mano*) with its object of sense (concepts, hearing, smelling, tasting, and so forth). "Unfortunately, the faculty of *mano* and the feeling or consciousness produced by it . . . are susceptible to solidification more than any other faculty or consciousness, and this is the cause of the belief in a permanent and eternal self" (Kalupahana, p. 32). Figure 1 may help to clarify the description of the reflective capacity of "mano," or mind (Kalupahana, p. 30).

With every moment of consciousness there arise the three aggregates of feeling, impulse, and disposition. These aggregates are called "mental factors" (Pandita, 1992, p. 286). They are the "discernible element[s] or qualit[ies]"

(Pandita, 1992, p. 286) that interact with form and consciousness to define each moment of experience or "how consciousness relates to the object" (Goldstein, 1976, p. 34).




Table 1.³ The six senses, their objects of sense, the consciousness of sense, and the reflective capacity of mind: Mind (*mano*, the reflective capability of mind) and concepts (objects of sense) gives rise to the feeling of self.

³ Note. Adapted from *The Principles of Buddhist Psychology* (p. 30), by D. J. Kalupahana, NY: State University of New York Press. Copyright 1987 by State University of New York.

Feelings, impulses, and dispositions.

With every sense experience there arises the feeling of pleasure, pain, or neutrality. In the moment of sensory recognition and response (organs, objects, and feelings) three root impulses also arise: desire toward that which is deemed pleasurable or desirable; anger or aversion toward that which is believed painful or undesirable; and indifference toward that which is considered neutral (Kalupahana, 1987).

Dispositions are habitual or rigid formations of "thinking, feeling, perceiving and acting" (Varela et al., 1991, p. 67); they are the idiosyncratic tendencies that fashion a person's particular interests. Dispositions are responsible for the way a person attends to his or her physical appearance, surroundings, or likes and dislikes. What a Buddhist calls dispositions, a Western psychologist might refer to as personality traits, for example, "motivated," "arrogant," "fearful," "confident," and so forth (Varela et al., 1991).

The five aggregates--form, consciousness, feelings, impulses, and dispositions--are not separate and discrete. In every moment of sensory experience, feelings, impulses and dispositions influence and reflect each other. Their multiplicity and interdependence give rise to the different experiences, or feelings of self. When the five aggregates are combined with "biological and situational influences"

(Goleman, 1988, p. 120), and the "preceding psychological moment" (p. 120), they account for the underlying factors that determine a person's actions.

The systematic dissection of moment-to-moment "arising of elemental experience" (Varela et al., p. 110) is one way to examine and describe the five aggregates. It is also necessary, however, to discuss the aggregates in terms of their interaction over time.

Dependent Arising

The conceptual framework of Buddhist associative and co-ordinative way of thinking [is] something different from the traditional European causal and nomothetic thinking. [It posits] a network of interdependent, co-existing [relation among all things].

--Herbert Guenther

Although the aggregates are described in what may appear as a linear sequence of events (organ of sense, object of sense, consciousness, feeling, impulse, disposition), it is important to foreground how Buddhists depict mindbody events as "arising" or "arising with." It is the experience of many meditators that as mindful attention becomes more refined, they become increasingly aware of the mutually interdependent relation among sense organs, objects of sense, thoughts, impulses, feelings, dispositions, and consciousness. Buddhists explain the mutual causal relation among mindbody aggregates in this way: "This being, that becomes; from the arising of this, that arises; this not

being, that becomes not; from the ceasing of this, that ceases" (Macy, 1991a, p. 39).

Buddhist teachers call the patterned relations among aggregates ("rising in pairs") by different names. The names all suggest, however, the same principle: "dependent-arising," "dependent origination," "dependent co-arising" (Macy, p. 18). This principle of mutual causality lies at the center of all analytical investigations of *namarupa*, or mindbody relations. Each aggregate is dependent on, and conditioned by, all the other aggregates that produce an intricate pattern of interdependent connectedness. There is no one, autonomous, immutable aggregate since each aggregate is a multiplicity of ever-changing mindbody events. When Buddhists dissect the five aggregates into microscopic descriptions, it is for the purpose of mindfully attending to the notion of self. Where is the abiding self that many Western, psychological traditions hypothesize if what we observe is only a series of constantly changing aggregates that rise together in mutually dependent, patterned relationships?

The principle of dependent arising describes the interdependence among multiple mindbody aggregates in each moment. If the aggregates are constantly changing, how do habitual patterns of conditioned thoughts and behaviors develop and continue? The basis of fixed patterns of thinking and perception is found in the evolution of

individual choices and actions. The causes and conditions that contribute to each moment are vividly depicted in Buddhist texts in the form of a turning wheel, the Law of Dependent Origination, the Wheel of Life, or *Samsara* (Epstein, 1995, Goldstein, 1976; Gyatso, 1992; Simmer-Brown, 1987; Thurman, 1994).

The Cycle of Ignorance: The Twelve Links of Dependent Arising

In Buddhist descriptions of suffering, a person's ignorant views about body, mind, and self condition every thought and action, which, in turn, sets in motion an endless cycle of erroneous assumptions, thoughts, and behaviors. If consciousness is rooted in ignorance, said the Buddha, one conceives the opposite of how things are (Gyatso, 1992). Instead of recognizing the nature of interdependent, mindbody aggregates, one acts as if mind and body are divided, as if mind is the only knowing agent, or mind is self.

Actions fixed in misperceptions about mind and body are depicted in the Tibetan Buddhist image of twelve links fashioned in the shape of a turning wheel (Figure 2). Actions rooted in false assumptions cause and condition each successive action which, in turn, keeps the wheel--representing the life pattern of mindbody--spinning in ignorance. There are, however, specific moments when the pattern of ignorance, or the "chain of mechanical

Figure 1.⁴ The Cycle of Ignorance and the Twelve Links of Dependent Arising.

⁴ Note. From *The Meaning of Life* (p. 19), by T. Gyatso, Boston, MA: Wisdom Publications. Copyright 1992 by Wisdom

conditioning" (Varela et al., 1991, p. 115) can be interrupted.

It is not necessary for our study of hypnosis to delineate in detail each of the interdependent links, or the various mind states that are vividly depicted in the Wheel of Life. Nevertheless, a summary of the Buddha's description of patterned, conditioned actions will be useful for understanding the conjecture about the intrapersonal process of hypnosis in terms of perceptual change.

If a person's actions are rooted in "ignorance" (which is the first link) or in the experience of divided mind and body, the composition of the person's "actions" (second link) will serve to "bring about pleasurable or painful effects" (Gyatso, 1992, p. 18). Actions that are conditioned by ignorance predispose "consciousness" (third link) to gravitate toward a particular sensory experience that is predominately mental, visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, or tactile (Varela et al., 1991). In other words, consciousness distinguishes ideas, and/or sensory objects by separating them from what they are not. In Buddhist parlance, the function of consciousness (that arises with the contact between sense organ and object of sense) is to make distinctions. Consciousness is called "name and form" (Gyatso, 1992, p. 23); it is the experience of the psychophysical complex (fourth link). Consciousness informed by ignorance is fractured into predominately mental

or physical consciousness. When the "sense organs" (fifth link) "contact" (sixth link) the objects of sense, the objects are "felt" ("feeling" is the seventh link) by a person as pleasurable, painful or neutral. Feeling arises with all sense experience, but it is the desire for pleasure that produces the strong feeling for *more* pleasure; and it is the aversion to pain that generates the strong feeling to *push away* pain. A neutral feeling is likely to engender a response of indifference. When one's actions are rooted in ignorance, "attachment" (eighth link) to more pleasure and aversion to displeasure arises. Attachment and "grasping" (ninth link) are both forms of desire. Although attachment is a "weaker" desire than grasping, according to Buddhist teachings, "attachment is the mental factor which increases desire, without any satisfaction" (Gyatso, 1992, pp. 33-34). Grasping is the more advanced stage of desire when one reaches for the object of gratification.

The cycle of patterned conditioned actions can be interrupted between the fourth link ("name and form") and the eighth link ("attachment"). Mindful attention to consciousness as it arises, to the strong feelings of pleasure or pain, and to the attachment or aversion to objects of pleasure or pain interrupts the unmindful (reactive) responses that are conditioned by one's previous choices and actions. Moment-to-moment awareness of thoughts and sensations, in turn, conditions new choices and actions.

Buddhists say that once the moment of feeling passes into grasping, it is virtually impossible to stop the turning wheel since each successive link after feeling increases, potentializes, and actualizes the effects of ignorant actions (Gyatso, 1992).

The Intrapersonal Process of Hypnosis

The ideas that were discussed in this chapter have formed the necessary background of thought for addressing the fourth objective of this study: to propose a theoretical conceptualization of the intrapersonal process of hypnosis. Both hypnosis and meditation begin with an introspective turn to the realm of self-reflection, the inner region of thoughts, feelings, and body sensations. Turning the gaze within, however, is not necessarily the domain of hypnotic or meditative experiences alone. Descartes's introspective investigation of mind and body, for instance, was neither hypnotic nor meditative.

In this concluding section of Chapter Three, I have again turned to Descartes, but this time as a point of departure for a theoretical discussion about hypnosis. I will offer a conjecture on the intrapersonal hypnotic process by first discussing what it is not. Concluding this discussion of meditation and the intrapersonal process of hypnosis, and leading us into the next three chapters' investigation of the interpersonal process, is a brief

discussion about the assumptions that inform meditative, hypnotic, and poetic traditions.

Descartes's Self-reflection Vis-a-Vis Mindful Attention

When Rene Descartes embarked on his introspective investigation of mind and body, his approach was shaped by an analytical method of inquiry. He systematically rejected everything but what he directly perceived with his "pure and attentive mind" (Capra, 1982, p. 59). Although Descartes's approach to the examination of mind and body may appear similar to the mindful meditator's observation of thoughts and sensations, his method of attention was significantly different. Mindful meditators attend to thinking and sensing without evaluating or comparing sensations and thoughts, whereas Descartes differentiated and classified thoughts and sensations. The meditator perceives mind and body as interdependently related processes, whereas Descartes divided body and mind, distinguishing them as substance and non-substance.

When the Buddha was asked the same question as Descartes asked himself (What is mind? What is body?), he responded in a way that reflected a relational way of thinking and perceiving. Mind is "contact with concepts" (Kalupahana, 1987, p. 16), said the Buddha, and body is "contact with resistance" (p. 16).

In Buddhist exegesis, mind consciousness, or consciousness of thinking, arises with the contact of the

mind organ (the sixth sense) and the objects of mind (concepts). Body consciousness, or consciousness of sensing, arises with the contact of sense organs (ear, eye, and so forth) and the objects of sense. In other words, the psychophysical personality is always conceptualized and perceived in relation to the environment of which it is a part. Matter is never thought of as something apart from how it is experienced. According to Buddhists, phenomena are not separate from the perceiver. When the Buddha defined mind as "contact with concepts" and body as "contact with resistance, he described processes of experiences rather than any kind of material-stuff or mind-stuff" (Kalupahana, p. 16).

Descartes's attention to mind and body (that led him to perceive separations), and the meditator's mindful attention (that leads him or her to perceive relationships) are different methods of inquiry. Descartes's analysis "objectified" and separated body (or "matter") from experience, whereas mindful (mind and body) attention perceives body (or "matter") only as it is experienced.

The analytical function of mind that led Descartes to conclude that he was not the experiences of the body led him to believe that the one thing he could not refute was "the existence of himself as a thinker" (Capra, 1982, p. 59). According to the meditator's point of view, the aspect of mind that Descartes identified as himself was *mano*. *Mano* is

the ability of mind to reflect on consciousness of thinking and sensing. This reflexive capacity of mind creates in everyone the sense of personal identity or self. "Self, I, me, mine are all ideas in the mind, arising out of . . . identification with various aspects of the mind-body process" (Goldstein, 1976, pp. 31-32). Buddhists point out that unless the sense of self is "understood in the same way as the feelings produced by the other senses, i.e., as dependently arisen, impermanent and changing" (Kalupahana, 1987, p. 31), one risks misperceiving a permanent, autonomous self behind thinking (Epstein, 1995).

Thus, the difference between Descartes's identification with the reflexive capacity of thought, and the meditator's awareness that this reflexivity is only a function of mind, is the special kind of attention that attends to thinking and sensing from a different vantage point--"without judgement, without reaction to the content, without identifying with it, without taking the thought to be I, or self, or mine" (Goldstein, 1987, p. 27). In other words, the organ of thought, object of thought, and consciousness of thinking co-arise. Thus, there is no autonomous self behind thinking (Epstein, 1995; Goldstein, 1976, 1993; Goldstein & Kornfield, 1987).

As noted above, the analytical and reflexive functions of mind that led Descartes to behold differences between mind and body and to identify himself with thinking are the

characteristics of mind that distinguish Descartes's introspective self-investigation. It is precisely these aspects of mental process that hypnotists seek to frustrate, distract, or put aside.

Phenomenological Attributes That Create Hypnotic Experiences

Like Descartes, most people are immersed in the content of their abstract, analytical thoughts (memories, fears, regrets, hopes, plans, fantasies). Identification with this "chain of linked associations" (Mangalo, 1993, p. 131) often separates a person from awareness of bodily sensations and behaviors. In the hypnotherapeutic context, when hypnotists speak in time with their clients' breathing, blink in time with their eye blinks, and assume their body postures, they are employing a similar method of mindful attention that Buddhist meditators use. The abstract, analytical function of mind that predominates in day-to-day thinking is usually in a state of reactivity, prompted by impulses to push away pain and hold onto pleasure. When the hypnotist attends to and communicates with the client's verbal and non-verbal responses, the client's usual automatic reaction to and identification with particular thoughts and sensations is altered in some way.

The Buddhist's depiction of the Wheel of Life suggests that fixed and rigid patterns of thinking and acting are rooted in abstract thought divorced from body awareness. The chain of reactive impulses that are conditioned by divided

mind and body is interrupted with mindful attention, or when mind and body are "united in a whole" (Dumoulin, 1990/1992, p. 88). It is my conjecture that hypnosis works in a similar way. As it did for Descartes, the process of analytical thinking suggests to most people that their thoughts are different from their bodies and that their selves are different from the environment that surrounds them. When hypnotists include into their hypnotic talk the movements of their client's body and the different objects of sense (sounds, lights, temperature, and so forth), the client (and hypnotist's) ordinary perceptions of divided phenomena change. Said differently, change in perception is concomitant with the phenomenological experience of "body and . . . mind united in a whole" (Dumoulin, 1990/1992, p. 88). Philosopher and Buddhist ecologist David Abram (1996) has described the phenomenological experience, and the perception of phenomena that arises with it, in the following way:

As we reacquaint ourselves with our breathing bodies, then the perceived world itself begins to shift and transform. When we begin to . . . frequent the wordless dimension of our sensory participations, certain phenomena that have habitually commanded our focus begin to lose their distinctive fascination and to slip toward the background, while hitherto unnoticed or overlooked presences begin to stand forth from the periphery and to engage our awareness. (Abram, 1996, p. 63)

The "hitherto unnoticed or overlooked presences" that begin to engage the client's awareness are phenomena perceived in a relational way. Gilligan (1987) has described the

phenomenal change during hypnosis as a "both/and" experience. Hypnotic experience

is much less restrictive than rational ("ratio-making" or dividing) logic. . . . The "both/and" (distinct from "either/or") relations of trance logic enable seemingly contradictory relationships to be simultaneously valued [Hypnosis] dissipates the either/or frame biases and allows the unity underlying positions to be felt. (Gilligan, 1987, pp. 55-56)

This is not to suggest that hypnotized persons will distinguish the changes in their thoughts and perceptions in the same way as meditators do. It is important to recollect that there is a significant disparity between the hypnotized person's subjective experience of hypnosis and knowing how this experience occurred. There is also a big difference between the client's goals and the mediator's intentions. A client's subjective experiences will be quite different from the mediator's subjective experiences. While meditation does not address the kind of problems that are specifically targeted for therapeutic change, it does provide a way to conceptualize the state of mind during hypnotic experiences. Although their intentions and subjective experiences may differ, theoretically speaking, clients, hypnotists, and meditators have similar phenomenological experiences when mind and body are connected.

The shift from the level of abstract concepts to the level of direct experience enables meditators to "become more finely aware . . . of the things which were below [their] . . . normal threshold of awareness" (Goldstein,

1987, p. 25). By not responding to their habitual thoughts, they are free to explore what is happening each moment and their relation to each moment. Milton Erickson suggested that hypnotized persons get to know themselves "at a different level of experience" (in Gilligan, 1987, p. 49). Setting "aside habitual . . . conscious processes [leaves a person] free to explore experiences from multiple perspectives" (Gilligan, p. 49).

When the hypnotist interrupts the client's usual way of thinking by reconnecting body and mind in the hypnotic talk, the client's "thought processes typically become less critical, less evaluative, . . . and less abstract" (Gilligan, p. 49). Not reacting in the same way as they do with their ordinary separative consciousness, clients are able to view displeasurable thoughts and sensations from different, and sometimes multiple vantage points. It is my conjecture that a hypnotized person's changed perception and/or experience of self (Flemons, 1994c; Haley, 1965) is concomitant with the change that arises when mind and body are united.

Theoretical Conjecture About the Intrapersonal Process

Like Descartes, most people identify their self with the reflexive capacity of mind. This identification often includes the assumption that mind is superior to body. When the hypnotist focuses on the interface between the client's thoughts and sensations (ideodynamic expressions), the

phenomenological experience gives rise to an experience of mind and body as interdependently connected: "This being, that becomes; from the arising of this, that arises." In other words, thoughts and sensations rise together; mind and body interact, take turns, listen, talk, and reflect.

A theoretical description of the intrapersonal process of hypnosis, based on this discussion of mind-body, suggests a change in the client's mind-body conversations, from a monologue (where mind dictates) to an interactive exchange of information between body and mind. When Buddhist meditators describe their perception of interdependent mind-body events as *namarupa*, or multiple aggregates, they are not insinuating that the five aggregates are "irreducible elements of existence" (Kalupahana, 1987, p. 21). They are simply distinguishing "some of the most prominent functions that are involved" (Kalupahana, p. 21) in the psychophysical experience. The Buddhist description of mind-body suggests that there is no autonomous thinker (or self) behind the exchange of information (or conversations) between thoughts and sensations.

Thus, hypnotists who conceptualize the intrapersonal process of hypnosis in these terms might theorize that

1. Mind is not the only knowing agent; body has its own wisdom and voice that can be engaged in hypno-therapeutic conversations.

2. The change that arises when mind and body are connected creates a change in thoughts and perceptions (from a separative to a relational way of thinking and perceiving).
3. The relation a client has with his or her self is changed when mind and body are connected.
3. The problems that are perceived and responded to with reactive and separative thinking are differently conceptualized and responded to when they are perceived relationally.
4. There is no autonomous self that needs to be changed during hypnotherapy; change arises in the conversations between mind and body.

An Overview of the Remaining Chapters

In this chapter, the *intrapersonal* process of hypnosis was theoretically discussed. In the next three chapters, I explore and analyze the *interpersonal* process of hypnosis. Since I am interested in studying relational patterns of mind-body communication during a hypnotherapeutic session, I examine some of the characteristics of language that are unique to hypnotic conversations. In Chapter Four, I discuss poetic diction, and I delineate a set of poetic distinctions that will be used in Chapter Six to analyze and describe a hypnotic conversation.

Because poetry is not rooted in a therapy tradition, I investigate how the language of hypnosis can provide an

appreciation of the process of hypnotherapy, but I do not focus on a theory of therapeutic change. While this inquiry gives aesthetic access to the hypnotherapeutic processes of change, it does not provide an explanation of therapeutic change.

In Chapter Five I develop a set of analytical methods selected from conversation analysis and discourse analysis. These methods will assist me in the analysis of interactive patterns of communication and processes of change. I discuss these analytical strategies in Chapter Five, and I describe the session that is analyzed in Chapter Six.

In Chapter Six, I explore the interpersonal process between a hypnotist and a client using categories of description derived from my earlier discussion of poetry and the inductive analytic techniques derived from conversation analysis and discourse analysis. I provide an overview of five hypnosis sessions and I analyze and discuss the transcribed hypnotic talk of one of these sessions.

In Chapter Seven, I re-visit some of the ideas from Chapter Three on Buddhist notions of change to theoretically discuss the intrapersonal process during the hypnotherapeutic conversation that is analyzed in Chapter Six. I also discuss the limitations and implications of this study, as well as ideas about future research.

CHAPTER FOUR

POETRY

In the concluding section of the last chapter, the intrapersonal process of hypnosis was theoretically discussed. In this chapter, I start the investigation of the interpersonal process of hypnosis by studying some of the linguistic characteristics that are unique to the language of hypnotherapy. This chapter begins with a survey of the literature, highlighting some of the different ways hypnotists and literary scholars have suggested that hypnosis and poetry are similar. After the literature review, I examine poetic diction by first describing what it is not. Discursive prose is discussed in contradistinction to non-discursive poetic locution. In conclusion, a number of linguistic devices that poets use to create engaging poems are defined. The poetic techniques discussed in this chapter compose the research categories that are used in Chapter Six to analyze the language of hypnosis.

Hypnosis and Poetry in the Literature

Both hypnotists and literary scholars have recognized the trance-like qualities of poetry and the poetic attributes of hypnotic trance. Edmonston (1986) proposed that the historical relationship between hypnosis and poetry could be traced back to "incantations and trance rituals" (p. 1); other scholars have pointed to the trance-like features in Homeric and Greek poetry (Havelock, 1963; Ong, 1977, 1982).

In 1930, literary critic Edward Snyder (1930) distinguished the trance-inductive features in poetry by categorizing poetry into "spell-weaving poems" and "intellectualist poems" (Snyder, p. 8). Fifty years later, hypnotist and researcher Ronald Shor joined with Snyder to revise and update Snyder's earlier work. Working together, they amended Snyder's 1930 edition specifically for the field of hypnosis, since they believed that hypnotists could benefit from the analysis of poetic techniques that are "instrumental in producing . . . trance-inductive influences" (Snyder & Shor, 1983, p. 3). Snyder and Shor differentiated the following poetic features as trance-inducing: "freedom from abruptness, marked regularity of soothing rhythm, frequent repetition, ornamented harmonious rhythm to fix attention, vagueness of imagery and fatiguing obscurities" (Snyder & Shor, p. 1).

Several hypnotists have brought poetic characteristics into the hypnotherapeutic context. Silber (1968, 1971, 1980) developed poetic rhythms and rhymes to create standardized, hypnotic inductions called "poetic hypnograms" (Silber, 1980, p. 212). He proposed that poetic inductions not only have "spell-weaving or hypnotic effects" (p. 212), but they also elicit therapeutically useful fetal memories of security and safety. Walters and Havens (1993) claimed that their standardized "hypnotherapy scripts" (Havens & Walters, 1989, p. 52) or "trance scripts" (Walters & Havens, 1993, p.

71), with their rhythmical, rhyming poetic qualities, captivated attention and "depotentiate[d] conscious resistance" (Walters & Havens, p. 64). To prepare his clients for hypnosis and increase their comfort about trance, Bourne (1989) used poetry's "hypnotic elements" (Bourne, p. 17) by reading poetry before beginning trance work.

Intrigued by the connection between hypnosis and poetry, researchers have developed a variety of studies to examine their relationship. McKellar (1987) suggested that the poetic images used by the romantic poets Coleridge and duMurier could be used to understand some of the imaginative processes that occur during hypnosis and other altered states of consciousness. Empirical researchers Dimet, Walker, and Hammer (1981) studied the relationship between receptivity to hypnosis and sensitivity to poetry by measuring and correlating increased sensitivity to poetry during hypnosis. Williams (1952) examined the literary essays and letters of poets to explicate their ideas and experiences with hypnotic trance. He concluded that several poets, skilled in inducing trance-like experiences in their listeners and readers, also experienced self-induced trance. Consider, for instance, Alfred Lord Tennyson's recollections of what he called "a kind of waking trance":

I have often [experienced a kind of waking trance], quite from boyhood, when I have been all alone. This has generally come upon me by repeating my own name two or three times to myself silently, till all at once,

out of the intensity of individuality, the individual itself seemed to dissolve and fade away into a boundless being; and this is not a confused state, but the clearest of the clearest. (Alfred Lord Tennyson in Williams, 1952, p. 7)

In recent years, several hypnotists have read poetry during their presentations at professional hypnosis conferences. Gilligan (1991) began a training seminar in hypnosis with poems by T.S. Eliot and Robert Bly. These poems, he said, illustrated aspects of hypnotic trance and the hypnotherapeutic relationship. Michelle Ritterman (1994) at an international conference on hypnosis, composed and poetically performed "A Five-Part Poetic Induction" (p. 465) . . . "in favor of human decency" (p. 468). As she rhythmically presented her poetic induction to the audience of professional hypnotists, she declared that "human troubles" (p. 467) are profoundly epitomized in their "poetic distillation" (p. 467) and that poetry "appeals to all the senses and to the intellect[;] . . . it trigger[s] in the listener a profound, even visceral, reaction" (p. 467).

In his text on hypnotherapy, social communication, and human brain function, Peter Brown (1991) integrated an eclectic body of research to study the "hypnotic brain" (Brown, p. xii). His analysis of different communication styles included an examination of the rhythmical, communicative patterns in oral poetry. Brown believed that

the speech patterns of the oral poet paralleled those found in the hypnotist's patterns of speech.

The oral poet used verbal skills much like the modern hypnotherapist. Elaborating on basic metaphors shared by all, the poet provided a method for learning of shared social values from one generation to the next. Our literature bias may obscure the importance of these skills as well as blind us to their persistence today. This form of poetry is in a real sense hypnotic in that if it were not "entrancing," it would not be effective. (Brown, 1991, p. 81)

Some of the distinctions regarding the differences between literate and oral traditions that Brown noted are discussed later in this chapter in terms of the differences between linear, discursive language and recursive, poetic diction. Corresponding with the development of the literate tradition was linear thinking (Brown, 1991; McLuhan, 1969), whereas parallel with the oral tradition was the development of a "highly patterned" (Brown, p. 75) speech and a poetic way of thinking. Brown pointed out that orality is more than the absence of literacy; it is "a style in its own right," which reflects the "state of mind and society that is the backdrop for that style" (p. 71). The literate tradition, with its emphasis on the visual, promotes objectivity, or "a clear sense of the self and its separateness from others" (p. 77). Contrarily, the oral tradition, with its accents on sound instead of vision, ties individuals "more strongly together" (Brown, p. 72). In the oral tradition, the

goal is not the transmission of information but the creation of a shared experience. The syntax of the spoken culture is fluid and heuristic. It is closely

...tied to the physical rhythms of the body and is judged not for correctness but for the impact it has on the listener. (Brown, p. 71)

Some scholars have noted the similarities between the language that hypnotists and poets use to create meaningful experiences (Roscoe, 1991; Watzlawick, 1990). Watzlawick (1990) suggested that psychotherapists should be familiar with the linguistic skills of poets and hypnotists, since their use of language communicates "very different emotional effects" (Watzlawick, p. 85) than "the dry, objective language of explanation and interpretation" (p. 85).

What I suggest is that more than any other particular therapeutic skill, a familiarity with this language may provide new effective approaches to solving human problems, handling resistance, and modifying behavior. (p. 85)

Watzlawick (1990) was particularly fascinated with the way Milton Erickson used language to alter his patient's behavioral patterns. Erickson was well aware of how language creates different sorts of experiences. He would offer suggestions to his patients "that violated the rules of grammar, syntax, or semantics (Watzlawick, p. 84) in a manner that was similar to the poet who fractures the syntax and grammar of everyday prose so that "even the most familiar words will seem strange" (Strand, 1991, p. 36).

Reflections On the Literature

This review of the literature indicates that many hypnotists have noted significant parallels between the poetic elements of hypnosis and the trance-like qualities of

poetry. Several hypnotists have underscored similarities between a hypnotist's use of language and a poet's diction. The primary direction of this study is different from the citations noted in the literature, since I utilize poetic distinctions as a method of analysis to examine a transcribed hypnotherapeutic session. However, this literature review underscores the value of investigating poetic diction as a way of understanding hypnotic talk.

Hypnosis and Poetry

Hypnotists and poets share a common approach to language not only in the way they violate linguistic rules but also in their ability to experientially communicate ideas (Roscoe, 1991). By turning and twisting the meaning of words, poets and hypnotists produce enough ambiguity in what is said and not said for listeners to create their own meaningful poetic or hypnotic experiences.

Different Purposes

The poet and hypnotist are analogous in their intention to create meaningful experiences. The hypnotist, unlike the poet, is also using language, however, for the purpose of altering rigid patterns of mind-body behaviors (which Gilligan [1987] describes as "singular fixations [to the] problematic processes" [p. 46]). Poet Robert Kelly (1991) likens these fixed habits of thought to the syntax that connects and orders the sum total of how people describe themselves, "not just out loud, but in the ceaseless

discourse of the head" (Kelly, p. 163) (or in abstract thought, divorced from the awareness of bodily sensations). Thus, it could be said that the work of hypnotists is to alter the syntax of everyday prose, with its separative assumptions, in order to facilitate change in their client's habitual ways of connecting to their "problematic processes." To better understand and discuss non-discursive, poetic language and its underlying premises (the language that Watzlawick praises in hypnotists and poets), it will help to describe discursive language and the assumptions that inform it.

Discursive Language: Prose

The separative assumptions that reflect abstract, analytical thought are implicit in the syntax and grammar of discursive language, or prose. These premises imply that everyday experience is divided into "discrete and ordered entities" (M.C. Bateson, 1989, p. 132). Said differently, the linear syntax of prose forces all ideas to be expressed as if they are individual "pieces of clothing strung out side-by-side on a clothesline" (Langer, 1942, p. 81), even if they are "actually worn one over the other" (Langer, p. 81).

The linear structure of prose causes one word to be said first, with the second, third, fourth words following-- one word comes after the other. This linearity suggests that there is a causal relationship between the past and the

future. In other words, that which is said last depends on what is said first. Flemons (1991) cautions us to be aware of how syntax and grammar can shape our thinking.

The discrete divisions within language--between subject and object, or between static noun and active verb--can seduce us into believing that such separations are not simply the stuff of description, but in fact inhere in the nature of the world. (Flemons, p. 25)

Writer Ursula LeGuin (1994) remarked that without being aware of how language works, language can become a "tool of estrangement" (p. 106). "The odd twist is that we become so enamored of our language and its ability to describe the world that we create a false and irresponsible separation" (LeGuin, 1994, p. 106).

For example, in prose, the subject and direct object are divided--the subject, or central figure of the sentence, acts (verb) on the object, but the object is not shown to act on the subject. In the sentence, "I see you," the implication is that only the subject "I" sees the object "you." But what about the "you" which may simultaneously see "I/me?" The separation between, and the delineation of, subject and object not only infers false distinctions and distances between "you" and "I," but it directs awareness away from the interactive sequences between the two.

Korzybski (1958) noted that the structure of language is "non-functional" (Korzybski, p. 89), since it does not "fit the structure of thē world" (p. 89). To illustrate his point, he gave the example of how the semantic arrangement

of "green leaf" (p. 89) suggests that "green" is added to "leaf," whereas, "green" is not added but is the leaf's "natural process" (p. 89) that occurs as a function of photosynthesis. The way discursive language is structured, said Korzybski, has a "tremendous semantic hold" (p. 90) on how the world is perceived.

We do not realize what tremendous power the structure of an habitual language has. It is not an exaggeration to say that it enslaves us through the mechanism of semantic representation and that the structure which a language exhibits, and impresses upon us unconsciously, is *automatically projected* on the world around us. (Korzybski, p. 90)

Contrary to the separative assumptions that shape the linguistic rules of prose, we experience phenomena not only in "discrete" sequence but also in its layered multiplicity and simultaneity. For instance, if we wash an item of clothing by hand, we may experience the force and temperature of the water, the wet fabric, the sounds of the environment, the aromas of breakfast cooking, the beams of sunlight through the window, a thought about the previous evening which connects with a childhood sense-memory and turns into a reminder, and so on. All of these experiences may take place in a moment, with one perception over-laying another.

Non-discursive Language: Poetry

Poetry uses the same words and sounds as prose but "differently co-ordinated and differently aroused" (Valery, 1958, p. 71). Poetry and prose "are therefore distinguished

by the difference between certain links and associations which form and dissolve in . . . [the] psychic and nervous organism. . . . This is why one should guard against reasoning about poetry as one does about prose" (Valery, p. 71).

Unlike the separative assumptions that are reflected in the syntax and grammar of prose, the "links and associations" that connect the various elements of poetic diction compose recursive, interdependent patterns. Poetry is a richly patterned language that is differentiated from prose in terms of its purpose, structure, and experience (Valery, 1958). The linear, sequential syntax of prose directs thought in a uni-directional, logical, progression (what is said second depends on what is said first) with the specific purpose to inform. The repetitive, recursive linguistic devices of poetic language overlap ideas and turn thought back on itself in a self-reflexive manner. The looping back and overlapping of ideas in poetic diction has a cumulative, echoing effect in which new meanings and understandings "come together into some kind of magical conjunction" (Dickey, 1989). Octavio Paz (1985/1990) said that poetic language "is propelled--and impelled--by the complementary action of affinities and opposition between its parts [which is] a triumph of contiguity over succession" (p. 52). In other words, unlike the discrete divisions in discursive prose that imply separations where

they may not exist, poetic diction both expresses and evokes multiple, simultaneous associations and complementarities.

Poetry does not necessarily presuppose a formalized style of speaking or writing. Composer and poet John Cage (1961) clarified that

poetry is not prose simply because poetry is in one way or another formalized. It is not poetry by reason of its content or ambiguity but by reason of its allowing musical elements (time, sound) to be introduced to the world of words. (Cage, p. x)

The lyrical description of poetry as the introduction of time and sound into the world of words suggests its close relation to music. Poetry, like music, is a "temporal art" (Paz, 1985/1990, p. 49) where "things follow one after the other" (Paz, p. 49). In poetry, "word follows word" (p. 49) while in music "sound follows sound" (p. 49). The primary difference between these two traditions is that in music there is a continuous synchrony of sound (harmony, counterpoint and fugue), whereas in poetry each sound (word) must be clearly distinguished in order to comprehend its meaning (Paz, 1985/1990). A poet uses various linguistic techniques in order to juxtapose word-sounds in a way that preserves their meaning while suggesting "simultaneousness presentation" (Paz, p. 49), contiguity, and recursivity. Some of the methods that poets use to introduce simultaneity "to an art ruled by temporal succession" (Paz, p. 49) are discussed later in this chapter.

Connecting Mind and Body in the Poetic Experience

The word was born in the blood,
grew in the dark body, beating
and took flight through the lips
and the mouth.

--Pablo Neruda

The Poet's Conversation

Poets have sometimes described the process of creating a poem in a way that suggests a similar experience to the meditator who mindfully connects mind and body in moment-to-moment awareness. The creativity of the poet "is not the work of the six inch cortical area of the brain but the total human organism" (Burnshaw, 1970, p. 46). The act of composing a poem reflects the communion between "various elements of the poet's being" (Levertov, 1979, p. 256).

Ear and eye, intellect and passion, interrelate more subtly than at other times, and the "checking for accuracy," for precision of language, that must take place throughout the writing is not a matter of one element supervising the others but of the interaction between all the elements involved. (Levertov, p. 256)

T.S. Eliot (1950) said that if a poet only looks into the heart, he or she is "not looking deep enough. . . . One must look into the cerebral cortex, the nervous system, the digestive tracts (Eliot, p. 250). In other words, poetry originates not in abstract thinking (divided mind and body) but in the multiple and diverse exchanges of information within the poet's mind and body. Poet Michael McLure (1982) explained it this way:

It is our over abstracted nature that does not see the complexity, or feel the complexity of the body. . . . A theory of the development of poetry surely will reflect poetry's origins in the body and in the growing complexity and diversity of the body[;] . . . there is no separation between body and mind. (McLure, p. 42)

The bodily involvement in sounding a word is a distinct part the word's "personality" (Ciardi & Williams, p. 103). Sounded words that are rhythmically phrased echo the poet's bodily movements, defining poetic language as the "external and communicative aspect" (Burnshaw, 1970, p. 13) of the body's motion. The poet Robert Kelly (1991) suggested that the syllables of the poem, the poem's shape, are the breath patterns, the "deep metabolic rhythms" (Kelly, p. 164) that are borrowed from the poet's body, "the ground swell" (p. 164). Poems "signal" (p. 164) the "personal (body) transcending itself into what is sharing, shared: Speech" (p. 164).

The Poet's Conversation With Others

In the silence of my room
 the murmur of my body:
 unheard.
 One day I will hear its thoughts.
 The afternoon
 has stopped:
 and yet--it goes on.
 My body hears the body of my wife
 and answers:
 this is called music.
 --Octavio Paz

Different from meditation (which keeps the meditator's gaze focused inward on the private experience of mind-body), "poetry holds forth" and "shares" (Snyder, 1991,

p. 2) the poet's experience with the world. Poetry "is a conversation with words . . . in which you allow those words to speak back with you[;] . . . poetry is a conversation with yourself[;]. . . poetry is a conversation with the world" (Nye, 1995, p. 321). Poets know that even if poetry begins in the rhythms of their own bodies, in the conversations with themselves, it ends in the physical rhythms of the listener's body (Ong, 1977)--"It begins in one and ends in another" (Burnshaw, 1970, p. 309). Poets and listeners are connected in a "seamless web" (p. 309), whereby "the poem ceases to exist as the object of words that it was, once it has been incorporated by the listener" (Burnshaw, p. 13).

The specific linguistic techniques that poets use to weave a "seamless web" of poetic experience centers on attaining and holding the attention of the listener, so that "what is transmitted [is] easy to assimilate" (Brown, 1991, p. 77).

Bound together by much repetition, a flowing rhythm, and a constant reference to shared experience, the result is a matrix of words, memories and feelings, each element supporting the others. (Brown, p. 77)

Octavio Paz (1956/1973) wrote about the recursive connection between poet and reader; his thoughts, nevertheless, are applicable to poet and listener. "Poet and reader are two moments of a single reality. Alternating in a manner that may aptly be called cyclical, their rotation

engenders the spark: poetry" (Paz, p. 28). The single reality that poet and listener together create, turns round, weaving listener and poet, poet and listener into a rhythmical "kind of whole" (Ong, 1956/1973, p. 277). The exchange of information which they share is valued not for its analytical "correctness," but more for its experiential "impact" (Ong, p. 277).

Those who listen and participate in the poet's shared poetic sounds interpret the meanings into bodily feelings and movements. Rhythmically sounded words have at their origin the pulse of the bloodstream; they "embody and echo" (Packard, 1992, p. 35) "biological unities of thought and feeling" (Langer, 1953, p. 258). A poetic musician explained it this way:

It seems clear from what we already know that rhythm is a way of transmitting a description of experience, in such a way that the experience is re-created in the person receiving it, not merely as an "abstraction" or an emotion but as a physical effect on the organism--on the blood, on the breathing, on the physical patterns of the brain. . . . [It is] a means of transmitting our experience in so powerful a way that the experience can be literally lived by others. . . . It is more than a metaphor; it is a physical experience as real as any other. (Williams in Sidran, 1971, p. 8)

The Poet's Intention

The poet uses language in a way that experientially absorbs the listener's attention through rhythmically sounded words. Attention to sound is a prerequisite for the listener and poet. The poet intentionally fixates the listener's attention by establishing and altering rhythms of

speech (Preminger & Bogan, 1993) and gradually weaves a context, different in "manner and mood" (Finnegan, 1992, p. 25) from the habitual, day-to-day, "abstract attitude" (Varela et al., 1991, p. 25) of thinking one thing while doing another. Attention to sound is the trademark of the poet. Without attention to the immediate sounds of the environment and the tenor within, what poems, asked the poet Denise Levertov (1973), "could possibly come into existence?" (p. 54).

The poet's intention is not to inform but to evoke (Burnshaw, 1970), whereas the listener's intention is to participate in the poem. By participating in poems, listeners not only make the poet's "performance whole" (Cicardi & Williams, p. 12), they make it distinctively theirs. The poem, after all, is an "event" (p. 12) that happens when poets and listeners "meet inside the form" (p. 12). The poet Margaret Gibson (1991) viewed it this way: "A poem [is] the skillful means that draws and holds [the reader] . . . and whatever I am together--within the skin of the poem those two inscribed, made briefly one thing" (Gibson, p. 86). Encountering poets inside their poems is another way of saying that listeners make real for themselves "those connections between things that poets see as real" (Cicardi & Williams, 1975, p. 12). The poet does not attempt to "create or recreate his own experience and to

pass it on" (Dickey, 1989, p. 146); rather, the poet tries to awaken the listener's poetic sensibilities.

Awakening poetic sensibilities can be interpreted as engaging and connecting body and mind through rhythmical phrasing and imagistic words that connote associative and multiple meanings (Johnson, 1987). Stanley Burnshaw (1970) noted that the words of the poem, while retaining their communicative power as rational utterances, also contain "expressive-evocative powers" (Burnshaw, p. 80).

Words are created by the human body--through alterations in breath and muscle, different sounds are produced and performed. Olson (1989) defined poetry as "projective verse" (Olson, p. 147) and the rhythm of the poetic line as "breath-reflected-in-distinctive-sounds" (Olson, p. 147). Poet Robert Haas (1995) maintained that to repeat someone's poem is the same as speaking "in that person's breath" (Haas, p. 195). He concluded that poets have a responsibility "to love and care about the rhythms and sounds of the language" (p. 195) since they are "putting that inside other people" (p. 195).

Poetic Devices

The poet uses a number of poetic devices to enhance the listener's mind-body experience. By arranging words in different relationships, and by altering the syntax and grammar of everyday prose, the poet changes how phenomena are ordinarily experienced or perceived. With this in mind,

I will now examine some specific linguistic techniques that are commonly shared among poets.

Ambiguity

Poets employ various poetic devices to activate the listener's participation. One method is ambiguity, which arouses the listener's attention by creating an uncertain feeling that "what is not necessarily so, might be so" [and] what has not been said has been suggested" (Cicardi & Williams, p. 147). Ambiguity encourages the listener to turn within and to wander about searching for an appropriate meaning to resolve the ambivalent feeling.

The poet's method for energizing the listener to become a "producer" (Barthes, 1970/1974, p. 4) of meaningful connections, rather than a "consumer" (Barthes, p. 4) of poetic products, is to use words or phrases that may denote one thing but connote a variety of meanings. It is said that when ambiguity is intentionally used, the multiplicity of "undermeanings" (Cicardi & Williams, 1975, p. 147) "imparts chordal richness and largeness to language" (Myers & Simms, 1989, p. 11).

Antithesis

Sometimes poets move poems forward through antithesis, which means holding two opposite ideas in one statement (Myers & Simms, 1989). Juggling two opposing concepts of "similar grammatical constructions" (Myers & Simms, p. 20), poets create a dramatic tension that holds the listener's

attention and makes thoughts more memorable (Brown, 1991). Consider the illuminating example of antithesis in Hamlet's agonized "To be or not to be" (Shakespeare, 1969, p. 936).

Images

Images are words that re-present or re-produce sensory experiences (Paz, 1956/1973). As one of the most distinctive elements of poetic language, images present in a simple imagined picture a sensuous "intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time" (Ezra Pound in Packard, 1989, p. 93). Images, said Octavio Paz (1956/1973), "summon . . . evoke, resuscitate, awaken, [and] re-create moments of perceptions" (Paz, p. 94), sensations that were once perceived. Word-images encourage us to "remember that which we have forgotten" (p. 94). Images are not only visual, but they are also felt, heard, smelled and tasted. Poet Anne Sexton said that they are the heart of poetic language (Anne Sexton in Packard, 1992). One way of entering into the multiple themes and undermeanings in poetic verse is by tracking the various images that the poet uses. Images can be examined according to what they denote and connote.

Ezra Pound (1989) depicted images as "radiant node[s] or cluster[s] . . . from which ideas are constantly rushing" (Pound in Preminger & Brogan, 1993, p. 557). Octavio Paz (1956/1973) defined them in terms of opposites. He said that an image reflects "unity" and "plurality" (Paz, p. 85)--an "identity of opposites" that "attack[s] the foundations of

. . . [logical] thinking" (p. 85). To logically tease apart the "plurality of qualities [and] sensations" (p. 93) that compose an image will destroy the moment of perception that the image is supposed to re-produce (Paz, 1956/1973).

Poetic Metaphor

Metaphors extend simple images (Packard, 1992) by associating one image with another, and by ascribing one or more qualities of the second image to the first. In other words, metaphors suggest certain parallels, commonalities, or paradoxical connections between images. Hulme (1924) referred to the metaphor as a "visual chord" (p. 84) or the simultaneous presentation to the mind of two different images which, in turn, creates the new image or idea.

Poetic metaphors engage the imagination of the listener by holding in interactive tension the similarities and differences between two images or concepts. As a poetic device, metaphors provide the possibility for a "unique thrill of insight" (Packard, 1989, p. 121) that comes when one recognizes the "sameness" (p. 121) that underlies the "difference in things" (p. 121). Poetic metaphors are memorable, "allowing for easy memory formation and retrieval" (Brown, 1991, p. 132). Poets use metaphors to engender unforgettable experiences that play a very important role in influencing how and what the listener recalls (Brown, 1991; McLuaghlin, 1990; Ong, 1977, 1982;

Zumthor, 1990). Hirshfield (1991) described the nature of linguistic metaphors in these terms:

At the heart of how poetry works is a dynamic connection suspended in emptiness: the connection between words and understandings is always a leap across a void. . . . By working near the limits of speech or imagination, a poem raises both the connective power and the openness of language up to consciousness. (Hirshfield, p. 151)

Eagleton (1983) described all poetic discourse and its complex relationships as a "metaphor of metaphors," a "system of systems," a "relation of relations" (Eagleton, p. 102).

Rhythm

Rhythm is a relation of difference and similarity: this sound is not this one, this sound is like that one. Rhythm is the original metaphor and encompasses all the others. It says: succession is repetition, time is nontime. The instant dissolves in the succession of other nameless instants. In order to save it we must convert it into a rhythm.

--Octavio Paz

Converting a moment of time into rhythm in language is the "movement of language through patterns" (Cicardi & Williams, 1975, p. 137) of sound variations. Rhythmical variations in sound (duration and pace) is reflected in stresses and pauses. Stress is the emphasis which is placed on a syllable; stresses range from heavy to light. A pause (caesura) comes after or before a syllable. In poetry, a pause is frequently marked by punctuation which corresponds to a breath-pause, a "phrasal break within the poetic line" (Preminger, 1986, p. 238).

Rhythmical patterns of sound variations increase the attention and heighten the listener's expectation.

Rhythm provokes an expectation, arouses a yearning. If it is interrupted, we feel a shock. Something has been broken. If it continues, we expect something that we cannot identify precisely. Rhythm engenders in us a state of mind that will only be calmed when "something" happens. It puts us in an attitude of waiting. We feel that the rhythm is moving toward something, even though we may not know what that something is. (Paz, 1956/1973, pp. 45-46)

The tension between the listener's anticipation and the fulfillment of that expectation is the "underlying dialectic" (Myers & Simms, 1989, p. 262) that evokes the poetic experience.

Rhythmical patterns, wrote Ezra Pound, are "perhaps the most primal of all things known to us" (in Packard, 1992, p. 36). The two-beat, accentual rhythm of the English language (iambic) is said to reflect the normal rhythmical pace of the human heart (Packard, 1992). Unlike the equally measured beats of the human heart that give life to the organism, in poetic language, the same beat maintained over time, line after line of perfectly metrical syllables, is monotonous and lifeless. If poetic language is to engage and hold the listener's attention, there has to be change in pace.

Since all elements of poetic language interact with each other, one of the best ways to analyze a poem is to note the relationships between the elements, or how they play off of each other. The interplay between these linguistic components creates the relationships that are

"inseparable from what the poem is and what the poem means" (Cicardi & Williams, p. 361). For example, the poem's meaning may be found in tracking images or metaphors, but it also may be located in the silences or in the "breaks" "between," when the rhythm changes, when the expected accent is missed (Paz, 1985/1990). The motions and countermotions of poetic diction are reflected in the "alliance between repetition and surprise, recurrence and invention, continuity and interruption" (Paz, 1985/1990, p. 9). Knowing this, poets "awaken the secret powers of languages" (Paz, 1956/1973, p. 45), not "in the manner of spells and sortileges" (Paz, p. 45) but by rhythmical variations.

The poet bewitches language by means of rhythm. One image sprouts from another. . . . [R]hythm distinguishes the poem from all other literary forms. The poem is a mass of phrases, a verbal order, founded on rhythm. (Paz, p. 45)

Refrains

Poetry is governed by the twofold principle of variety within unity[:]. . . repetition and surprise.

--Octavio Paz

The movement in language through patterned sounds is varied not only through rhyme but also through the repetition of words and phrases or refrains.

Repetitions tend to slow down the poem's motion

(Cicardi & Williams, 1975) by "turning [or] revolving"

(Preminger & Brogan, 1993, p. 1035) the repeated phrase back on itself.

In poetry, repetition of a phrase has the "paired advantage . . . [of] repeating what is already known and providing a connecting pathway" (Brown, 1991, p. 75) between "active memory [and the immediate or] current situation" (Brown, p. 74). In other words, words and phrases that echo each other "solve effectively the problem of retaining and retrieving memorable experiences" (Ong, 1982, p. 34).

The "gradual overlapping of ideas builds a bridge" (Brown, p. 75) from what is already known "toward new constructions and new understandings. 'It is a difference contained within the same.' The apparent redundancy is in fact a recursive process, an organic cumulative change" (Brown, p. 75). The word *refrain* comes from the Latin word, *refrangere*, "to break;" (Packard, 1989, p. 153) thus, a refrain is broken off or separated from the rest of the poem, only to return again and again, "the way a wave breaks, always falling backwards on itself" (Packard, p. 153).

Rhyme

Motion in language is produced through patterns or variations in the sound's intensity (stress) and quality (Cicardi & Williams, 1975). In language, sound resonates when syllables or words echo each other, creating a harmony or "patterning of aural effects" (Packard, p. 157). Since resonating or rhyming sounds

are easier to remember than sounds that do not echo each other, rhyming is one of the fundamental mnemonic techniques used by poets (Havelock, 1963; Ong, 1977, 1982). It is a well known phenomenon in ritual and artistic expression that certain repetitions of echoing sounds (incantations) induce trance-like states (Edmonston, 1986; Havelock, 1963; Ong, 1977, 1982).

Rhyme is usually vital to poetry since it gives language the effect of texture, by enriching and deepening the complexity of sounds. If a poet does not use rhyme, then the absence of it must be accounted for and justified with the use of other poetic techniques that move the poem forward (Cicardi & Williams, 1975). Poetry with little (scattered) or no rhyme ("free verse") is closer to prose than formally rhymed verse (Preminger, 1986).

End rhyme is when the end of a word echoes the end of another word (fit/sit), whereas assonance and alliteration are internal rhymes located at the beginning, middle or end of a word. Assonance is an echoing or rhyming vowel sound that creates a very lyrical, harmonious patterning of sound. Alliteration, the repetition of consonant sounds, is used to produce a "strong tactile texture of sound" (Packard, 1992, p. 44).

Poetic Meaning in the Between: Silence

Silence is anything but absence...it is the fullness of the present instant.

--G.C. Fiumara

Enamored of silence, the poet's only recourse is to speak. . . . The poem is the trajectory between . . . the wish to speak and the silence that fuses the wishing and speaking.

--Octavio Paz

Silence is the life of poetry; the silence that hears us at the end of every line of poetry.

--Robert Kelly

Although analyzing poetic techniques may tease apart some of the different elements that make up a poem, even the most thorough analysis cannot explain the poetic experience. The words of the poem "reach out in all directions" (Burnshaw, 1970, p. 85), conditioning and reflecting all the other poetic elements around them. The meaning of a poem, much like the meaning of a trance, is found not in the components that make up the poem, but in the relationships between the linguistic elements, and between the poet and listener of the poem (Picard, 1952).

When we look for the meaning of a poem, we want to ask the question, as the poet and critic do, "How does the poem mean?" (Cicardi & Williams, 1975, p. 4), rather than "What does the poem mean?" If we ask "how" instead of "what," we look not only at the various elements of the poem's structure, but we examine how the different images, metaphors, ambiguities, motions and counter-motions interact.

Poet Jane Hirshfield (1991) likens the interdependence among the many different elements in a poem to the Chinese Buddhist image of the Jeweled Net of Indra. Imagine a gigantic net that extends infinitely in all directions of the universe. At the center of each intersection of the intertwining net is a shimmering jewel. Each jewel, or element in a poem, is "joined by a wide mesh" (Hirshfield, p. 151). Each jewel is "a universe, and all of them glimmer in the reflected light of one another's existence" (p. 151), producing an intricate, interdependent connectedness. Some poets and literary scholars have claimed that focusing on the relationships between the "jewels," (the poem's aggregates), releases the poem's meaning (Armantrout, 1985; Cicardi & Williams, 1975). Poet Anna Kamienska proposed that the silences between the various elements of a poem suggest "a means of communication that is universal and more efficient than words" (Jaworski, 1993, p. 161).

Poets know how to speak the silence that communicates between words. Discursive language is usually spoken with words that arise not from silence but from other words, like "mere verbal noise [that] moves uninterruptedly along the horizontal line of the sentence" (Fiumara, 1990, p. 169). Words that do not come out of silence but that come from other words lose their "source of refreshment and renewal" (Picard, 1952, p. 26). In poetry, speech and silence remain connected--without silence, there can be no interpretation

of the words (Jaworski, 1993). "Silence is the life of poetry . . . [it] hears us at the end of every line" (Kelly, 1991, p. 165).

In ancient traditions, languages were "constructed radially, always beginning from and returning to the center that is silence . . . like a bird hovering and advancing in circles" (Picard, 1952, p. 26). In modern, literate traditions, language "seems to arise from the movements of a man walking straight forward[:] . . . every word and every sentence speeds on to the next" (p. 44).

The language that breathes silence (Picard, 1952) is not static, linear or fixed in space as the image of Indra's Net may seem to imply. The language that comes out of silence is deeply alive and ever-changing, with every linguistic element interacting with and mutually causing the other, so that no single poetic element stands alone, immutable. The silence between words, or the value in what is not seen and not heard, is evoked in the poetic verse by the Chinese poet and philosopher, Lao Tze:

We put thirty spokes together and call it a wheel;
 But it is on the space where there is nothing that
 the utility of the wheel depends,
 We turn clay to make a vessel;
 But it is on the space where there is nothing that
 the utility of the vessel depends.
 Therefore, just as we take advantage of what is,
 we should recognize the utility of what is not.
 (in Fiumara, 1990, p. 102)

Poetic and Hypnotic Experiences

Tracking the various elements that compose a poem does not necessarily explain poetic experiences any more than detailing the practice of meditation explains meditative experiences. A similar explanatory dilemma arises with trying to chronicle the different components that create hypnotic experiences. The syntax, or the patterned arrangement that holds together the various elements of the hypnotic conversation between a hypnotist and client, like the poem's structure, "releases . . . meaning; it does not say it" (Cicardi & Williams, p. 371).

Altered Perceptions: Non-Logical

Listen to the presences inside poems,
Let them take you where they will.

--Rumi

Rational, abstract thought with its separative assumptions cannot be used in creating and experiencing poetry, nor can it be used in developing and experiencing trance. What is required in both poetry and hypnosis is a change in perception. The poet, said Valery (1958),

is obliged to speculate on sound and sense at once, and to satisfy not only harmony and musical timing but all the various intellectual and aesthetic conditions[,] not to mention the conventional rules. . . . You can see what an effort the poet's undertaking would require if he had consciously to solve all these problems.
(Valery, p. 68)

Just as the poet cannot attend to all the multiple complexities of composing a poem with abstract thought, the hypnotherapist's attention to important details requires a

change from logical thinking. Erickson said, "If I have any doubt about my capacity to see important things, I go into a trance. When there is a crucial issue with a patient and I don't want to miss any of the clues I go into trance" (Erickson & Rossi, 1977, p. 42).

Altering perceptions, requires first of all, changing the "manner and mood . . . apart from everyday speech and prose utterance" (Finnegan, 1992, p. 25). When hypnotists change their speech patterns to correspond with their client's body rhythms, their talk reflects rhythmical variations that are different from ordinary prose. Meditators who bring awareness to the cacophony of inner thoughts shift their attention away from the usual concern with content of thought to the process of thinking. Likewise, the poet Naomi Shihab Nye (1995) said that poetry asks people to stop and take notice of "the things which often go unnoticed. . . . [Poetry says]: Pause. Take note. A story is being told through this thing" (Nye, p. 324). Changing one's ordinary focus of attention and slowing down to notice the unnoticed may, in turn, alter the usual patterns of irregular breath, scattered thoughts, reactive and unmindful responses.

Poetic rhythms can abolish one's "fixation on reality" (Rieser, 1969, p. 24) that is the "mark of prosaic thought-activity" (Rieser, p. 24) and "which . . . forms the basic presupposition of realistic-analytic thought" (p. 24). The

purpose of rhythmical sound patterns, said the poet William Butler Yeats (1961),

is to prolong the moment of contemplation, the moment when we are both asleep and awake, which is the one moment of creation, by hushing us with an alluring monotony, while it holds us by variety, to keep us in that state of perhaps real trance, in which the mind liberated from the pressure of the will is unfolded in symbols. (Yeats, p. 159)

The patterned language of the poet who creates the spell-binding poem can be likened to the patterning of language that hypnotists use to create an effective trance. By engaging their listeners' attention in rhythmical sound variations, both hypnotists and poets liberate thinking from its fixed patterns of analytical, "disembodied" (Varela et al., 1991, p. 27) mental activity.

Mapping Patterned Relationships

According to Mary Catherine Bateson (1972/1991), many people "have incomplete access to the complexit[ies] that [compose their lives] (Bateson, p. 288). "One reason why poetry is important" (p. 228), said Bateson, is because it reflects "a set of [patterned] relationships" that gets

mapped onto a level of diversity in us that we don't ordinarily have access to. . . . We need poetry as knowledge about the world and about ourselves, because of this mapping from complexity to complexity. (pp. 288-289)

The notion of mapping patterned relationships of poetic diction (for example, rhythmical variations) to a "level of diversity" which is ordinarily not accessible to most people is especially relevant for describing the patterned

communications between hypnotists and clients. When hypnotists speak in time with their clients' breathing patterns, they map complex rhythmical speech patterns onto complex body rhythms. Mapping complexity onto complexity in this way helps clients temporarily set aside their "habitual . . . conscious processes" (Gilligan, 1987, p. 49), which enables them to access "a different level of experience" (Gilligan, p. 49).

Concluding Thoughts

In this chapter, I described poetic diction as a language that mirrors the mind-body conversation of the poet. The conversation that poets have with themselves, and, in turn, with the world, gives rise to poetic speech--a kind of expanded knowing that reflects the body as much as the mind. The recursive relation (or conversation) between the poet's rhythmically sounded words and the listener's active participation, turns together, connecting them in a reflexive mind-body conversational domain.

In Chapter Six, I will use the ideas discussed in this chapter to examine a transcribed hypnotic conversation. While poetic distinctions offer a set of linguistic categories with which to examine the language of interpersonal process, they do not provide a way to examine interactive patterns of communication or hypnotherapeutic change. Thus, in Chapter Five, I will address the fifth objective of this study by developing a set of research

methods selected from qualitative research traditions. These methods together with poetic distinctions will render a methodology for investigating the interpersonal process of hypnosis.

CHAPTER FIVE

METHODOLOGY

In Chapter Four, some of the richly patterned, non-logical characteristics of poetic diction were examined. Chapter Five delineates the qualitative methodologies that I used to investigate the interpersonal process of hypnosis in Chapter Six. In Chapter Five, I describe the case study and the particular session that was analyzed, the reasons for selecting the hypnotherapist, case, and session, and some of the ethical concerns and confidentiality issues that were connected with this study. This chapter also includes a discussion of how the data were gathered, the analytical strategies that were used in the analysis, and how the text was "scored." I also delineate the methods for establishing trustworthiness in this study.

Key Issues and How They Were Addressed

For the investigation of the interpersonal process of hypnosis, I will develop and integrate a "close-knit set" (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p. 2) of qualitative, analytical methods that will be used with poetic distinctions to examine a transcribed hypnotherapeutic session. My major focus of interest is the interactive patterns of communication between a hypnotist and client during one session. Thus, I will closely attend to their verbal and non-verbal behaviors. I also describe and utilize data that were gathered from three previous sessions, and two post-hypnosis interviews with the client.

My analysis focuses on what transpired interactively between the two participants. I drew from process-oriented research, as well as conversation and discourse methods in my analytic approach to the data. In Chapter Six, the data will be presented in a way that reflected some of the interactive mind-body discourse between the hypnotist and client. The spoken words were transformed into written text and then scored according to variations in breath patterns, pauses, intonations, and repetitions. Descriptions of the client's body behaviors were presented in the written text parallel with the hypnotist's verbal communications.

Even though my examination of the data was, in part, guided by specific poetic distinctions, my orientation to the data was one of discovery and openness to unexpected possibilities. It is my intention to provide readers with enough details that will enable them to determine what information from this study is applicable to other hypnotherapeutic cases. Close attention to the unique ways the hypnotist and client patterned their interactions highlights the characteristics that are common among all hypnotic conversations (regardless of the hypnotist's theoretical orientation). The criteria that establishes the trustworthiness of this analysis will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

Qualitative Research Traditions

Faced with the imposing task that many researchers confront when analyzing naturally occurring, complex, interactive processes of therapeutic communication, I chose to adopt a qualitative research approach for my study of hypnosis. Denzin and Lincoln (1994) define qualitative research as "multimethod in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalist approach to . . . [the] subject matter" (Denzin & Lincoln, p. 2). Qualitative researchers use multiple methods in order to "secure an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in question" (p. 2). They do not change or manipulate the focus of their study--they attempt to describe and understand "naturally occurring phenomena in their naturally occurring states" (Patton, 1990, p. 41).

Some qualitative researchers assume that the nature of reality is socially constructed and that everyone interprets their experiences differently. Thus, they do not seek to find or establish absolute truths; rather, they endeavor to construct and interpret the meaning-making process in terms of themselves as researchers, and the people they study (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Patton, 1990; Polkinghorne, 1983; Schwandt, 1994).

Biases and Interpretive Perspectives

Fundamental to most qualitative research traditions is the researcher's conviction that there is no value-free

research (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). One of the specific methods that enable qualitative researchers and analysts to get a better grasp of the subject is the articulation of their biases and interpretive perspectives that shape the parameters of their studies.

In this study, the investigation of hypnosis was fashioned by the premise that my findings would be "value mediated" (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 110): That which is "known . . . is inextricably intertwined with the interaction" (p. 110) between myself as the analyst and that which I'm analyzing. I came to this study of hypnosis with an "unabashedly subjective" (Greene, 1994, p. 539) perspective that was "imbued" (Greene, p. 539) with a set of assumptions that biased this inquiry in particular ways (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Steier, 1991a, 1991b; Wolcott, 1994). Although specific assumptions influenced the focus of this study and the boundaries of its analysis (Wolcott, 1994), I anticipated discovering and learning something new during the process of investigation that would challenge my presuppositions (Bamberger & Schon, 1991; Greenberg, 1986).

My study and practice of hypnosis, meditation, and poetry have engaged my curiosity as to the ways the different traditions connect, and how each might be useful in an explanation of the other. Because I am interested in the relation between hypnosis and meditation, I was curious if my understanding and practice of one would teach me

something new about the other. Language has also intrigued me. I am fascinated by how hypnotists and poets configure words to create opportunities for different kinds of experiences.

Some of the biases that influenced the focus of this study were that perceptions of phenomena do not represent the world as it is (Bruner, 1986): What we perceive are "representation[s] . . . description[s] . . . learned and maintained through conditioning" (Cleary, 1990, p. xviii). Perceptions are multiple and varied (among different individuals and cultures), and there is no one true way of perceiving phenomena (Guba & Lincoln, 1994).

Like perception, language is socially constructed. It is not a transporter of definitive meanings that symbolize the world as it is (Korzybski, 1958). Notions that divide mind and body, self and other are "learned and maintained through conditioning" (Cleary, 1990, p. xiii). These beliefs reflect the process of separative, abstract thinking, and the divisive syntax of discursive language.

Hypnosis, meditation, and poetry are reflexive practices that offer non-logical ways of perceiving and experiencing phenomena. Practitioners in each tradition focus on the interface between mind and body. Metaphors that describe these recursive practices suggest interdependent exchanges of communication between body and mind.

I concur with Denzin (1994) when he says that qualitative researchers and analysts learn about their research perspectives by considering how they "make sense" (p. 501) of their lives. With this in mind, the interpretive approach that, perhaps, best mirrors how I have made sense of my life (or biases) is defined, in part, by Altheide and Johnson (1994) as an analytical realism.

[Analytical realism] is founded on the view that the social world is an interpreted world. It is interpreted by the subjects we study. It is interpreted by the qualitative researcher. It is based on the value of trying to represent faithfully and accurately the social worlds or phenomena studied. . . . Analytical realism assumes that the meanings and definitions brought to actual situations are produced through a communication process. (p. 489)

Sampling Strategy

In order to delve into, and learn a good deal of information about particular issues that are central to their investigation, qualitative researchers often purposefully choose a single case sample as the focus of their study (Patton, 1990; Stake, 1994).

The logic and power of purposeful sampling lies in selecting *information-rich* cases for study in depth. Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the research. (Patton, 1990, p. 169)

The case selected for analysis in this study is representative of a hypnotherapeutic conversation between a hypnotist and client that engages the client's mind and body in the hypnotic talk. Through rhythmical variations in speech, rhymes, repetitions, sounds, and silences, the

hypnotist engaged the client's mind and body in a particularly lively hypnotic dialogue. The investigation of this "information-rich" (Patton, p. 169) single case study highlighted the specific hypnotist-client interactions that facilitated hypnotherapeutic change.

It is my intention to provide readers with "as much information as possible" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 201) about the hypnotist-client interaction. With this in mind, the analysis was informed by Patton's (1990) ideas about "critical case sampling" (Patton, p. 174). Furnishing readers with an "information-rich" analysis should enable them to determine what from the analysis of the chosen hypnotic conversation is applicable to other hypnotic conversations.

Critical case sampling.

"While studying one or a few critical cases does not technically permit broad generalizations to all possible cases" (p. 174), wrote Patton, an in-depth analysis will provide the context for readers to make "logical generalizations" (p. 175) from the findings "produced in studying [this] single, critical case" (p. 175).

To provide readers with enough information so they may deduce for themselves what can be logically generalized from one context to another, I described, in Chapter Six, some of the specific characteristics that gave this particular

hypnotic interaction "its unique flavor" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 201).

Choosing the Hypnotherapist

Since I am building bridges among different traditions, (Buddhist meditation and hypnosis; hypnosis and poetry), I have throughout this dissertation selected and discussed the scholars, teachers, poets, and hypnotists whose ideas facilitate bridge building. Although the work of any hypnotherapist could be analyzed in this study, it behooved me to study a hypnotic session of a hypnotherapist who is informed by some of the same ideas that I am investigating. The hypnotherapeutic work of Douglas Flemons, whose hypnotic conversation with a client was analyzed in this study, reflects his philosophical grounding in Gregory Bateson's systems theory and Taoism, his mind-body practices of T'ai Chi Chuan, and his poetic sensibilities (Flemons, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c, 1995).

Flemons is a respected and accomplished hypnotherapist, academic scholar, and family therapist. He has presented his ideas about hypnotherapy, brief therapy, and qualitative research at national and international conferences. He has also conducted several basic and advanced trainings for psychotherapists on his "relational approach to the understanding and practice of hypnosis" (Flemons, 1994a). Author of the book *Completing Distinctions* (which interweaves Gregory Bateson's ideas, Taoism, and family

therapy), Flemons has published many highly regarded professional articles on hypnosis, family business, brief therapy, and supervision. Presently authoring forthcoming books on hypnosis and academic writing, Flemons brings his elegant, parsimonious, relational way of thinking to the fields of hypnotherapy, psychotherapy, teaching, and academic and professional scholarship.

With Flemons as my dissertation advisor, the choice to closely examine his hypnotherapeutic work might suggest certain limitations to the analysis. In other words, do I have the freedom to critique Flemons's work given our academic relationship?

I chose a hypnosis case that *the client* determined was helpful. My interest in this study was not to evaluate the success of a hypnotherapeutic session, but, rather, to examine the mind-body conversation between a hypnotist and client. While Flemons's ideas about hypnosis have been influential in my understanding of hypnotherapy, I had very little contact with him for more than a year as I explored and formulated the different ideas that constitute my own approach hypnosis. The latitude that I experience in my relationship with Flemons to develop my own ideas that are distinct from his, suggests a similar freedom that I have in examining his hypnotherapeutic work.

Before I can address the reasons for selecting the particular hypnotherapeutic session that was examined in

this dissertation, and the methods of collecting and analyzing the data that were employed, I need to introduce the particularities of the case. This will provide the necessary background of thought for understanding what this investigation of the interpersonal process of hypnosis entailed.

Case Study: The Presenting Problem

Anna, an accountant in a successful law firm, was concerned that she was falling behind in work. She was experiencing pain in the joints of her fingers, hands, and hips which was affecting her sleep, concentration, and ability to work. Worried about not being able to complete her responsibilities, Anna became more anxious, and the anxiety seemed to exacerbate the pain.

While Anna knew that she should take sick leave, missing work felt like a "double-edged sword." She was aware that her work would continue to accumulate, and that she would have to double her efforts when she returned. Before contacting her medical physician, Anna decided to try hypnosis as an "alternative method" to drug therapy. Having heard about Dr. Douglas Flemons through a mutual friend, she contacted him for an appointment.

After speaking with Anna about her concerns, Douglas informed her that I was interested in gathering hypnosis data for my doctoral dissertation. He asked her if she would be interested participating in an academic research project

to determine if hypnosis could be used to benefit her. He said that in the "spirit of seeing what would happen," he would hypnotize her and video record their sessions; if the recordings were suitable for the research project, they could be used as data for further analysis. Intrigued by the idea of being part of a research study, Anna readily agreed. She said that she would like to participate in the study because she was considering a career change that would entail going to graduate school. She added that being part of an academic study might help her make the decision if she really wanted to return to school. Anna also agreed to participate in one or two follow-up interviews with me as part of the research project. The first hypnosis session was scheduled for the following week.

Setting and Background of the Case Study

There were five hypnosis sessions; Anna and Douglas met once a week for five consecutive weeks. All of the sessions were conducted in one of the therapy rooms at a university family therapy clinic. The room was equipped with two video recording cameras and a two-way mirror. Audio recordings made of the five video recorded sessions were transcribed. In the following description of the first session, the client's words were taken from the written transcription of the audio recording.

During the first session, Douglas asked Anna to describe her symptoms. She said that for approximately six

weeks, every joint in her body (except her elbows), hurt with a "swollen, achy, burny feeling." One knuckle on her left hand was particularly painful and distorted with swelling. Douglas asked whether the finger joint had become more painful after she had noted the inflammation, and Anna said that her first response was to ignore it. She said,

I don't look at painful things. I don't know why I don't do that, but I go through a whole process of trying to ignore it and it'll go away sort of thing. I'm too busy for it. . . . But once the pain didn't go away, and once I was starting to wake up at night from it, and it was clearly becoming an issue, I just looked, and then, once I look, I don't stop looking Now I'm attending very closely. I'll look. Even if I wake up in the middle of the night, I'll go, "Oh, yeah. It is worse or it is better."

She said that now, since she had "started looking" at her distorted finger, she hated seeing it, since the inflammation seemed to "make it more real."

The first time that Anna experienced painful joints was approximately six years earlier. The doctors that she consulted at that time did not detect any swelling in her joints, either visually or with x-rays; they diagnosed her symptoms as stress-related (she had just closed her business and was about to get married). Anna related that family and friends were more or less telling her that she was crazy.

[They said to me,] "Just find something you like to really do. Settle down. Change your life. It's all in your head. If you feel better about yourself and everything else, it'll go away." So, I just got tired of it all and I said, fine, I'd rather be crazy than sick, I'll be crazy. That's when I started to ignore it all.

When Douglas asked Anna about the stress that she might be experiencing at the time, she responded that she was "far less stressed" than she had ever been. Douglas remarked that he didn't know too many professionals who had as busy a schedule as she did who were not "stressed out in some way," and Anna said,

I don't say that I don't have any stress, or that I've got stress all locked up and under control. But it's so minimal compared to the way it used to be that I'm surprised. I truly am surprised. . . . Certainly, I struggle with getting the work done and that sort of thing, but I've minimized pressure in every respect. Any of the pressure things that were happening are not happening any more.

When questioned about whether she was going to see a physician, Anna said that she wanted to avoid going to a doctor, although she probably would if the pain and swelling continued. She would be relieved, said Anna, if they told her that she didn't have "lupus," or some "connective tissue disorder," but she also did not want to be given a condition or a label like "arthritis," for that would just make things worse. She said that she had tried taking nonsteroidal, anti-inflammatories for one week but had to stop taking them because she was getting sores in her mouth, cramping and diarrhea. The medication had relieved some of the pain in her hips, but it had not been helpful with any of her other joints.

When Douglas asked Anna what would be the "minimal indication" for her that things were different, she replied,

That the pain in my hips would stay minimal as it is, and that ah, this finger would, the pain in this finger would not be [pause] if not the distortion at least the pain would go away, or lessen. . . . The rest are manageable. The rest of them are the way they always are. It's this one that's the trouble.

In Chapter Six, I provide a brief summary of the rest of this first session and the two sessions that followed. Since I have analyze the fourth session, a discussion of the first three sessions, prior to the analysis, will help the reader contextualize the selected hypnotic conversation. In Chapter Six, I will also discuss the fifth (the last) session, and how it was determined by Anna and Douglas to stop the hypnosis work after five sessions.

Eight months after the last meeting with Douglas, Anna and I met for a follow-up, in-depth, unstructured conversation. Eight months after that, we met a second time, during which we watched one of the video-recorded hypnosis sessions. The format of these two follow-up interviews are examined later in this chapter. The quotations in the following discussion were taken from the two audio recorded and transcribed interviews.

During the first interview, Anna reported that toward the end of the hypnosis sessions she had started to feel better. A few weeks after the sessions were over, however, an injury that she had previously ignored in her achilles heel was "not only not getting better" but it was "getting worse." She said that when she reached her threshold of pain, she went to a doctor because she was concerned that it

was a "systemic arthritis thing." When the physician examined her finger and hand, he told her that he thought that "whatever was going on . . . was not rheumatoid or anything systemic. He thought it might be an osteoarthritic kind of thing" and he advised Anna to get more aerobic exercise.

After doing some physical therapy for her heel, Anna said that she "turned to the same automatic process" that she had done after her hypnosis sessions. Telling herself that she had done all that she could do, she told her heel (like she had told her finger and hand after the hypnosis) "Okay, we've done the best we can for you now. You're going to get better and I'm not going to interfere with you anymore, no more invasive procedures."

Anna said that after the hypnosis sessions she was satisfied that she had done everything that she was willing to do at that time, but not all the things she could have done. She said,

I could have gone to doctors and all that stuff for it. So I had done all I was willing to do at that time, and also had an experience with hypnosis. It felt very comfortable and felt like it was above and beyond all I could do. . . . I felt very fortunate to have had that experience. I felt like it [finger] had had all the focus now it needs, or needed. Now it can do its own, go into remission, permanently, temporarily, whatever. I mean, who knows, life might be a remission [laughter].

During the second interview, Anna reported that she had recently experienced a flare-up of painful joints. She said that she thought that the hypnosis would have changed her

"conscious behaviors" so that her response to the flare-up would "manifest differently because something was happening automatically from unconscious developments." If that was happening, she said, "it wasn't obvious enough to me. What I noticed most was that there were a lot of the same things." She said that her first response to the flare-up was to ignore the pain, but her ignoring it did not seem to make a major difference.

My first response was, "Oh, just ignore it, it'll go away." And sometimes that worked, but when it wasn't working I continued to do it, and saying, "Well, any day now. It'll go away, it'll go away, it'll go away." I had thought that I would have found something else to do after the ignoring part was not working. Either it would work or I would do something else. But I was still in a control mode. "I can control this if I ignore it. It will go away if I ignore it."

She said that she had started doing self-hypnosis several times a week for relaxation, and that she was "kind of mad that this could happen" when she had been getting "healthier emotionally and supposedly physically." She said that she continued to do the self-hypnosis and "expected more benefits quicker"; then she started practicing the self-hypnosis differently.

Once or twice a week I would go into trance . . . with a global sort of question like, "How can I connect to what's happening here?" or "What do my fingers have to say?" or "What do my hips have to say to me?"

She said that at the same time she started to look to see how she could "simplify her life," where she could "ease up without it being too much."

And if you look, if you really look at it, you can find those places. I hadn't been looking at it because I kicked back into "let's just deny all this and it'll go away," which works sometimes, but doesn't work at other times."

At the time of the second interview, Anna reported that even though the pain had not gone away, it was "minor" and "subsiding," and that she was starting to feel better.

Reasons for Selecting the Session

Although there were five hypnosis sessions from which to choose, and in all of the sessions Anna and Douglas were actively engaged in verbal and non-verbal exchange, I selected the fourth session for the following reasons. The fourth session offered a particularly interesting opportunity to discuss hypnotherapeutic change, since during this session Anna's hands became very animated and directly engaged in shaping the hypnotic dialogue. In addition, she related at the beginning of the fifth session that she noticed a significant difference in how she was feeling; in previous sessions she had reported little to no improvement.

Rennie and Toukmanian (1992) have suggested that selecting a particular session for analysis should be determined by therapeutic events. According to these researchers, clients who are "aware of the event, [either] deliberate on its significance and decide what to do about it" (p. 245), or, as in this case, they perceive a change, a "shift in the direction of experiencing things differently" (p. 245). Anna's report of feeling considerably better in

the fifth session warranted closer scrutiny of the previous week's hypnotic interaction.

From a technical point of view, the fourth session was also a good choice because the background noises and buzzing sounds in the recording equipment during the first three meetings made it difficult and, at times, impossible to hear many of the hypnotist's words. The audio clarity of the fourth session was much improved.

An interesting incident occurred in regard to choosing the fourth session. During the first follow-up conversation with Anna, she was given the five video recordings to watch. Before we met for our second follow-up conversation, we made arrangements by telephone that we would watch one of the sessions together. When Anna arrived at our designated meeting place, she said that she had seen all five sessions. We spoke for awhile and then I asked her if she wanted to watch a particular session. When she said that it didn't matter to her, I chose the fourth one for many of the above reasons (audio clarity, vivid interaction, and so forth). After watching the tape for approximately five minutes, Anna stopped it and reported that even though she knew she had seen all of the tapes prior to our meeting, she had no memory of watching this particular session, nor did she recollect having the original hypnosis experience.

Gathering the Data

In qualitative research, using a "variety of data sources in a study" (Patton, 1990, p. 187) lessens the possibility that the study will be "vulnerable to errors" (Patton, p. 188) that are usually "linked" (p. 188) to one "particular method" (p. 188). This study of a hypnotic conversation combines data from the five transcribed video recorded hypnosis sessions, two transcribed tape recorded interviews, and a brief account of my observer involvement as an onlooker (Patton, 1990).

Raw data: Ten Video Recordings

All of the hypnosis sessions were recorded with two video cameras and two microphones; one camera focused on the client, and the other camera was centered on the hypnotist. I sat behind a two way mirror and observed the five sessions.

Audio recordings were made from the video recordings in each session that had the clearest sound. The audio recordings were transcribed, and the transcriptions were checked for accuracy against the audio and video recording. After viewing all of the sessions, the fourth session was selected as the focus for this dissertation. The transcription of this particular session was checked two more times for accuracy against the audio recording. During the analysis, session four will be compared to the video recording three times for accuracy, and five times, or more,

to add descriptions of body behaviors and other non-verbal behaviors. Information from the first three sessions relevant to the examination of the fourth session will be incorporated into the analysis.

Observations

I sat behind a two-way mirror and observed all of the hypnosis sessions. At the time that I observed the sessions, I was unaware of how the recorded data would be used. I had not yet formulated my own thoughts about hypnosis and the hypnotherapeutic relationship. I was very influenced by the ideas of the hypnotherapist, and, at the time of the recordings, unable to conceptualize a way of observing hypnotic interaction other than what I had learned from his writings and being his student.

Two Follow-Up Interviews

Approximately eight months after the last session, I met with Anna for a follow-up, two-hour interview. Approximately eight months after the first interview, I met with her for a second, three-hour interview.

The first interview was an unstructured, in-depth conversation with open-ended questions, during which Anna was asked in a very general way to reflect on the hypnosis experiences (Fontana & Frey, 1994; Fetterman, 1989; Mishler, 1986; Seidman, 1991; Spradley, 1979). For instance, some of the following questions were asked: Are there any general things you would like to say regarding the hypnosis research

project that you were involved in? What stood out for you as most significant? Can you talk about what the hypnotic experience was like for you? Can you say anything about what a specific session was like for you?

I began both of the interviews with the presupposition that Anna would have something to say about the hypnosis experiences. Patton (1990) pointed out that if interviewers presuppose that interviewees will have something to say, it "increases the likelihood" (p. 303) that respondents will "indeed have something to say" (p. 303). Anna is an intelligent, articulate, thoughtful woman who had no difficulty reflecting on her experiences. In both interviews, she expressed her thoughts in a very considered yet candid way.

During the first 1-1/2 hours of the second interview, I had an in-depth conversation with Anna about some of the ways she had responded to the reoccurrence of painful joints. Like the first interview, many of the questions were open-ended. The second half of the interview was primarily shaped by the qualitative research method, Interpersonal Process Recall (IPR) (Elliott, 1986; Gale, 1995). IPR is a data gathering method that was initially developed as a technique for examining the psychotherapeutic process (Elliott, 1986; Gale, Odell & Nagireddy, 1995). Researchers video tape or audio record a therapy session and then either

the whole tape or part of the tape is played for the client or "informant" (Elliott, p. 504).

IPR is carried out so as to make the informant feel safe. The recall consultant [interviewer] is interested and permissive, the informant is given as much control as possible over the recall process. The result is that

most informants are far more open with the recall consultant than they were during the session being reviewed. (Elliott p. 504)

During the second interview with Anna, the Interpersonal Process Recall research method was discussed with her. She was told that the process of watching the tape with her would give me an opportunity to hear her unique perspective, and to include her voice in the analysis. She was given the video controls and asked to stop the tape whenever she had a thought or feeling about what she was watching. Since Anna did not have a preference as to which session, or extract from a session, to see, I chose an extract from the fourth session. I began the tape at the point where Anna and Douglas had stopped the verbal interaction that preceded their trance work. My reason for starting the tape at this point in their conversation was my interest in the different ways Douglas engaged Anna's body in the hypnotic dialogue. I was also curious to hear Anna's perspective about what was happening.

Both interviews were audio-taped and then transcribed. The transcriptions were compared two times to the audio tape for accuracy. The data generated from these two conversations will be interspersed at various points in the

analysis of the transcription in order to elucidate the hypnotic interaction from the client's perspective.

Ethical Concerns and Confidentiality Issues

Qualitative researchers are confronted with the same ethical issues that face every concerned researcher, such as right to privacy, and protection from harm (Fontana & Frey, 1994). In keeping with these ethical considerations, I requested and was given permission to view and transcribe the five, video recorded sessions by the client and hypnotist. Before commencing hypnosis, the hypnotist and client signed a research agreement. I also obtained a signed release from the client to audio record and transcribe the two follow-up interviews. I was granted permission by Anna and Douglas to use the transcribed material from the video recordings and interviews for this dissertation and any future written publications.

With respect to Anna's confidentiality, no one had access to the video and audio recordings except Anna, Douglas, and me. Any information that could reveal Anna's identity was removed from this study and it will be excluded in all future publications.

Ethical Concerns Regarding Interviews

Naturalistic inquiry, wrote Patton (1990), "may be more intrusive and involve greater reactivity than surveys, tests, and other quantitative approaches (p. 356), because it often "takes the researcher into the real world where

people live and work" (p. 356). In-depth interviews may especially affect the person who is interviewed, since "a good interview lays open thoughts, feelings, knowledge, and experience not only to the interviewer but also to the interviewee" (p. 353).

The primary purpose of the qualitative interviewer is "first and foremost to gather data, not change people" (Patton, 1990, p. 354). With this in mind, I was aware that my role as an interviewer, I had the potential to support or challenge whatever meaningful understandings Anna had derived from her initial hypnotic experiences. The interviews also provided an opportunity for her to reflect on her hypnotic experiences.

During both interviews, my questions and responses were informed by the assumption that language "constructs reality" (Mishler, 1986; Spradley, 1979, p. 17). Thus, I tried to keep my questions as open-ended (Fetterman, 1989; Seidman, 1991) as possible and to limit my responses to requests for more information. In order not to incur a reoccurrence of Anna's initial hypnotic experiences, both follow-up interviews were conducted in settings different from where she had been hypnotized. The eight-months between the last hypnosis session and the first interview helped to protect Anna's self-reflective process of assimilation. When we met for our first conversation, she said that it was "okay" with her that I had not called sooner to schedule a

follow-up meeting, since she had tried not to become "too conscious" about her unconscious hypnotic experiences. Anna said,

I wanted to (to use the hippy-dippy phrase) go with the flow, let it [the hypnotic experience] kind of get in my bones in any way that it was going to get in, and in some sort of automatic way, some sort of just having faith that it will take its time and work its way in however its going to, in my best interest.

In order to present an account that best represents

Anna's experiences and does not violate her view of herself, a copy of this chapter and my analysis was given to her. She was asked to make changes that made this study a better representation of her perspective.

Analytical Strategies

This study combined ideas and perspectives from various traditions in order "to get a better fix on the subject matter at hand" (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p. 4) and to "add vigor, breadth, and depth to . . . [the] investigation" (p. 2). Patton (1990) wrote that "methodological triangulation" (p. 187), or the "combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomena" (p. 187), is a "powerful solution to the problem of relying too much on any single . . . method, thereby undermining the validity and credibility of findings" (p. 193).

In this examination of a hypnotic conversation, distinctions drawn from the poetic tradition were intertwined with analytical methods gleaned from the qualitative traditions of process oriented analysis,

conversation analysis, and discourse analysis. Stitching together different analytical practices to map the process of therapeutic change helped address the many paradoxical dilemmas that often arise with qualitative analysis. Dey (1993) pinpointed these multiple incongruities in an eloquent way:

In qualitative data analysis we have to come to terms with a series of paradoxes. Thus, we want to use existing ideas, but not prejudge the data. We want to break the data up into bits, but also to analyze it as a whole. We want to consider data in context, but also to make comparisons. We want to divide data into categories, but also to consider how these relate. We want to be comprehensive, but also selective. We want to analyze singularities, but also to generalize. We want our accounts to be accessible, but also acceptable. We want to be rigorous, but also creative. (Dey, 1993, p. 266)

The qualitative analytical strategy used in this study of hypnosis could be viewed as embracing both inductive and abductive approaches to the data.

Induction

Flemons (1995) has suggested that induction is "a movement upward from data to categorical abstractions . . . about the data" (p. 9). My method of studying hypnosis was one of discovering and describing the interactive patterns and coordinated communications *between* hypnotist and client as it was "locally produced" (Psathas, 1995, p. 38) during a hypnotic session. Through repeated viewings/listenings and readings, the transcribed hypnotic conversation was divided into small bits of interactive patterns of communication in order to identify "previously unrecognized connections"

(Flemons, 1995, p. 9) among these various bits of conversation. Studying and categorizing the patterned relations between data bits enabled me to build "a meaningful, hierarchical set of relationships between data, categories of data, and categories of categories of data" (Flemons, p. 9). In this respect, inductive analysis enabled me to describe processes of change. While my study included elements of induction, I also made use of abduction.

Abduction

Flemons (1995) wrote that abductive analysis "entails connecting two diverse phenomena through a formal description that adequately protects the uniqueness of each" (p. 9). In order to understand how abduction works in this study of the interpersonal process of hypnosis, we need to recollect the discussion in Chapter Four which established the relational attributes that connect the different traditions of hypnosis and poetry. Some of the shared relational characteristics by which poetry and hypnosis operate (the multiple, and interdependent patterned relationships that compose and structure poetic and hypnotic experiences) were highlighted.

While deduction is "a movement from categorical abstractions *downward* to the data," and induction is "a movement *upward* from data to categorical abstractions," abduction is "a *lateral* movement between analogous structures or systems" (Flemons, 1995, p. 9). A lateral move

is not seen as an imposition of abstract categories on the data (deduction). A lateral move may be described as a recursive and reflexive co-mingling of categorical abstractions with the data. I took the relational assumptions that reflect how poetry is structured and moved them laterally into the relational, conversational domain of hypnotherapy. Poetic distinctions were used in Chapter Six to distinguish and analyze bits of hypnotic conversation between hypnotist and client. From this abductive process, a different understanding of the hypnotherapeutic conversational domain arose.

Process Oriented Research Analysis

The hypnotherapeutic conversation is contextualized by the client's request for change, and like all therapeutic interactions, the hypnotist-client relationship is "extremely complex and interactive" (Greenberg, 1986, p. 712). Thus, an accurate representation of what was happening during the hypnosis session called for an analytical method that would track hypnotherapeutic change by highlighting complex, interactive processes of mind-body communication.

Process oriented research analysis examines therapeutic change by attending to the interactive communications between therapists and clients (Greenberg & Pinsof, 1986; Rennie & Toukmanian, 1992). Greenberg (1986) noted that every communicative act is contextualized by a hierarchy of "multidimensional" (p. 712) levels of meaning. He proposed

that analysts who are interested in explaining processes of change need to describe how interactive communications are recursively connected with previous interactions and with implicit understandings that go beyond the content of what is said, or the manner in which it is said. In other words, analyzing change requires attending to a "complex network of relations" (p. 715) that arise during "communicative acts" (p. 715).

Conversation Analysis and Discourse Analysis

Conversation analysts and discourse analysts focus on what is actually being said between conversants by attending to their language and to their interactive patterns of communicative behaviors (Heritage & Atkinson, 1984; Labov & Fanshel, 1977; Psathas, 1995). Conversation analysts, in their attempt to keep their investigation of the data faithful to the perspectives of the observed conversants, will only use in their analysis the information that was available to conversants at that particular point in the conversation. This constraint keeps the analyst's perspective closely aligned with the conversants' experience. It helps prevent the analyst from using a "theoretical, explanatory framework" (Psathas, 1995, p. 47) or future happening to explain what is transpiring between conversants in the present. Conversation analysts are interested in describing interactive patterns of communication in terms of how they are produced and

organized by the conversants; thus, they study conversational interactions in sequence (Gale & Newfield, 1992; Psathas, 1995). Essential to the conversation analyst's approach to the data is the investigation of how the conversants "themselves make sense of what is said. Meanings are seen to be contingent, locally accomplished, [and] situated" (Psathas, p. 52).

The discourse analysts Labov and Fanshel (1977) proposed that conversations should be examined "not as a chain of utterances, but rather [as] a matrix of utterances and actions bound together by a web of understandings and reactions" (p. 30). Discourse analysts who study conversations as complex matrices expand their observations to include all parts of the text (including that which is said after specific utterances) in order to clarify specific references to persons, places, events, and ideas expressed at other times. Thus, discourse analysts will bring together "utterances scattered through various parts of the interaction . . . to provide the basis for the interpretation of any one [particular utterance]" (Labov & Fanshel, 1977, p. 26). According to Labov and Fanshel (1977), analyzing the "real meaning" (p. 123) of any conversation requires examining "the complex nature of the relations between what is said and what is done [actions]" (p. 123).

When discourse analysts examine a particular sequence of patterned interactions or episodes (and the relations between them) in terms of the text as a larger whole (Totdman, 1995), their analysis takes on a "global coherence" (Totdman, p. 102). Their analysis is gradually developed "by the intertextual process of linking local portions of discourse with other portions distributed throughout the text" (Totdman, p. 102).

Expanding the text to include all aspects of the conversational discourse equips discourse analysts with the information they need to tease apart and make explicit the implicit understandings that may be shared by conversants. Statements that appear to be "implicit at one point" (Labov & Fanshel, p. 51) in the conversation may be "plainly stated at another" (p. 51) time. These statements, or "propositions" (p. 51), are the "recurrent communications" (p. 51) that speakers share; they are what Labov and Fanshel point to as "what is really being talked about" (p. 52). "Propositions" (p. 52), or the agreements among speakers about the "facts" (p. 52) of their world, may highlight "specific social relationships, role definitions, personal attributes, factual assertions, or norms" (Totdman, 1995, p. 102).

Now that I have established that the methods of this analysis were rooted in qualitative research traditions (process oriented, conversation, and discourse analysis), it

is necessary to explicate how these analytical strategies are used in Chapter Six.

Focus of Analysis

In correspondence with the goals of process oriented research analysis, this examination of hypnosis attended to how interrelated and multi-dimensional patterns of communication contextualize the process of hypnotherapeutic change (Greenberg, 1986; Greenberg & Pinsof, 1986; Rennie & Toukmanian, 1992). The analysis of therapeutic change began by attending to variations in the interactive patterns of communication between Anna and Douglas. By noting differences in how they communicated, I began to track the differences in how Anna responded to her painful fingers and the joints in her hands.

Similar to discourse analysts who are interested in examining "language beyond the sentence" (Tannen, 1989, p. 6), I, in my investigation of mind-body conversations, attend to interactive sequences of communication between the Douglas and Anna. Similar to conversation analysts, I assumed that conversants in a hypnotic dialogue organize their patterned behaviors in ways that are unique to them. Like the analysts who seek to discover how social interaction is organized between conversants (Gale & Newfield, 1992; Psathas, 1995), I attempted to ascertain how mind-body conversations were organized between Anna and Douglas.

Unlike conversation analysts, however, I did not assume that there is an "orderliness" (Psathas, 1995, p. 45) to the hypnotic dialogues that I needed to "discover, describe, and analyze" (p. 45). Rather, I adopted the perspective that hypnotic interactions are a different kind of communication than the ordered, logical, turn-taking organization of commonplace conversations. Psathas (1995) points out that "alternative speech exchange systems" (p. 36), unlike "free-flowing conversational interaction" (p. 36), have "different restrictions on who may speak, when they may speak, and sometimes in what order they may speak" (p. 36). The analysis of hypnotic conversations, therefore, could not be approached in the same way that analysts study ordinary conversations.

Similar to conversation analysts, discourse analysts also seek to discover specific rules of discourse (Labov & Fanshel, 1977; Todtman, 1995). They explain their observations, however, differently than conversation analysts. Discourse analysts focus on the relation between "what is said and . . . the actions performed by those words" (p. 71) (instead of on the ordered sequences of turn-taking). They are interested in defining the "action which affects (alters and maintains) the relations of the self and others in face-to-face communication" (p. 59) in the terminology of discourse rules (rules of request, response, challenges, narratives, and so forth [Labov & Fanshel,

1977])). Unlike discourse analysts, I did not seek to discover or explain hypnotic dialogue with specific rules of discourse.

When conversation and discourse analysts study conversant's talk, they examine discursive language that is structured in predictable ways (with its linear syntax and subject-predicate grammar). Ordinary conversational interaction reflects the conversant's abstract, logical thinking, whereas hypnotic dialogue mirrors non-logical, poetic ways of thinking and sensing. The language of hypnotic dialogue is rhythmically patterned. Hypnotists, like poets, turn and twist the meaning of words, connecting them with other words or ideas in non-logical ways. Just as the hypnotist fractures the syntax and grammar of prose, hypnotic conversations shatter the rules of ordinary social interchange.

This study of a hypnotic conversation employed methods used by analysts that fit with the non-logical, patterned language of hypnotic dialogue, which meant drawing on the tradition of analysts who attend to conversation in a poetic way. The ideas and methods of these scholars provided the necessary linkage and segue from the analysis of ordinary conversation to the analysis of hypnotic conversation.

Poetic Analysis

conversational narratives THEMSELVES
 traditionally classified as PROSE
 turn out, when listened to CLOSELY
 to have poetic qualities of their OWN.

--Dennis Tedlock

Discourse analyst Deborah Tannen (1990) paralleled the aesthetics of a "well-calibrated conversation" (p. 16) with the aesthetics of poetry when she noted that in both instances "form and meaning are inseparable" (p. 16). Understanding, said Tannen, "grows out of the form as much as--or more than--it grows out of . . . referential meaning" (p. 16). According to Tannen, meaning is created when conversants are "swept along by patterns of sound . . . rhythm . . . [and] repetition" (p. 16) and by the "sense of identification" (p. 17) that comes from their participation "in sensemaking" (p. 17).

Chenail and Fortugno (1995) highlighted the poetic qualities in therapeutic conversations when they examined a transcribed conversation for its patterns of figurative speech. These researchers suggested that "common, everyday language usage, including clinical talk, has figurative qualities heretofore restricted almost entirely to . . . poetic discourse" (Chenail & Fortugno, p. 73). They concluded that examining "the language in therapeutic conversations as a vibrant, complex resource in and of itself" (p. 73) foregrounds the way language contributes its own meaning.

In the tradition of poetic analysis, what a poem says is "inseparable from its . . . performance" (Cicardi & Williams, 1975, p. 4). Analyzing how a poem is structured is concomitant with examining "the matrix of the meaning and effect of the poem" (Hymes quoted in Tannen, 1989, p. 36). If conversations are "inherently poetic" (p. 18), as some scholars suggest (Tannen, 1989; 1990; Tedlock, 1983), then analyzing how they are structured (rhythmically, musically, figuratively, imagistically) is analogous to examining their meaning and effect.

The affinity between conversational narrative and poetic qualities is demonstrated in the work of anthropologist Dennis Tedlock (1983). He distinguished the poetic characteristics of Zuni Native American oral traditions by transcribing their conversational narratives and by scoring the transcriptions to highlight the oral conversation's poetic features. Structuring the presentation of his analytical findings in a poetic way, Tedlock spoke before an audience of professionals:

conversational narratives
 which are the more ORDINARY business of the oral
 historian
 are THEMSELVES highly poetical
 and cannot be properly understood from prose
 transcripts.
 The MEANING of SPOKEN narrative
 is not only carried by the sheer words as transcribed
 by alphabetic writing
 but by the placement of SILENCES
 by TONES of VOICE
 by whispers and SHOUTS. . . .
 It was not until the Renaissance that there began to
 develop the kind of prose narrative we know today

the kind that is
 read silently and has lost many of its oral features.
 Today's prose is no longer in the care of professional
 performers who know
 how to turn it back into the oral
 nor is it accompanied by performance notations
 and so it is an EXTREMELY poor medium for the
 transcription of tape-recorded discourse
 EVEN the most ordinary conversation.
 (pp. 113-114)

Like Tedlock, Tannen (1989; 1990) focused her attention on analyzing and presenting conversational interaction as "verse structure created by patterns of repetition and variation" (p. 72) that are usually "neglected for the more readily salient line structure" (p. 72). Both Tannen and Tedlock suggested that in order to surface the poetics of discourse, the analyst needs to attend to how words sound (Tedlock, 1983) and how certain sounds are repeated (Tannen, 1990).

Poets have often maintained that sound suggests meaning (Farb, 1993; Preminger & Brogan, 1993) and that word-sounds and "certain sequences of sounds have a built-in emotional impact" (p. 114). Farb (1993) suggested that words have "sound postures" (Farb, p. 114) that connote "idea[s] or emotion[s] . . . regardless of the dictionary's meaning" (p. 114). Knowing this, poets sometimes combine nonsensical words to create patterned sounds that directly influence the nervous system in a way that is akin to music (Cage, 1961; Farb, 1993; Valery, 1958).

Tedlock's (1983) analysis of oral narratives attended to sound in terms of silence:

Even in an extended well-rehearsed discourse the speaker of any language may spend forty to fifty percent of his time being silent. The punctuation we use today is not an accurate guide to the silences though it is true that people reading aloud usually stop at each period. But in oral discourse a person may go right on from one sentence to another without pausing, or else he may pause in a place where there would ordinarily be no punctuation in writing. (p. 115)

Tedlock and Tannen's analysis of ordinary conversations and conversational narrative using rhythms, repetitions, sounds, and silences brings attention to the body's participation in the conversational activity.

Poetic Analysis of Hypnotic Conversations

I began the analysis of the fourth session (which lasted one hour and 40 minutes), approximately 35 minutes into the session. Since I was interested in analyzing the language that is unique to hypnotherapeutic contexts, I began the actual analysis when there was a significant shift in the patterns of communication between the hypnotist and client. When the hypnotist began to respond not only to the content of what was being verbally said, but also to what was being non-verbally communicated in the client's body rhythms, there was a marked change in the hypnotist's rhythm of speech. Prior to this shift the client and hypnotist were conversing in ordinary prose, during which they were more attentive to what was being said (the content) than to their non-verbal behaviors. As the hypnotist continued to

communicate with the client's body rhythms, the hypnotist and client's linguistic patterns noticeably changed from the linear syntax and grammar of prose to the rhythmical phrases and varied intonations of poetic diction.

This is not to suggest that hypnotic work can not start earlier. Gurgevich (1990), who defined hypnosis as suggestion, proposed that hypnotic work begins in the waiting room with strategically placed signs that encourage certain behaviors like non-smoking ("if you still enjoy smoking, ashtrays are located in the patio") (Gurgevich, p. 418). Erickson, who defined hypnosis as "intercommunication" (Erickson, 1989, p. 70), maintained that hypnosis begins the moment hypnotists and clients start communicating with each other.

In this study of hypnosis, I took the position that the hypnotist's attention to the client's mind-body communications signaled a difference that is akin to the Buddhist meditator's mindful attention to the interface between mind and body. It marked the beginning of a different kind of conversation that, in turn, facilitated a change in the client's relation with her self (Flemons, 1994c).

In poetry and poetic conversations, form, content, and meaning are intertwined--a variation in one suggests a change in another. The interdependent relationships between form, content, meaning, and change are relevant to the

analysis of a hypnotic dialogue. In hypnotic conversations, "what" is said is as important to understanding therapeutic change as "how" it is said. I attended to the multiple variations in interactive mind-body communications in a hypnotherapeutic conversation in the following ways.

Through repeated viewings, listenings, and readings, I examined how Anna and the hypnotist organized their interactive sequences of communications in ways that were unique to them. At times, I studied and discussed their patterned interactions with only the information that was available to them at that particular time in the dialogue. At other times, I utilized all the information that was available to me to help tease apart and make explicit various implicit understandings.

I investigated rhythms, rhymes, sounds and silences, metaphors, images, ambiguities, and antithesis. Just as poets alter everyday language to create poetic experiences, hypnotists change ordinary speech in poetic ways to develop hypnotic experiences. I also marked the transcribed text to reflect variations in the hypnotist's and client's rhythms of word sounds by adding timed pauses and silences.

Marking or scoring the text.

Some qualitative researchers have proposed that transcribing interviews in a poetic form "may actually better represent the speaker than the practice of quoting snippets in prose" (Richardson, 1994, p. 522; Agar, 1994).

Configuring words to reflect the speaker's breath patterns (body rhythms) enhances the written text by allowing other researchers and readers to "hear, see, and feel the [researched] world in new dimensions" (Richardson, 1994, p. 522).

By scoring transcribed interviews (Agar, 1994) and interactive conversations (Tannen, 1990) with symbols that represent "the speaker's pauses, repetitions, alliterations [and] rhythms" (Richardson, 1994, p. 522), the linguistic features that shape the meaning of what is said are foregrounded (Agar, 1994). In Chapter Six, I describe the specific notation system that I used to mark or score the conversant's body rhythms and speech patterns (see Table 2, Chapter Six). However, it is important to note at this point in the discussion that when I added the elements of timed pauses and silences to the transcribed text (and marked or scored the text to reflect these elements), the transcript was changed in a significant way. I noted that when the linear syntax of the transcription was reconstructed to reflect the elements of time and sound, the text was reconfigured in poetic form. The reconstructed transcription enabled me to experience the written data in a new way. The scored text emphasized smaller conversations, or sequences of speech within the larger conversation.

Units of analysis.

Greenberg (1986) has described these smaller sequences of interaction as forming a kind of "unit" (Greenberg, p. 715) that is both part of and separate from the larger conversational activity from which it was drawn. As I examined the transcript, I distinguished smaller units of speech from the larger conversation by attending to noticeable differences in the conversant's rhythms of speech and changes in their non-verbal behaviors (Greenberg, 1986).

Tannen (1989) proposed that large conversations can be separated into smaller units by noting "repetitions [words, phrases, or sounds] at the beginning, which operate as a kind of theme-setting, and at the end, forming a kind of coda" (p. 69) or episode. Each time a patterned sequence of interaction is repeated, "its meaning is altered" (p. 52), since the listener who hears "the same item a second time [will] . . . re-interpret its meaning" (pp. 52-53). I divided the larger hypnotherapeutic conversation into six smaller units by attending to the repetition of predominant images or themes.

Because the scored transcript appeared to me as a long, narrative poem, I conceptualized the smaller units of speech as a sequence of verses or cantos. Canto (from the Latin word, *cantus*) in Italian means "song" (Oxford English Dictionary, 1971, p. 83). After dividing the transcription into six cantos, I named each *canto* according to the

dominant image or theme that originated during that particular segment of the conversation. In Chapter Six, I discuss in greater detail how I demarcated and named the six *cantos*.

Investigating the Process of Hypnotherapeutic Change

Greenberg (1986), who discussed therapeutic change in terms of the therapeutic relationship, wrote that relationship exceeds "any particular content, act, or episode (p. 715). Relationship, said Greenberg, contextualizes every act of communication and how it is understood. Attending to the meaning of relationship suggests describing "the particular *qualities*," or "implicit understandings" (p. 715) that each interactant brings to the relationship, which, in turn, composes their "collective . . . sense of 'we'" (p. 715).

Parallel with the poet and critic who analyze the poem not by asking "What does the poem mean?" but, rather, "How does it mean?" (Cicardi & Williams, 1975) the question posed in this inquiry was: *How do hypnotherapeutic conversations mean? or How does the language of hypnosis provide aesthetic access to hypnotherapeutic processes of change?* In this investigation of the interpersonal process of hypnosis, the process of change was discussed by integrating Anna's description of her hypnotic experience with my analysis and interpretation of hypnotherapeutic mind-body conversations.

After the investigation of the hypnotherapeutic conversation in Chapter Six, I discussed in detail how a poetic analysis of the interpersonal process during hypnosis highlighted hypnotherapeutic processes of change. In Chapter Seven, I offer a theoretical conjecture about the intrapersonal process of change from a Buddhist perspective.

Accounting for Trustworthiness

Once we find something to believe in, it is easy to forget the original question. But instead of acquiescing in the security of belief, we can intensify the sense of [radical] doubt.

--Stephen Batchelor

Belief, whether in a teacher, a doctrine, or even one's own experience, retreats from the questions behind a shield of protective views and concepts. But the person who questions lies open and exposed, prepared for the unpredictability of the moment.

--Stephen Batchelor

Throughout this chapter, much attention was given to the description of the methods of analysis that were used in the examination of the transcribed hypnotic conversation in Chapter Six. It is equally important, however, to account for the rigor of this inquiry by attending to the specific set of criteria that makes the analysis a trustworthy account (Guba & Lincoln, 1985).

Guided by the advice of the Buddhist teacher Stephen Batchelor in the opening quotes of this section, my approach to the investigation of the interpersonal process of hypnosis was imbued with a sense of radical doubt, and with

a willingness to be exposed to the uncertainty and unpredictability of my inquiry. In order to assess the acceptability of my account (Dey, 1993), I adopted the assessment strategies suggested by qualitative researchers. Guba and Lincoln (1985) proposed that analysts and the readers of their texts should consider the following benchmarks when they evaluate qualitative studies: Credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.

Credibility

In order to attend to the credibility (or internal validity) of their studies, many researchers have asked the questions, do my "findings match reality" (Merriam, 1990, p. 166)? Do they "capture what is really there" (p. 166)? One of the fundamental assumptions that shaped this study is that there is no singular true reality but rather multiple perceptions of the same event.

An assessment question that guided this investigation was: Have my "reconstructions[,] . . . findings[,] and interpretations" (Merriam, p. 168) of the hypnotic conversations adequately represented the "paralinguistic features" (Gale, 1989, p. 54) and body movements of the conversants' talk?

In order to gauge the credibility of this study, I employed a set of *different* practices from the poetic and qualitative research traditions to analyze and interpret the

data: interpersonal process recall, poetic analysis, conversation and discourse analysis. I also invested sufficient time with the video and audio recorded tapes through "persistent observation and prolonged engagement" (Guba & Lincoln, 1985, p. 304). During repeated viewings of and listenings to the recorded data, I constantly updated "the details of the transcription" (Gale, 1989, p. 54) (see "Gathering the Data" in this chapter, and "Preparing Myself for the Analysis" in Chapter Six).

My initial assumptions were accounted for (see section on biases and interpretations in this chapter) prior to analyzing the text. As I examined the data, I looked for noticeable characteristics that could be given "tentative label[s]" (Guba & Lincoln, p. 305). I have delineated how the created categories (prior to the analysis and during the analysis) were determined (see Chapters Four and Six for further discussions). Each time I examined the data, I left "tracks" (Altheide & Johnson, 1994, p. 493), or an account of how I approached them (see "Preparing Myself for the Analysis" in Chapter Six).

Anna was asked to participate in a member check by reading and commenting on chapters five and six of this dissertation (Guba & Lincoln, 1985; Merriam, 1990). I have included her suggestion to change identifying information in the text. Finally, I allowed for the possibility of revising my initial assumptions after completing the analysis. I

describe in Chapter Six that during the analysis I was surprised to discover the poetic attributes of not only the hypnotist's talk, but also the client's.

Transferability

Transferability (or external validity) accounts for how the findings of this analysis may be generalized to other situations (Guba & Lincoln, 1985; Merriam, 1990). In order for readers to have sufficient information to make that assessment for themselves (Gale, 1989), I have stated my biases and point of view (see discussions in this chapter), and I have attempted to furnish ample description of the case study and the background of the case. In Chapter Seven, I have included a discussion about transferability in terms of this study by examining some of its limitations and implications.

Dependability and Confirmability

Guba and Lincoln (1985) suggested that in qualitative research, dependability and confirmability are methods of assessment parallel with reliability and objectivity. The assessment criterion for meeting dependability requires "taking into account factors of instability" (Guba & Lincoln, p. 299). With this in mind, I have attended to dependability by describing in detail in my approach to the data, and any changes that arose during the process of analysis.

Another presupposition that shaped this investigation of hypnosis was that there are no objective points of view or analytical methodologies. Guba and Lincoln (1985) maintained, however, that when the analyst is guided by the assessment strategy of confirmability, he or she does not try to establish objectivity, but, rather, the confirmability of the data.

In order to assess dependability and confirmability in this study, I have explained the assumptions behind this investigation (see biases and perspective in this chapter). I have also utilized multiple methods of analysis (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), and I have left an "audit trail" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 319). Leaving a "residue of records" (p. 319) that includes my hand-written analysis of 20 copies of transcriptions, and my rationale for establishing descriptive categories should provide readers with enough information to conclude for themselves whether the data are confirmable.

CHAPTER SIX

ANALYSIS OF A HYPNOTHERAPEUTIC CONVERSATION

In the previous two chapters, I delineated the poetic characteristics and qualitative methodologies that informed my orientation as an analyst. In this chapter, I use the poetic distinctions and ideas gleaned from qualitative traditions to examine the hypnotic conversation that I introduced in Chapter One and described in Chapter Five. I also give a brief overview of the three preceding sessions and the one that followed the hypnosis session that I analyze. Following this summary, I introduce and present the transcription that is the focus of my investigation. The remainder of this chapter is the analysis of the transcribed data. The transcribed hypnotic conversation was first divided and analyzed as six small units, and then the entire transcript was examined as a whole.

Overview of the Five Sessions

Session I

Anna and Douglas met once a week for five consecutive weeks. During the first session (extracts from this conversation were included in Chapter Five), Anna described the painful symptoms she was experiencing in the joints of her fingers, hands, and hips. As Douglas gradually introduced Anna to the experience of hypnosis, he suggested that she might begin to have a "kind of conversation" with herself, "a running commentary," a "sense of close scouting," during which she could experience or not

experience her symptoms. He said that she could either "look closely . . . at what's occurring" or "not look at all" [by] "simply let[ting] whatever thoughts and wonderings" that were going on for her "proceed."

Session II

At the beginning of the second session, Anna said that while there were no significant changes during the week, and the pain in her fingers was "about the same," she had noticed that holding and using a knife to cut food had become painful. She was beginning to wonder if the symptoms were a delayed reaction to the "ongoing chronic stress" she experienced in the previous year. Even though her life was not nearly as stressful as it had been the year before, less stress seemed to give her more "freedom" to think about existential issues. Thoughts about "life, death . . . sorts of things" were "surfacing" simultaneously with the painful symptoms.

After hypnosis was introduced and Anna appeared to be inwardly absorbed, Douglas proposed the idea that hands have a "mind of their own." Speaking in a slow and rhythmical way, he said,

Now wherever else you may find your imagination
floating
to, it may prove interesting for you to allow
it at least
minimally move down into your hands
and when its there giving your hands that kind of
independent action,

[the fingers slightly move]
a mind of their own
[the head moves up and down in a yes motion]
that's right.

Douglas encouraged Anna to be curious about the various sensations she might be experiencing in her hands. He invited her to float backward or forward in time "to the first time" she remembered her fingers hurting. In a child-like voice, Anna described her experience as an 8-year old child after her brother had bitten her finger so hard that it was throbbing. After conversing with Anna about the bitten finger, and how her mother intervened, Douglas suggested that perhaps during the coming week, the throbbing that finger experienced now would allow the blood to circulate all the necessary nutrients the finger needed to "cool down the inside." He added that Anna may not even notice how the finger heals and is swollen at the same time. Anna replied: "the throbbing was better than pain."

Session III

When the session began, Anna reported that the pain had increased, and that she was feeling worse. She remarked that even her thumb had started hurting, which made it difficult for her to hold onto things. In order not to "re-injure" her fingers while adjusting the blanket during sleep, she said that she put splints on her fingers before going to bed. Anna was unable to tell Douglas when the pain had gotten worse, since she was doing her best to "ignore" rather than "encourage" the painful symptoms by giving them attention.

Douglas asked Anna if the hypnosis sessions were helpful to her. She responded,

When in trance, my body feels generally deadened in many ways, so that there's not a lot of feeling of pain. If I were to focus on what my body's feeling or where there was any kind of discomfort then I might have some show of pain . . . but basically I have more of a numbed feeling overall. So I guess it's helpful in that way.

After some discussion about auto-hypnosis, and how it might be used to continue the work they were doing together, Douglas began speaking in a slow and rhythmical way, providing a context for hypnotic experience. After trance was established he said,

Now if being out of trance during your week has a lot to do with ignoring how this finger feels or that finger feels, then what better way to go into a trance than to go through and enter your hands and begin to notice how they feel different, and how they feel differently. Because of course, they not only feel different, but they also feel differently.

During the remainder of the session Douglas invited Anna to have "a conversation" with her fingers. At one point in the "conversation," Anna said that her fingers needed to begin to share "the responsibility," and not "try and do it all by one finger's self." "They need to remind each other," said Anna, that "they're not alone . . . they need to help each other to . . . spread the responsibility."

After naming the right index finger as "smart finger," Anna added that it carries the burden and does "everything himself," while all the other fingers "hide and don't pay attention." "Smart finger," said Anna, needs to "trust" that

the other fingers will be able to "do a good job." "Maybe the fingers don't know they're important," she said, "until they hurt." Douglas asked her if there was "any finger or thumb" that was "willing to be appreciated as important without needing to hurt?" "Could they trade back and forth," he continued, "as to which finger would like to be the most important one for those times when there needs to be an important one?" Could they choose among themselves the fingers that were important so they wouldn't have to hurt to be appreciated? Anna replied that the fingers would have "to figure out how" to do it. Douglas then inquired, in a number of different ways, how the unconscious mind might prepare the "space and time" for the fingers to learn what they needed to know, and whether the whole body could support them by helping them spread their learning throughout the rest of the body.

Session IV: Opening Dialogue

At the beginning of the fourth session, Anna recalled that during the week the pain had lessened for a few days, and that "things were really improving." She said that on the days when she felt better, she worked out and lifted weights at the gym. She noted that she had also lifted and carried heavy packages like a "normal person." When the pain increased, however, she wondered if she should have been doing so many weight-bearing activities.

When Douglas questioned her about what had happened during her auto-hypnosis, Anna replied that when she tried to do it, she could not concentrate or stay with it long enough to "wind her mind down." Instead of "emptying her mind," her mind would wander, thinking about all the things she had to do. She equated this experience with earlier attempts to meditate.

Douglas responded that developing auto-hypnosis is not about "trying to get into trance" by "emptying her mind" or in "trying to get some place else" other than where she was. He said that perhaps she was telling herself that she could not go into trance because she was "too wired" or "too distracted." Saying to herself that she was "too wound up" to experience trance implied that trance was somewhere else and she needed to find a way to "get there." Douglas remarked that in her attempts to practice auto-hypnosis she might be telling herself,

Here I am . . . and I need to be over there in order to be in a trance . . . and I can't get over there because of something going on here (I'm too wired . . . too distracted . . . too wound up), so I can't get over there.

He said that she could "forget about the necessity to get over there," and instead of asking, "What can I do to get my mind empty? What can I do to get myself into trance?" she might just set aside time for "trance time." All she had to do, suggested Douglas, was "figure out" where she was

instead of where she had to get to, because "the place to get [to] really is where you are."

To Anna, this description of trance sounded like "general daydream." She said that she was a "great daydreamer," but that her daydream experiences felt very different from the trance she had experienced with him. Yet "daydreaming," remarked Douglas, "is a good kind of trance," because it is a way of being "internally absorbed."

I begin the transcription (analyzed in this dissertation) at this point in their conversation for reasons that are discussed later in this chapter. This brief overview of the first three sessions and the beginning of the fourth session features some of the ideas and images that arose during the rest of the session. In the analysis that follows, I describe in greater detail how Douglas and Anna embroider ideas about daydreams and trance to create a contextual pattern for hypnotic conversations. The rest of this session is thoroughly discussed in the analysis.

The following is a brief review of Anna's and Douglas's last hypnosis session together, Session V.

Session V

At the beginning of this session, Anna related that she felt considerably better, and that the pain in her fingers had "subsided to a tolerable level." While a month ago she had felt like a truck had run over her, she now had "more energy, was sleeping better, and had a better outlook." Anna

said that her concerns about the symptoms getting worse had lessened because the pain in her fingers was now "minimal" and the swelling had not increased. Underscoring the changes that Anna had experienced, Douglas remarked that while this session would be helpful "a follow up meeting might not be needed." Anna agreed, and after Douglas asked her how they could "best use" this last meeting, she said she would like to "pay attention" to how she could continue to practice hypnosis. Douglas responded by saying that they could use this session for "auto-hypnosis." "So go into trance," he said, "and let me know when you are there." Anna said, "but I've never done this," to which Douglas replied,

Well, actually you have. You see . . . for you to go into trance, it's just me . . . relating back to you how you're doing this. It is you doing auto-hypnosis always, and I provide some violin accompaniment, but it's you that's soloing. So why don't you do that again . . . and I'll provide a little bit of continued commentary about how you can carry this on if you wish on your own without any violins or percussion.

Douglas continued to describe how Anna might go into trance as he guided her into trance. He suggested that she could use all the sounds of her outer and inner environment as a "kind of accompaniment" for going into trance. He told her that she could attend to her ideas, what her muscles and fingers felt like, as well as her "breathing and how it changes, and any kind of other changes that are going on in your body" as she moved into trance.

After speaking in a slow and rhythmical way for approximately fifteen minutes, Douglas engaged Anna's

"unconscious" in a conversation. During this conversation Anna, speaking for her "unconscious," said that she had to "lighten up."

D Lighten up?

A Lighten up. Things won't burn so much.

D They won't burn so much? And if she [Anna] lightens up then that will continue to help her physically?

A Uh huh. . . .

D So, can you like give her fingers a sense of humor? . . .

A Yeah, she's got a sense of humor in her head. Need to spread it out.

D So with a sense of humor in her joints, and maybe even in her immune system, if you were to go ahead, say a couple of months, how does that help her lighten up?

A She has more time to do more things. She can be clear about things.

D Less weight?

A Yeah, lighter.

During the remainder of the session, Douglas wove some of the ideas that were discussed during previous sessions into his talk.

Now that I have briefly discussed the five sessions that composed this hypnosis case, I will begin analysis of

the transcribed fourth session by returning to the purpose of this dissertation and the questions that guided my inquiry.

The Analysis

This study is a two part investigation of hypnosis. In the first part, I utilized Buddhist philosophy and meditative practice to theoretically explore the *intrapersonal* process of the hypnotized person. While the results of my conjecture can be found in Chapter Three, I reintroduce the Buddhist notion of change in Chapter Seven. The second part of my investigation employed ideas from the tradition of poetry to research the *interpersonal* process between a hypnotist and client. The questions that guided this part of the study were: How does a poetic analysis of a hypnotherapeutic conversation between a hypnotist and client provide aesthetic access to processes of change? And how does the conversation between the hypnotist and client alter the conversation the client had *within*? Both hypnotic processes--the *intra-* and the *interpersonal*--can be understood as *conversations*. The focus of my study is on the interaction between these two conversations.

Preparing Myself for The Analysis

After transcribing the fourth session (I discuss the process of transcribing later in this chapter), I made twenty copies of the transcription. Each time before beginning the analysis, I prepared for it by immersing

myself in either poetry or meditation for an hour before I interacted with the transcribed text. I was curious to see how each preparation might shape the analysis. Guided by the presupposition that "there are no facts flying around in nature as if they are butterflies that . . . [can be] put into a nice orderly collection" (Bertalanffy in Davidson, 1983, p. 214), I assumed that my perceptions of the data would reflect my interpretive perspective. I presumed that my interpretive point of view could be influenced by how I spent the hour prior to the analysis.

Nine times before encountering the text, I prepared by absorbing myself in poetry for one hour. Eleven times before the analysis, I did Buddhist mindful meditation. Having prepared myself in different ways, I noted that each time I interacted with the text I attended to different distinctions that reflected my pre-analysis preparations.

The practice of preparing myself in different ways for the analysis reinforced my constructionist assumptions that perceptions of phenomena do not represent the world as it is. It also strengthened my presupposition that there is no one way of perceiving phenomena. Depending on how I prepared myself, each time I analyzed the transcript I would see different things and the same things differently.

While the analysis was guided by specific assumptions that influenced the focus of the study and the boundaries of its analysis (Wolcott, 1994), I discovered and learned

something new during the process of each investigation. I have discussed these understandings later in this chapter. With this context in mind, I will begin the analysis by describing my process of transcribing the data and scoring the transcription.

Transcribing, Scoring, and Dividing the Data

I have included in this chapter the transcript of the fourth session, instead of attaching it as an appendix, because the process of transcribing was an essential part of the analysis. Gale (1989) pointed out that transcribing "is more than simply putting words down on paper[;] . . . it is part of the discovery process" (p. 65). Each time I checked the transcription for accuracy against the audio and video recordings (approximately fifteen times), I learned more about the data. A number of significant "discoveries" arose after I scored the text for pauses and silences between words.

The scored transcript is presented in a way that highlights Anna's and Douglas's interactive patterns of speech and body behaviors. Because their verbal and non-verbal conversations were often occurring at the same time, I have presented what they were saying and doing parallel with each other so that the reader may attend to both conversations simultaneously. The scored text of the verbal dialogue between Anna and Douglas is on the right page, while a description of their non-verbal body behaviors are

described on the left page, parallel to the spoken words. Every line of the transcribed talk is numbered. Descriptions of body movements are prefaced with numbers (in parentheses) that correspond with the line numbers in the verbal text. In order to indicate who is speaking, I have used the letters "D" to signify the hypnotist, Dr. Douglas Flemons, and "A" to represent Anna.

When I initially transcribed the audio portion of the video recording, the transcription was in the form of prose. After many re-listenings of the audio tape, I added timed pauses and silences to the written text. I scored the text to reflect variations in the hypnotist's and client's rhythms of word sounds and their simultaneous utterances. After marking the text to indicate elements of time, I watched and listened several times to the video recording for intonations (sounds), which I then added to the written text.

I noted that when the linear syntax of prose was re-constructed to reflect the elements of time and sound (pauses, silences, intonations), the transcribed text was re-configured in poetic form (Tannen, 1989, 1990; Tedlock, 1983). The text's transformation from narrative prose to poetry recalled John Cage's (1961) description of poetry.

Poetry is not prose simply because poetry is in one way or another formalized. It is not poetry by reason of its content . . . but by reason of its allowing musical elements (time, sound) to be introduced to the world of words. (Cage, 1961, p. x)

While the transformation of a text from prose to poetry obliges us to realize that "the text has been constructed" (Richardson, 1994, p. 522), we often forget that prose texts are also constructed (Richardson, 1994). When time and sound were introduced to the narrative text, the patterns of language were changed from the linear syntax of prose to the rhythmical line breaks of poetic diction. The re-constructed transcription enabled me to experience the written data in new and un-predictable ways. The scored text highlighted relational patterns of conversation that were very different from the original narrative transcript.

In order to include descriptions of the hypnotist's and client's body movements, I repeatedly watched small segments of the video recording, gradually adding descriptions of what I observed to the transcribed text. However, I did not develop a methodology for classifying and analyzing body movements as I did for examining verbal talk. My study and description of body movements were guided solely by my interest in investigating interactive patterns of mind-body communications between the hypnotist and client. Examining the client's body movements parallel with the verbal text provides a richer description of the hypnotic interaction, and a possibility to track processes of change in the inter- and intrapersonal conversations.

When the elements of time and sound were added to the transcription, and the transcript was scored to reflect

these elements, the line breaks suggested to me poetic diction. The entire transcription seemed to form a long, narrative poem. Once the transcribed hypnotic conversation was conceptualized as a long poem, I examined the text for repetitions of images and themes (Tannen, 1989). I also looked for noticeable differences in the conversants rhythms of speech, and for changes in their non-verbal behaviors (Greenberg, 1986; Tannen, 1989).

I distinguished smaller units of speech from the larger conversation by noting the predominant images or themes that originated during particular segments of the conversation. Because I conceptualized the hypnotic conversation as a long poem, I considered the smaller units of speech as a sequence of verses or cantos. After dividing the transcription into six smaller units of speech, I named each section or *canto* according to the dominant image or theme that originated during that particular segment of the conversation.

The Six Cantos

In the structure of a long poem, each canto holds a unique place in the poem's composition. While a canto is a section of a long poem (similar to the chapter of a book), it might be studied as both part of, and separate from the longer verse that is a single poem. In analyzing a long poem, literary scholars might study the different elements that compose each canto, and/or the poetic characteristics that connect groups of cantos. A critic might also examine

the coherence of the long poem by tracking the poetic elements that connect the distinct cantos.

The six cantos are:

- Canto I: Daydream
- Canto II: Dream Time
- Canto III: You Can Count On Your Fingers
- Canto IV: Crystal Ball
- Canto V: Fingers Talking
- Canto VI: Two Dimensions at the Same Time

While the first Canto (Daydream) is presented in the linear syntax of prose, Cantos II-V are re-presented in the form of poetic diction with rhythmical line breaks that reflect timed pauses and silences. Canto VI returns to the syntax of prose. The change in the transcript's syntactical structure from Canto I (Daydream) to Canto II (Dream Time), and again from Canto V (Fingers Talking) to Canto VI (Two Dimensions at the Same Time) marks a significant difference in the conversational rhythm of speech. The shift from Canto I to Canto II signals the moment Douglas begins speaking in time with Anna's body rhythms.

Unlike the way a long poem is constructed, I began with a lengthy text, and then divided it into shorter units for analysis. I analyzed each segment of the hypnotic conversation as a separate canto by studying its images, metaphors, ambiguities, rhythms, and rhymes. As I examined the scored text, however, I was keenly aware that I had

constructed it by imposing divisions. While I separated the hypnotic conversation into smaller units for the purpose of analysis, I also examined the text as a whole. I analyzed the cantos in sequence by tracking the transformation of poetic characteristics (images and refrains), and the variations in patterned communications (body movements, sounds and silences) through the whole conversation.

In the analysis, I discuss how a poetic investigation of the transcribed, hypnotic conversation highlights hypnotherapeutic processes of change. In the concluding section of this chapter, I return again to the questions that guided the analysis. I describe processes of change that arose during the conversation between Anna and Douglas, and how the variations in their mind-body conversations mirrored changes in Anna's conversation within. Before analyzing the text, and after describing the notations that were used for scoring the text, I will present the scored transcription.

Notations For Reading the Transcription

The key (Table 2) for scoring the hypnotherapeutic conversation that was analyzed in this dissertation was developed from my personal conversations with anthropologist and folklorist Dr. Judith Shulimson, and from my study of Denis Tedlock's (1983) work with Native American oral traditions. When composing the key, I assumed that, like

poetry, the rhythms and sounds of this transcript would best be appreciated when read aloud.

Many poets have suggested that all poetry, including written poetry, is oral. "The graphic sign in all written forms of poetry," wrote poet Octavio Paz (1990), "acts as a function of the oral sign" since the "reader hears mentally, behind . . . the words of the text, their verbal music" (p. 140). Similarly, "The retreats, advances, prolongations, and fugues of the poem, and its very layout," wrote Mallarme (in Paz, 1990), "become a musical score for anyone who cares to read it aloud" (p. 14).

1. **When segments of speech are divided in poetic lines, pause for a breath each time a new line begins.**

That ability as a young girl to have a thought
a good thought that somehow grabs you
and to be able to play with it
until it develops into a story.

2. **When segments of speech are written in a line and the next line is indented, continue speaking without pause.**

How nice it is to feel your hands
feeling different again,
and I wonder how the daydream [softly]
could incorporate that

3. **When there is a space in the line pause momentarily, and then continue.**

and they're to know if they were to have a
conversation, who would be the one
to lead it?

4. **Pause (4) seconds for an asterisk**
 *
between lines, and (4) seconds for an asterisk in brackets
at the end of a line [*].

Pause (1) additional second for a [.]

* . = (5) second pause.
 * * * * * = (20) second pause.

Of course, if you were to multiply
 the number of hands you do have by the number
 of hands that created by that combination

* .
 that is one less than
 the seven Samurai that it took to

* * .
 make such a difference
 in that town

* * * . . .

And how different your experience becomes
 once you begin
 running allowing your imagination to turn
 somersaults [*]
 to twirl and be just as aware of what happens

5. **[[Double brackets signals two speakers speaking at**
the same time.

D [[You don't have to tune me out]], however.
 A [[I don't have to tune you out]]. Okay

6. **-- Dashes indicate an interruption between speakers.**

A I see my red nails--
 D Uh huh.
 A --and the bones.

7. **Stair-stepping the letters of a word signals a**
glissando.

d
 o
 w
 n

Less of a glissando is indicated in the following way:

do
wn

8. Hyphenated words indicate a word that is emphasized.

n-o-w

9. When words are said fast or with an increase in pace, [fast] or [pace increases] is written in brackets preceding the segment of speech that should be spoken fast. The segment of speech that should be spoken "fast" is written in italics.

[Fast] *The nice thing about dreams, of course*
is how real they can become

[Pace increases] *And you know*
when you drive quickly
in a nice car that you can be going very
fast and it begins to feel like you're going
quite [softly]
slow-ly.

Similarly, when words are said slowly or softly, [slowly] or [softly] are written in brackets preceding the segment of speech that should be spoken "slowly" or "softly." The segment of speech that should be spoken "slowly" or "softly" is written in italics.

to twirl and be just as aware of whatever happens
outside of here as you need be, but let it
[slowly] *just-pass-by.*

[softly] *that's right, and weeks, that's right,*
that's right, and months to come,
and years, and decades, to continue that
[softly] *that's right*

Table 2. Key for reading the transcription aloud.

CANTO I: DAYDREAM

- 1 D You could start a daydream.
- 2 A Starting one on purpose, I've never done in my life.
- 3 D Really?
- 4 A I just have a thought and I like the thought so I stay
5 with the thought and it develops into a story.
- 6 D How often does that happen?
- 7 A I don't know, it depends on how busy I am or if I have
8 time for other things.
- 9 D You can't make it happen but you just plant the seed.
- 10 A No, what happens is the thought comes into my head and
11 if I have time to play with it and develop it and have
12 energy and time then it will become a daydream.
- 13 D If you take the time to develop it nicely, how long
14 does it last? . . . the whole daydream?
- 15 A I don't know, I've never paid attention, it's auto-
16 matic. But gee, I just wiled away an hour on this
17 because I can do things while I'm daydreaming too. I
18 mean, I can go through motions of doing things. I could
19 not sit down and do bills or anything.
- 20 D Well, it's interesting. Perhaps what you've been trying
21 to do is to think that you need to do something other
22 than daydreaming.
- 23 A Yeah, that may be. Oh, I'm sure I could daydream but
24 see, that's what I thought was happening--that I was
25 beginning to daydream when I was trying to go into a
26 trance and be specific about something--that my mind
27 would wander into daydreams and that in fact was
28 disturbing my trance.
- 29 D Oh, okay. Well then, that's--
- 30 A That's wrong, huh?
- 31 D --that's my . . . that's my misdirection for you if you
32 left with that impression. What you want to do with the
33 trance is you set up a possibility, not an agenda. So
34 you'd set up a possibility. You can ask yourself a
35 question, "I wonder how my unconscious or my day-
36 dreaming, will continue to help me feel healthier,"

- 37 something as general and vague as that, and then you
38 leave it up to your unconscious. You leave it up to the
39 part that you have no control over, to decide what on
40 earth it wants to daydream. And to not worry about
41 having to interpret it, or make sense of it, that's its
42 own task--
- 43 A Uh huh.
- 44 D --but that you allow it to develop on its own. And then
45 the daydream can be helpful for reasons and in ways
46 that you don't understand, and that you might not
47 recognize, even if you were to follow the daydream
48 closely and scrutinize it, take notes, that it would
49 still be doing what it's doing quite apart from your
50 conscious scrutiny.
- 51 A Well, maybe I haven't even done enough daydreaming
52 lately, cause I've been too busy. That could be a
53 problem in my life, [laughing] cause it's really, I
54 loved it in my daydreamings. I've always . . . I
55 suppose this is probably, the last year is the first
56 year of my life that I've been as busy as I've been
57 consecutively.
- 58 D Uh huh. Well that's interesting, cause you said a
59 couple of weeks ago, "Hey, this is my least stressful
60 time of my existence," and yet if you're very busy and
61 you haven't time to do those healthy things like
62 daydream, that can be very taxing for your body.
- 63 A Uh, even when I had my own office and I worked hours
64 and hours and hours, there was lots of time, idle time
65 I could go in my office and do things like
66 daydream. When I have idle time now, there's always
67 something to do. . . . Its the first time in my life I
68 think that my mind has been as full. And not stressful
69 in a sense that I like what I'm thinking about and that
70 work-wise my schedule isn't that bad. . . .
- 71 D Well, part of, part of taking care of yourself is
72 having do
73 wn time where you don't have to be figuring
74 something out or mulling something over, or--
- 75 A Yeah. And I was thinking, too, about how this could
76 possibly not be stressful. There isn't a lot of time
77 when I have downtime. . . .

91-98 A: In one continuous movement, Anna stands for a moment, straightens her long skirt, and then sits down on the couch curling her legs slightly underneath her. With the top of her right arm resting on the back of the couch, bent at the elbow, her head leans slightly to the right side, supported by her right hand. The gaze is attentively focused on the face of the hypnotist, while the left hand takes ahold of the right foot that is curled next to her on the couch and gently massages it as the hypnotist speaks.

99-100 A: Head nods slightly up and down.

101-103 A: For a moment, the eyes look up and then with the word "dream," they return to looking into the the face of the hypnotist as he speaks. The left hand moves toward the left knee where it remains resting on the leg.

104-109 A: The left hand makes a fist and holds it for a moment.

110 A: The left hand opens and remains open, with the palm resting on the leg.

114 A: The head slightly nods up and down as the throat clears.

78 **CANTO II: DREAM TIME**

79 A So, I have to admit that as good as the rest of my
80 life might be that stuff is all new and pressure
81 oriented.

82 D Of course. So in the midst of all of that, let me add
83 some more pressure for you to organize and schedule
84 dream time.

85 A Yeah, it probably would, but to know that, just to have
86 the realization that I may not have been allowing
87 enough dream time, it just, I'm, when it starts to
88 happen I may notice it more and just let it happen.

89 D Well, why don't you let it happen right now? So, I'm
90 going to talk, but this is not like paying bills.

91 A This not like paying bills. Good. There's nothing
92 worse than paying bills.

93 D So, you don't need to listen to me.

94 A So, I don't need to listen to you. I can tune you out.

95 D You can tune me out and you get into your best dream
96 time that you can manage. Okay. [[Now you don't have to
97 tune me out]], however.

98 A [[I don't have to tune you out]]. Okay.

99 D And, what you might do is imagine yourself then at home
100 now with yourself propped up in your bed and with
101 a special pillowcase or the special cover, or the
102 special animal, or whatever dream *
103 marker you're going to use. This is dream
104 time. It might be just something that, something small
105 that you hold in your hand
106 or it simply could be something that you wear
107 but that
108 you hold tightly to the necessity to be able to go
109 down, or go into a trance by going into a dream.
110 [Faster] And you don't need an agenda and you
111 don't need to try hard, and your mind wandering
112 often is a nice way to start a daydream, isn't it?

113 A Uh huh.

114 D And so it's really not, there's not a right way to get
115 there. You can meander your way in

118 A: Almost imperceptibly, the head nods up and down.

119-121 A: The right arm that was on the back of couch joins the left hand which is resting in the lap. The right hand raises to face and lightly scratches it and then returns to lap where the left hand takes hold of it and begins to lightly rub its fingers. After a moment, both hands become still. The left hand rests on top of the right hand.

122-123 H: The hypnotist's legs uncross and re-cross as he says, "position yourself, whatever is most comfortable for you."

A: While maintaining their position (left hand on top of the right hand), both hands move closer to the waist as the hypnotist says, "position yourself, whatever is most comfortable for you."

127 A: The head nods up and down in a "yes" motion. Both hands are motionless.

129-130 A: The hands continue to be motionless in the lap. The eyes remain focused on the hypnotist's face as he speaks. They occasionally blink and for a few moments, they assume a steady, unblinking gaze.

131-147 A: The hands remain still and the eyes that were occasionally blinking blink less

148 A: While the left hand stays on top of the right hand, the left finger tips begin slightly rubbing against right finger tips.

150-154 A: The eyes stop blinking for several moments.

154-155 A: The fingers on the right hand begin to move slightly while the hands remain in the same position.

116 if meandering is your chosen way of getting absorbed
117 in your own experience. *
118 So you could imagine that you're home
119 and that you're finding that way to absorb, and as
120 you move further into the dream you can just
121 position yourself, whatever is most comfortable
122 for you.
123 Though here you have the benefit of my voice, but as I
124 said, you can choose to tune that out if it's
125 getting in the way of you're developing a
126 good dream. That ability as a young girl to
127 have a thought,
128 a good thought that somehow grabs you,
129 and to be able to play with it
130 until it develops into a story,
131 you can have that thought now, if you haven't already
132 got one *
133 and begin even perhaps out of your conscious awareness
134 to
135 develop it.
136 The nice thing about having a daydream and the nice
137 thing about going into
138 trance
139 is that your conscious mind doesn't need to
140 be involved, and it can try to be involved
141 and you can let it help if it really wants to, I
142 guess.
143 You can humor it.
144 But knowing that
145 what really matters is that you
146 find your way in-to where you are now, so if you have
147 mind
148 winding up and racing that you then just race with it
149 and follow-along-side-it and
150 listen for awhile to the racing. And you might even
151 see if you can speed it up just a bit more
152 so that it's
153 racing
154 at just the right speed. [Pace increases] And you
155 *know when you drive quickly*
156 *in a nice car that you can be going very fast and*
157 *it begins to feel like you're going [softly] quite*
158 *slow-ly. [*]*
159 And so as you get in time with racing,
160 the car seems to [softly] *s-l-o-w* way down. It's only
161 when you're accelerating and you're a little bit
162 behind where the car is that you can feel that
163 pull, but once you're there and the two of you,
164 the car and you, are at full speed, it's then
165 possible for you to just [softly] *calm-ly*
166 *steer your way,*

170 A: On words "free up" the eyes look down for a moment, away from the hypnotist's face.

175-176 A: The right hand clasps the left wrist and both hands move higher up on the lap (toward the waist) where they remain motionless for several moments.

177 A: The eyes appear heavy and almost close.

199-200 A: The eyes close for just a moment and then open.

206 A: The eyes momentarily close with the words "relationship between" and then open.

215-216 A: The eyes close and remain closed until the end of the session.

167 [faster] and that's a good time often to day dream as
168 well. You can attend to what you need to be safe
169 and then free up
170 yourself
171 to absorb yourself in your experience.
172 Now that may not be a good time for you
173 [softly] and certainly it matters for you to find the
174 time that's best for you, but the principle is the
175 same. That you can carry on
176 with what you're doing n-o-w and race and consider
177 everything that's going on in your head
178 right
179 now. You could itemize them all.
180 You could itemize them backwards.
181 You could follow them as they make their course and all
182 of the jumps and leaps and wondering where you're
183 going to go next. And in the midst of all that
184 that hustle and bustle and rustle allow that story
185 line to develop
186 itself. And so, and so, there can be three at least
187 things going on simultaneously. You can be
188 listening or not listening
189 to my voice, you can be racing with your conscious
190 mind,
191 or it might be racing with questions about what I'm
192 saying, or it could be about work or about plans
193 or about your child or about your fingers,
194 but it could be any-
195 num-ber of things
196 And then the story line, all on its own,
197 developing
198 nicely and privately, [softly] always privately.
199 And that experience can be
200 then three-fold
201 at least.
202 But then there is the question of what is the
203 relationship between
204 the first
205 conscious thought [fast] you have and the second one
206 in order how did you make that leap. And then the
207 relationship between
208 [Faster] these two thoughts and the story line
209 developing all on its own.
210 And whatever those have to do
211 with each other, and then the relationship between
212 the two conscious or three conscious thoughts, one
213 after the other, the relationship between them and
214 the developing narrative of the story line, and
215 then that
216 with my voice and what I'm saying,
217 that's right. And it may even be a relationship of
218 no relationship.

234 A: The fingers on both hands slightly move.

238-239 *Voices are heard in the background as people pass by in the hallway outside of the room.*

248 A: Slightly coughing, with the word "terrain," the right hand raises up and covers the mouth. The right hand then returns to its previous position of holding the left wrist.

258-263 A: The fingers on both hands begin to move. The right hand slightly closes into a fist and then opens and again closes. The fingers on the right hand spread open and close. The right hand raises to the right shoulder and lightly rubs it and then returns to the lap and rests by itself for a moment on the lap.

266 A: The right and left palms come together and the fingers on each hand entwine with the fingers on the opposite hand.

268-269 A: Remaining entwined, the finger tips on each hand slightly raise up and down.

219 [Rhythmically] *One can continue all on its own over*
 220 *there, and the other can continue all on its own*
 221 *over there, and the third can continue on over*
 222 *here,*
 223 [softly] *all on its own.*
 224 And how nice that you've known ever since you were a
 225 little girl
 226 how to go [softly] *into this special*
 227 *state*
 228 *where you find you*
 229 *and allow your imagination to run,*
 230 *and jump,*
 231 *and [softly] tum-ble*
 232 [Softly] *that's right*
 233 *and play.*
 234 *That's right. And how different your experience becomes*
 235 *once you begin*
 236 *running allowing your imagination to turn somersaults*
 237 *to twirl and be just as aware of whatever happens*
 238 *outside of here as you need be, but let it*
 239 [slowly] *just-pass-by,*
 240 *and how nice to let that*
 241 *dream develop and enter into dream time.*
 242 [Faster] *The nice thing about dreams, of course,*
 243 *is how real they can become,*
 244 *that inside of the dream you're not even*
 245 *aware that it isn't a dream,*
 246 *and that the movement through [*]*
 247 *terrain, encountering people can continue*
 248 *as you clear the way for*
 249 *the story to develop.*
 250 *
 251 And each time that you've been here the experience has
 252 been slightly different,
 253 and you might indeed find this experience
 254 developing in the same way
 255 as last time, and yet different in some small or
 256 significant way.

257 **CANTO III: YOU CAN COUNT ON YOUR FINGERS**

258 That's right. How nice it is to feel your hands
 259 feeling different again,
 260 and I wonder how the daydream [softly] *could*
 261 *incorporate that*
 262 * *
 263 and always move to get comfortable
 264 * *
 265 and let the fingers talk to one another
 266 * * *
 267 and you can always count
 268 [softly] *on your fingers*

272-275 A: The finger tips continue to move and the head slightly bends forward.

277-278 A: After the hypnotist says, "what can that third hand reach out and do," the thumbs on each hand straighten. The thumb tips momentarily touch and push against each other before returning to their entwined position where they and the rest of the fingers remain still.

280 A: The in and out breath is deep and long during the brief silence that follows the hypnotist's words, "now-for-you."

281 D: Immediately following the deep breath, the hypnotist says, "and you don't need to try to do anything at all."

307 A: The head bends forward a bit more.

269 * . .
 270 One way to do that
 271 is to recognize that you have two hands [* *]
 272 and yet when they're entwined, it's almost perhaps as
 273 if there's a third, that is, a combination of the
 274 two
 275 * * .
 276 and what can that third hand reach out and do
 277 *
 278 now-for-you
 279 * * .
 280 and you don't need to try to do anything at
 281 all. In fact, you could even try trying and
 282 realize that that's not part of your
 283 experience of going even deeper d
 284 o
 285 wn
 286 into trance
 287 * * .
 288 There was a movie once, Five Easy Pieces, and
 289 there's nothing easier than just letting
 290 yourself move
 291 where you are and find yourself there,
 292 find yourself in your hands, allow your hands to
 293 continue and
 294 to elaborate their own thinking, their own knowing,
 295 because they know how to do so much on their own,
 296 how nice to listen to them tell a story
 297 * * . . .
 298 [fast] because in a way really that is what happens
 299 is it not when you go d into a daydream,
 300 o
 301 w
 302 n
 303 that you allow your b-o-d-y
 304 to tell you a story,
 305 one that you don't plan but that gets told
 306 * * . . .
 307 Of course, if you were to multiply
 308 the number of hands you do have by the number of hands
 309 that are created by that combination
 310 * . . .
 311 that is one less than
 312 the seven Samurai that it took to
 313 * * .
 314 make such a difference
 315 in that town
 316 * * * . . .

317-318 A: The right hand raises toward the face and the fingers of the right hand lightly rub the inside corner of the right eye.

318 A: The right hand returns to the lap and rests on the left wrist. The shoulders stretch up and back and then relax.

320-321 A: The right hand makes a fist and then opens. The open hand rests palm down on the leg.

341-351 A: The right hand raises up toward the face and the finger tips lightly rub the inner corner of the right eye. Whereupon the right hand returns to the lap and rests momentarily on top of the left hand. The right and left palms come together and fingers on each hand intertwine with the fingers on the opposite hand. With the fingers still entwined, the arms stretch out in front (palms facing forward) and the head, neck, and shoulders stretch back. The head stays resting on the back of the couch while the hands return to the lap and remain lightly clasped with each other.

352 A: The index fingers stretch out and the tips touch each other.

354 A: The head bends forward away from the back of the couch.

354-356 A: Dis-entwining themselves, the right fingers are embraced and held by the left hand.

362-365 A: The whole body remains very still.

366 D: Leaning forward momentarily, legs uncross and the back rests against the back of the chair.

317 Your hands know so much, about how to bring relief.
 318 Without thinking they can scratch and move
 319 and hold. And I wonder what they would like
 320 to hold onto, that they would like to continue
 321 to hold onto and never let go of
 322 *
 323 what really matters to them
 324 to hold on to [softly] *tightly, and never let go of,*
 325 and before you move deeper into trance,
 326 you might find yourself asking them to tell you
 327 what-they-hold-dear
 328 * * . . .
 329 [faster] *because just like you, they want to take*
 330 *their time developing their own understanding*
 331 * * . . .
 332 and you can consciously check them out
 333 for their changes that's going on there, but, they
 334 have their own k-n-o-w-i-n-g that is much deeper
 335 than that, and what do they wish to hold on-to,
 336 and allow them to tell a story to each other
 337 about that
 338 * * *
 339 and they're to know if they were to have a
 340 conversation, who would be the one to lead it?
 341 * * * * *
 342 Imagine for a moment that your right hand is
 343 your left, your left your right
 344 * * .
 345 so that the signals that your right hand are sending to
 346 your left brain [pace increases] *become the*
 347 *signals that your left hand would be sending your*
 348 *right brain if your, your left hand were your*
 349 *right hand sending signals to your left brain.*
 350 *And so allow your right index finger to become*
 351 *your left index finger*
 352 * . . .
 353 and you know if your right or left thumbed
 354 * * * *
 355 and how your hands can cradle each other
 356 and take care of each other
 357 * * .
 358 then allow that dream
 359 or that story
 360 to begin to unfold
 361 * * * * *
 362 and what do your hands have to contribute to that
 363 story?
 364 * * * * * . . .
 365 and you needn't try anything, you needn't try
 366 to go into a trance.
 367 You might wonder where the next itch
 368 will be,

367 A: The right hand raises and scratches the side of forehead.

368-370 A: The head bends forward slightly.

370-372 A: Remaining cradled in the left hand, the fingers on the right hand slightly move. The left index finger rubs against the right index finger and then the fingers on both hands become still.

385-390 A: The head raises slightly while the fingers on each hand move a bit. The left hand continues to hold the right hand as the index fingers on both hands straighten, push against each other and then return to their previous position.

391-405 A: The hands unclasp, right and left palms face each other but do not touch. The right and left finger tips meet and push up against each other. While the tips are still touching, the fingers begin to curl in until the hands resemble the shape of a ball.

406 A: The right and left fingers intertwine with each other and the hands momentarily hold each other before they disconnect. The right hand takes hold of the left fingers and begins to, one at a time, stretch each finger on the left hand back.

407-413 A: The hands separate and then the palms on each hand come together with the fingers pointing upward. The palms and fingers remain in this position while the hands raise up toward the face. In one continuous movement, the left and right fingers intertwine with each other, the palms turn outward and the arms and interlaced fingers stretch out in front. The right and left fingers separate, the palms come together, the fingers point upwards, and the hands raise up toward the face until they are opposite the chin. While the fingers press up against each other, the palms separate. The right and left hands completely separate from each other until they are approximately 8 inches apart. Although separate, the right and left palms continue to face each other while the fingers (that are pointing upwards) move back and forth.

414 A: The hands remain in this position as the head turns slightly from side to side with the words, "I was young, I was modeling."

369 anticipate it,
 370 and wonder what your mind and your hand is thinking as
 371 it travels up to relieve it
 372 * * *
 373 in what way will it next bring you relief
 374 * *
 375 and how will it make the trip, will it make it slowly
 376 or quickly? I knew a man once who did his
 377 dissertation on the fact that we are all elegant,
 378 and he did that by photographing people lifting
 379 glasses of water of various weights
 380 and filmed it, and was able to prove that we adjust
 381 the speed at which we lift and the muscles used,
 382 depending on perceived weight,
 383 and so just before your next relief and itch, you
 384 might want to just wait
 385 but a moment
 386 * . . .
 387 in order to consider the trajectory,
 388 and how does you hand know where to [slow] *find it*?
 389 * * * * *
 390 how does it make that movement, [soft] *that one*
 391 * *
 392 Your conscious mind can, wonder about what you're
 393 feeling there in your hands

CANTO IV: CRYSTAL BALL

394 * * .
 395 Test it like a good scientist,
 396 *
 397 assess it.
 398 * * * * . . .
 399 while your unconscious mind can begin
 400 or continue to make
 401 changes
 402 * *
 403 [fast] *tell me what you're feeling in your hands?*
 404 * * * * *
 405 A They're heavy.
 406
 407 D Uh hum.
 408 A I'm thinking of holding a heavy crystal globe
 409 D Uh huh.
 410 *
 411 A I was holding one time for a picture.
 412 D Uh huh. And when was that picture taken?
 413 A I was young. I was modeling. I was eighteen, nineteen.
 414 *

415-421 A: The right and left fingers close into fists and then they rhythmically open and close.

415-421 A: The left and right fingers continue to rhythmically open and close ten times with the words, "I was eighteen, nineteen" and "my hands, it was really for hands, but my face was behind the crystal ball. It was heavy and smooth and hard to hold. . . ." The hands remain open with the fingers stretching up, as if they are holding a big ball in front of the face.

422 A: The hands return to lap.

423-427 A: Clasping each other, the right hand momentarily holds the left fingers and hand before the fingers on each hand intertwine with the fingers on the opposite hand. For a moment, the entwined fingers and hands hold each other and then the index fingers on each hand straighten while the rest of the fingers remain entwined. The index fingers push against each other, taking turns pushing the opposite finger slightly back. The index finger tips meet and continue to press against each other.

428-434 A: The right and left fingers dis-entwine. The right and left palms touch, while the fingers are straight and pointing forward. The right and left finger tips touch, press against each other, curling the fingers slightly inward, making the hands into the shape of a ball. The finger tips separate and the right hand grasps and holds the left hand. The right and left fingers loosely entwine with each other while the fingers remain straight. Still entwined, the fingers lightly rub against each other.

434-451 A: In one continuous movement, the fingers and hands separate and come together again. The right and left fingers (which are straight and pointing upward) meet--finger-to-finger, palm-to-palm, the left and right hands press against each other. Together the hands move toward the face where the finger tips briefly touch the lips before they move away from the face and down toward the lap. Before they reach the lap, the right and left fingers intertwine with each other and while loosely entwined, the straightened fingers gently rub against the fingers of the opposite hand. Pausing for a moment, the hands separate and then the right fingers take hold of the left hand, stretching the left fingers back. The left fingers, in turn, take hold of the right fingers and stretch them back. The head slightly bends forward. The right and left finger tips meet, the fingers curl in slightly so that the hands are shaped like a ball.

451-457 A: The hands raise up in the direction of the face but they do not touch the face. Although the eyes are closed, they appear to be intently gazing at the hands and fingers as they continue to rub against each other. The hands and fingers separate. The right and left finger tips come together. While the finger tips press against each other the fingers slightly curl inward so that the hands are again shaped like a ball, as if they are holding a ball. Holding the "ball" under the nose, the expression of the eyes appear to be intently gazing at the "ball."

415 My hands, it was really for hands, but my face was
416 behind the crystal ball. It was heavy and smooth
417 and hard to hold.

418 D Uh huh. And can you hold that now?

419 A They made me take my rings off.

420 D Uh huh. And if you were to look in that crystal ball
421 right now,
422 what do you see?
423 *

424 A A lens on the other side, of the camera, and my face
425 * *
426 a flash.

427 D And with that flash, de-focus
428 and let the image in the crystal ball go blurry for a
429 moment.
430 And now when you're looking again, look at your hands
431 through the crystal ball,
432 and now what do you see?
433 * * . .

434 A I see my hands and my red nails--

435 D Uh huh.

436 A --and the bones.

437 D You can see through the skin?

438 A Yeah, I can see the bones.
439 *

440 D And how do the bones look?
441 * * .

442 A Knobby.
443 *

444 D Uh huh. Like good strong hand bones?
445 *

446 A They're kinda of frail. They need to get stronger.

447 D Uh huh. And look at the muscles on the bones for a
448 minute. What do you see there?
449 *

450 A I don't see any muscles. I just see skin and bone.

451 D Ahh. Take one of the fingers now, looking in the
452 crystal ball
453 and strengthen the bone in one of them,
454 *
455 and when you've done that you can tell me.
456 *

458-463 A: The hands separate and the right hand gently stretches the fingers of the left hand back. Taking turns, the left hand stretches and bends the right fingers back.

464-472 A: The throat is cleared. With the palms together, the hands move to chest level. The fingers are straight and pointing up. The left and right fingers press against each other, moving the opposite finger back and forth. The fingers intertwine and gently rub against each other.

472-475 A: The head nods up and down with the hypnotist's words "Um, more alive, not like a skeleton." Palms together, the fingers intertwine while the right and left index fingers straighten and push against each other. The index finger tips touch, pushing the opposite finger back and forth. While the palms remain together, the entwined fingers straighten, the right and left finger tips touch and press against each other, slightly separating the palms. The palms come together again and then separate as the finger tips push against each other. The finger tips curl inward until the right and left finger knuckles touch, forming two fists that now press against each other.

476 A: The hands clasp each other and return to the lap.

477 A: When hypnotist asks, "which finger was that?" the hands separate and the left fingers momentarily rub the right index finger. The right and left finger tips touch and then separate as the right fingers begin to gently massage the left index finger.

478-490 A: The hands come together, finger-to-finger, palm-to-palm as they lift up toward the face. The finger tips touch the tip of the nose and then the bridge of nose. With the head slightly lowered, the finger tips remain gently resting on the bridge of the nose. The inward gaze appears deeply concentrated. After a few moments, the finger tips move away from the face and the outstretched right and left fingers intertwine, clasping the opposite hand. The clasped hands loosen, the fingers straighten, while the right and left fingers remain loosely interlaced at the finger knuckles and open at tips.

490-494 A: The head nods up and down three times as the right and left fingers separate from each other. With the palms still one another, the right and left finger tips touch and slightly bend inward with the palms apart. The fingers intertwine while the index fingers remain erect, pressing against each other. Both hands return to the lap, where they momentarily separate. The right hand grasps and gently massages the left fingers. The hands clasp and unclasp. The right fingers fold over the left finger tips and gently pull the left fingers back.

494 D: The hypnotist leans forward and gazes intently at the fingers.

457 A I think I made it better.

458 D Uh huh. And the bone
459 is stronger now?

460 A Uh huh.

461 D And now, what do the muscles look like in that finger?
462 * * *

463 A I have to put muscles under the skin.

464 D Yeah. You might see the blood vessels first.

465 A Uh huh.

466 D And the nerves.

467 A Um, yeah.

468 D Yeah. So how does that finger now look different than
469 the other ones?

470 A Now, it's more alive. It's not like a skeleton.

471 D Um, more alive,
472 not like a skeleton.
473 *

474 A It breathes.

475 D Ah, it breathes.
476 Can you find another finger. Which finger was that?
477 Can you let its partner on the . . .
478 that's right, that one
479 can you let it breathe as well?

480 A Yeah, it needs those blood vessels.

481 D So, put them there
482 * *
483 all the blood vessels it could possibly need
484 * *
485 and all the muscles it needs
486 * *
487 and when you're finished with that finger, let me
488 know.
489 * * * * *

490 D Okay. Now, do those two fingers feel heavier or
491 lighter than the others?
492 *

493 A Heavier. They're stronger.

494 D Yeah. So can you take each of those fingers, and I

496-501 A: Each hand continues to take turns gently bending the fingers of the opposite hand back. The hands embrace each other, the fingers intertwine and the clasped hands move closer to the waist.

502-505 A: The right and left thumbs separate from the rest of the entwined fingers and the thumb tips touch each other, pushing the palms apart. The hands separate and the finger tips of each hand press against each other. Palms apart, the hands form into the shape of a ball. While holding this shape, the hands move up toward the face. Pausing for a moment in front of the chest, they continue to move up until they are in front of the chin.

505 D: The hypnotist leans back against the back of the chair and crosses the legs.

505-507 A: With the hands shaped like a ball, the right and left finger tips push against each other, the palms separate and again touch. The right and left hands separate to approximately 5-6 inches apart from each other. The fingers on both hands stretch up straight and then close into fists.

507 A: The head moves up and down with the verbal utterance, "Um."

508-523 A: Rubbing against each other, the right and left fingers intertwine and separate, intertwine and separate. The right and left finger tips touch, separate and touch again. The finger tips take turns massaging the palm of the opposite hand. They pause for a moment before they begin one-at-a-time to gently stretch and bend back the fingers on the opposite hand. The hands embrace each other, the fingers straighten, and the outstretched fingers loosely intertwine with the fingers on the opposite hand.

524-537 A: The entwined hands return to lap. The head slightly bends forward and the inward gaze appears to be intently concentrated on the hands which are now resting in the lap. Holding each other, the entwined fingers begin to rub against each other. The hands separate and come together again at the finger tips. As the right and left finger tips press against each other, the fingers curl inward forming the hands into the shape of a ball.

495 [fast] don't know if they will communicate how to
 496 do that to the other fingers on their own hand or
 497 whether they'll communicate to the fingers on the
 498 opposite hand but bring life and blood vessels and
 499 breath and nerves [soft] to all the other fingers
 500 * *

501 and when they're all feeling heavier and more alive
 502 *
 503 when they're all feeling that way, [softly] let me
 504 know.
 505 * * * * *

506 A Um.

507 D Okay, and that includes your thumbs?

508 A Uh huh.

509 D Now look into the crystal ball again and de-focus,
 510 and refocus in a month from now
 511 * * *
 512 May 12th, 11th, or 13th, and now what do you see?

513 A My complete eighteen-year-old hands, nineteen-year-old
 514 hands. They're strong--
 515 *

516 D Hmmmmm.

517 A straight.

518 D [In the same tone] They're complete-and-strong-and-
 519 straight
 520 * * *
 521 Now, will you de-focus again
 522 into the crystal ball
 523 and refocus
 524 however long ago
 525 *
 526 at a time when your hands were strong and straight and
 527 full of life and vigor,
 528 and when you can see that and feel that in your hands,
 529 let me know.
 530 * * * * *

531 D Okay, and where are you?

532 A I'm at my grandmother and aunt's house in the kitchen.
 533 My aunt's putting nail polish on my hands. I'm
 534 about four.

535 D What color?

536 A Red.

538-539 A: With a slight smile, the head nods up and down with the word, "Yeah."

538 D: While gazing intently at the fingers, the hypnotist's legs uncross and with the left arm bends at the elbow and the elbow rests on the leg. The left hand supports the chin.

540-553 A: The right hand raises up and for a moment and rubs behind the right ear before returning to the lap where it clasps the left hand. The two hands embrace each other, taking turns, each hand massages the fingers of the opposite hand. The right hand holds the left thumb, pulling it back slightly, and then the right fingers rub the left fingers. Each hand, in turn, continues to gently rub the fingers of the opposite hand, first holding the fingers and then massaging them.

554 A: The hands separate from each other and with the palms resting on the leg, the fingers spread open and the hands become still.

557 A: The mouth forms into a slight smile, and the head nods up and down with the word, "Yeah."

559-562 A: In slight movements from left to right, the palm of the right hand rubs back and forth across leg. The fingers are still spread open.

562-575 A: The left fingers move toward the right hand which is resting with its palm down on the leg. As the fingers of the right hand slightly curl under, the left fingers take hold of the right index finger, whereupon, the fingers and hands become still. With a slight smile and a concentrated inward gaze, the head bends slightly forward.

537 D Um. Is she admiring your hands?

538 A Yeah [nods head and smiles].

539 D And you can feel how full of life they are?

540 A Yep. They're cute little hands.

541 D Uh huh.

542 A It's hard to keep them still so she doesn't get the
543 nail polish on the skin.

544 D [Child-like] Ah, *cause your always moving?*

545 A Cause I want to look at it before she's done.

546 D And you're excited. Is this the first time you've
547 gotten nail polish?

548 A No. [Childlike] *My grandmother did it once and she got*
549 *it all over my skin,* and I cried, till my aunt
550 took it off.

551 D But this time it's going on right?

552 A Uh huh [nods head and smiles].

553 D Hmmm. And your hands feel wonderful, and tingly,
554 and warm.

555 A And all sweaty.

556 D Yeah.

557 A They're on the kitchen table.

558 D Um, is it cool?

559 A Smooth.

560 D Uh huh.

561 A It was cool, now it's sticky.

562 D And they're cute little hands.

563 A They still have dimples.

564 D Now, de-focus again into the crystal ball, and take
565 those hands forward
566 until you're fifty.

575-577 A: The head raises up and in one continuous movement the elbows bend as the right and left fingers intertwine with each other. The entwined hands raise up toward the chin. The fingers straighten and the palms and fingers press against each other. While the fingers remain touching, the palms separate and come back together again. The head bends forward and the up-stretched fingers move toward the face.

578-580 A: The finger tips touch the mouth and stay there for a moment.

580-585 A: With a slight smile, the head raises. In a continuous movement, the hands move away from the face and down toward the lap. The right hand makes a fist as the left hand wraps itself around the right hand. The left hand opens and makes a fist and is, in turn, cradled and held by the right hand. For just a few moments, the right fingers gently massage the joints of the left fingers.

585-598 A: The hands separate from each other, stretch open, and with the fingers pointing upward, the finger tips come together, slightly curling inward as they press against each other forming themselves into loose fists with knuckles of each hand touching the knuckles of the opposite hand. The fingers straighten and the right and left palms press against each other. The fingers intertwine and clasp the opposite hand, remaining loosely intertwined. The hands raise up toward the face and as the head slightly bends forward to meet them, the tips of the fingers lightly touch the tip of nose and then the bridge of nose, and again the tip of nose where they remain for a few moments.

599-611 A: The hands move away from the face and slightly down toward the lap. The right and left finger tips press against each other. The fingers curl inward and then the fingers loosely intertwine with the fingers of the opposite hand. As right and left fingers remain entwined, the left fingers straighten and then clasp the right hand. The right fingers, in turn, straighten and clasp the left hand. While the fingers remain loosely entwined, the right and left index fingers straighten and push each other back and forth. The tips of these two fingers press against each other as the hands un-clasp. Right and left finger tips press against each other, pushing each other back and forth.

567 * *
568 [Softly] *That's right.*
569 And holding the crystal ball
570 with those strong hands
571 * *
572 at fifty
573 * *
574 and what do you see?
575 * * .
576 A Ladies hands.

577 D Uh huh.

578 What else?

579 A Dimples are inside.

580 D Uh huh. And the inside dimples are keeping them feeling
581 young
582 and healthy? Is that right?

583 A Yeah.

584 D And you can see those dimples through the crystal ball,
585 but to the normal gaze they'd be invisible, is
586 that right?

587 A Right.

588 D And can you also see then the strong bones
589 and the
590 blood vessels [softly] *and the nerves?*

591 A Yeah.

592 *
593 D Yeah. De-focus again,
594 and now refocus at those seventy-year-old hands,
595 * *
596 again locating the internal dimples.
597 * * * *
598 A They're really different.

599 D Uh huh.

600 A The outside is like shell.

601 D Uh huh. In what way?

602 A Hard and brittle
603 and holding the
604 life and the softness
605 inside.

612-614 A: Separating for a moment, the right and left palms and fingers again connect and the flattened hands press against each other with the fingers straight and pointing upward. In this position, the hands raise up toward the face until the finger tips are near the tip of the nose. The head slightly bows and the tip of the nose meets the finger tips where they remain together for a moment. The inward gaze appears intently focused.

615-621 A: The hands move away from the face. The right and left fingers intertwine, the torso leans slightly to the right and the entwined fingers and palms turn outward as the arms stretch out in front and the neck and torso lean back. After a momentary stretch, the hands return to the lap and rest separate from each other with their palms facing down on the leg. The right hand lightly grasps the calf of right leg which is curled slightly under the torso and the left hand remains resting on the leg. The left and right hands join each other and the left fingers begin to lightly massage the right thumb.

622-630 A: The legs (which have been curled up on the couch) unfold. The right foot goes to floor while the left leg crosses the right leg. When the legs are settled in their new position, the left hand crosses over the right arm (which is resting on the lap) and clasps the right elbow. The fingers of the right hand open and close making a fist before they rest a moment (with the palm down) on the lap. The fingers begin to move very slightly.

631-647 A: The left fingers begin to move and then all the fingers begin to move more until the hands relocate and join each other. The fingers on each hand intertwine with the fingers on the opposite hand. The hands separate and the backs of the hands are held out in front for a moment as if they are being looked at. The left hand grasps and lightly massages the right index finger and then the right fingers and hand take hold of the outstretched fingers on the left hand and begin pulling the fingers back. The left hand squeezes the right thumb and then the fingers of the right hand push against the palm of the left hand. The hands come together, palm-to-palm with the finger tips touching and pushing against each other. Holding each other for a moment, the hands rest for a moment on the lap close to the waist. Separating, the hands move forward on the lap as the tips of the left and right index fingers touch and press up against each other. The fingers turn in until the finger tips touch the palms, making two lightly held fists. While remaining on the lap, the fists open and close. The fingers on each hand take turns rubbing the fingers on the opposite hand. The two hands separate until they are approximately 6 inches away from each other with the palms facing one another. The hands momentarily stretch open before the left and right palms come together.

606 D Uh huh. So they're still full of life and softness
607 on the inside.

608 A Yeah, [nods head up and down slightly] like a clam.

609 D Uh huh. And they still have that youthful vigor?

610 A Yeah. They just don't look as good.

611 D They don't look like the four-year-old hands on the
612 [softly] outside.

613 A They look like my grandmother's hands . . .

614 D Uh huh.

615 A . . . but they work.

616 D And they're still strong?
617 * *

618 A They're strong.
619 * *

620 D Yeah. Now look once more, if you would, into
621 the crystal ball and de-focus
622 *
623 and refocus back to now
624 * *
625 [Softly] That's right. And locate those internal
626 dimples that source of life and movement
627 * *
628 and holding tightly to that, tell me what you see.
629 * * *

630 A My hands are baby hands inside.
631 * . . .

632 D Yeah.
633 And what does that bring your hands in order to
634 be able to see and to feel that?
635 * .

636 A What?

637 D What does that change in the feeling of your hands in
638 order to be able to see and to feel that?
639 * * * * * * * * * *

640 A Um, my hands are pudgier.
641 Softer.

642 D Uh huh. Stronger?

643 A Yeah, stronger, straighter
644 * * * *
645 smoother.

648-657 A: Palm-to-palm, the hands raise up toward the face until the finger tips touch the chin. As the head bends slightly forward, the finger tips touch the lips for a moment. The head raises up and the hands move toward the lap, stopping at chest level. The fingers spread open, and with the finger tips pointing toward the hypnotist each finger moves back and forth for a few moments. In a continuous movement, the hands (which are at chest level approximately 6 inches apart with the palms facing each other), the fingers turn up, spread open and then slightly back, before they close into fists. Repeating the same movement, the fingers stretch up and open, bend back and then close into fists.

657-662 A: As the head bends slightly forward, the right and left hands join each other. The fingers intertwine and the clasped hands return to the lap. The head raises and the facial expression suggests an intent, inward gaze. The hands remain clasped and still while the fingers slightly move. The right and left index fingers straighten while the rest of the fingers remain entwined. The two index finger tips touch and push against each other and then the hands become motionless.

663-666 A: The hands remain motionless during the long silence, while the inward gaze appears intensely focused. There are the sounds of voices conversing loudly in the hallway outside the room. Approximately 2 1/2 minutes pass before the head raises. Swallowing, the lips tighten for a moment and then loosen in a relaxed expression.

666-681 A: In a continuous movement, the hands momentarily unclasp and then the left hand grasps the right hand and holds it for a moment before separating from the left hand. The right and left fingers intertwine as the arms and hands stretch out in front, palms facing forward, the shoulders and neck lean back. The hands separate and then the left hand embraces the right hand, holding it for a moment before the left and right fingers again intertwine. The little fingers remain outstretched, their tips touch and push up against each other. The hands separate and the right fingers massage the left fingers. Stretching the left fingers back, the right fingers gently massage the left fingers one at a time.

646 D Hm. And how do they feel?

647 A Hot.

648 D Hotter or harder?

649 A Hot.

650 D And that heat's bringing them what?

651 A Cooking blood vessels
652 *
653 makes them more comfortable.
654 * *

655 D Uh huh. Can you take that warmth now and put it
656 in all of the joints in your body?
657 * * * * *

658 A They're colder now.

659 D Hm. And your other joints?

660 A They're warmer, except my toes.

661 D Hm. And can you take that, those internal dimples, and
662 make sure there's an internal dimple
663 there at every joint.

664 [Approximately 2 1/2 minutes]

665 Are you finished?
666 * *

667 And what difference has that made?
668 * * * * *

669 A I have my little baby body in me--
670 * * * * *

671 D Hmmmmm

672 A --and I have more supple muscles.

673 D Yes.
674 * * * * *

675 What else?

676 A I can run without thinking about it.

677 D Hmmmmm.

678 A Just moves, everything just moves. I don't have to pay
679 attention.

682 A: The head nods up and down in a yes movement. The right and left fingers intertwine and in a clasped embrace they rest on the lap with the thumb tips touching.

683 A: Nods head up and down in a "yes" motion.

698 A: After hypnotist asks which is the "yes finger," the right index or pointer finger raises.

700 A: After hypnotists asks which is the "no finger," the left thumb raises.

703-708 A: The hands separate. The left hand rests with the palm down on the left leg, the fingers are slightly spread open. The right hand rests on the right leg, almost out of sight from the camera.

680

CANTO V: TALKING FINGERS

681 D Yeah. They know how to move on their own?
 682 *

683 A [Nods head up and down in a "yes" motion].

684 D I'd like you to ask your unconscious a question if you
 685 would, or I would like to ask your unconscious a
 686 question
 687 * * *

688 and it might be that your fingers
 689 answer because they're the ones that we're
 690 really interested in
 691 *

692 and they can then spread their knowledge to all the
 693 other
 694 joints in your body.
 695 So maybe I'll just talk directly to your fingers. And
 696 just so that I know, can one of your fingers
 697 [faster] *decide to be a "yes" finger?*
 698 Okay, and another finger be a "no" finger?
 699 * *

700 Can you just fingers go
 701 completely
 702 relaxed.
 703 * * *

704 Just completely.
 705 *

706 [Softly] *That's right, relaxed.*
 707 *

708 D And do you know
 709 the best way
 710 for Anna to
 711 regain
 712 the comfort,
 713 *

714 relaxed comfort and strength
 715 in you,
 716 the ability to be confident in you,
 717 knowing that the responsibility will be shared
 718 *

719 [softly] *equally,*
 720 *

721 and assuming you're all willing to that
 722 * * *

723 And do you know
 724 whether
 725 Anna
 726 should be exercising
 727
 728 yet?

730 A: The left index finger raises up and lowers.

735-736 A: The fingers on both hands move slightly and then the right index finger raises and lowers.

742 A: The right index finger raises and lowers.

745 A: The right index finger raises and lowers.

749 A: The right index finger raises and lowers.

754 A: The right index finger raises and lowers.

757-762 A: After the words "for her to" right index finger slightly curls inward and then stretches out. The hypnotist pauses for a moment, watching the index finger as it stretches.

763 A: After the word "daydream," the right index finger slightly raises, and then slowly curls in toward the palm of the hand before stretching out straight.

766 A: The right index finger raises up and goes down.

729 A [Left index finger raises and goes down].

730 D Don't know.

731 * *

732 And do you think it would be wise for her to give you a

733 chance to heal?

734 A [All the fingers move slightly and then the right index

735 finger raises slightly and lowers down].

736 *

737 D Yeah.

738 And that when she begins the exercise and begins to

739 rely on you more fully that she do that

740 slowly.

741 *

742 Are you willing to feel more comfortable if you're

743 trusting that she won't overtax you?

744 A [Right index finger raises and lowers].

745 D [Soft] Okay. So that she will continue to protect you

746 in allowing you to regain your strength and comfort

747 when you're trusting that she will

748 allow you to do that on your own time.

749 [Soft] Okay.

750 Would you be willing to continue that

751 process in her daydreams,

752 that process of regaining--

753 A [Right index finger raises and lowers].

754 D [Soft] --Yes,

755 that's good

756 And so that would be a good way, wouldn't it, for

757 her to

758 protect you would be to allow time for that daydream.

759 [Fast] And you do know how to do that. If she were

760 to set aside time for trance

761 and simply not have to try to figure anything out but

762 simply allow the time for her to day dream, you

763 can take care of the rest, is that right?

764 *

765 A [Right index finger raises and lowers].

766 D [Softly] Yeah, okay.

767 * . . .

768 And you can feel comfortable

769 doing that in her [softly] daydreams,

770 while she daydreams.

771 [Fast] You can do it all the time, of course, but

772 her taking time to daydream can help invigorate that

773 process.

775 A: The right index finger raises up and goes down.

778 A: The right index finger raises up and goes down.

780-782 A: All the fingers move around slightly. The right hand moves down the leg away from the torso and then becomes still.

786 A: The right index finger raises up and remains up.

789-793 A: The right index finger continues to stay up.

794-795 A: The right index finger raises a bit higher.

799 A: The right index finger lowers down.

802-804 A: After the words "couldn't it?," the right index finger raises up and down two times.

- 774 A [Right index finger raises and lowers].
- 775 D And are you willing to take this knowledge and
776 spread it throughout the other joints in her body?
777 * *
- 778 [Softly] *That's good. Thank you.*
779 * * . . .
- 780 So you can continue, hands, in that way,
781 * *
782 allowing Anna to
783 take care of you in this new way?
784 * . . .
- 785 A [Right index finger raises and remains raised].
- 786 D [Softly] *Yes.*
787 * * *
- 788 You can memorize that and use that learning
789 in the coming hours
790 *
791 and days
792 * . . .
- 793 [softly] *that's right, and weeks, that's right,*
794 *that's right, and months to come,*
795 *and years, and decades, to continue that*
796 [softly] *that's right,*
797 *that important learning. [Softly] That's right.*
- 798 A [Right index finger lowers down].
- 799 D [Softly] *That's right.*
800 * . . .
- 801 and that could even be surprising for her, couldn't it?
802 Yeah.
803 [Softly] *But that would be okay.*
804 * . . .
- 805 And you can keep those internal dimples
806 placed at each joint.
807 * * * * *
- 808 A Takes a deep breath. Hands move together; intertwined
809 at stomach.
- 810 D And now in your own time you can come back to this
811 room, returning from trance, leaving there what's best
812 left [background noise], there in trance, and return to
813 the room and the rest of your day feeling rejuvenated
814 and rested.
815 * * *

827-829 A: The arms stretch out in front, the right and hands rub the back of the neck as the legs uncross and the left leg re-crosses the right leg. The hands move from massaging the neck to holding each other in the lap.

816 **CANTO VI: TWO DIMENSIONS AT THE SAME TIME**

817 A [Eyelids flutter and open].

818 D Hi.

819 A Hi.

820 D So, how was this one different?

821 A This one was a lot brighter. I mean, I saw things very
822 clearly, and, ah, I could listen to you and still
823 daydream. I didn't have to do everything you said,
824 either. Sometimes you were saying something and I was
825 somewhere else.

826 D Good.

827 A And so it felt more it was comfortable to do two things
828 at once.

829 D Ah hum. Great.

830 A It was like two dimensions at the same time.

831 D Uh huh. Well we need to stop.

Analysis of the Six Cantos

In the analysis that follows, I investigate the transcribed hypnosis session between Anna and Douglas by first attending to smaller units of conversation (the cantos), and then by examining the text as a whole. I use poetic distinctions to discuss the talk of hypnosis, and qualitative analytical strategies to attend to interactive patterns of communication. In conclusion, I utilize a process oriented perspective to examine the changes that arise in the conversation between Anna and Douglas, and how the variations in their conversation *between* reflect a change in Anna's conversation *within*.

Canto I: Daydream

I distinguished the first canto from the opening dialogue by noting that Douglas and Anna repeated the word "daydream" several times. Tannen (1989) suggested that segments of conversations may be differentiated from the larger conversation by attending to repetitions "which operate as a kind of theme setting, and at the end, forming a kind of coda" (p. 69). In the opening dialogue, immediately before the transcription starts, Anna states that Douglas's description of auto-hypnosis reminds her of daydreams. He immediately underscores her association of daydreams with trance by noting that both are a way of becoming "internally absorbed." At the end of the first canto, the word "daydream" is repeated again (lines 62, 66)

before it is transformed into the word "downtime" (lines 72-73, 77).

Tannen (1989) wrote that conversational repetitions facilitate understanding between conversants by intensifying the part that is repeated and the "part that is different" (Tannen, 1989, p. 51). She maintained that when one speaker repeats the words of another speaker, one "gives evidence of one's own participation" (Tannen, p. 52), and, at the same time, "shows acceptance" of the "other's utterances" (p. 52) and of the person. As Anna describes and clarifies her experience of daydreams, Douglas repeatedly connects daydreams with trance, and also relates it to health (lines 61-62).

I marked the beginning of the first canto (Daydream) with Douglas's invitation to Anna to "start a daydream now." Because Anna already knew how to daydream, starting a daydream implies that she could now start a trance.

There were no significant variations in rhythms of speech during this segment of the conversation to warrant scoring the text with timed pauses and silences. There were, however, several images and themes introduced in this canto that were transformed and appear later as echoes or refrains. For instance, Anna describes her daydreams as staying with a thought until the thought develops into a story. She also notes that her attempts to go into trance were disturbed by her wandering mind. In Cantos II and III,

I will examine how Douglas repeats and expands Anna's association of daydreams with stories, connecting daydreams and stories with unconscious thought.

In this canto, Douglas differentiates unconscious from conscious thought through a series of negations. "What you want to do with trance," he tells Anna, "is set up a possibility, not an agenda." "You can ask yourself a question, 'I wonder how my unconscious or my daydreaming will continue to help me feel healthier'" (lines 32-36). He suggests that she could "leave it to the part" she has "no control over to decide what on earth it want[s] to daydream." "Not to worry about having to interpret it, or make sense of it, that's its own task" (lines 39-41). Daydreams are "helpful," he says, "in ways that you don't understand, and that you might not recognize, even if you were to follow the daydream closely and scrutinize it" (lines 46-50) [*italics added*].

Flemons (1994a) has written that "negation is an essential factor in conscious thought" (p. 17) because it enables us to "distinguish," "categorize," "establish identity," "clarify," "and so on" (p. 17)). He has also suggested that negations create "undistinguished connections" (p. 29) outside of conscious awareness. "These out-of-conscious-awareness connections" (p. 29) are the "connections between ideas that are not named" (p. 29), and, thus, they remain unavailable to ordinary consciousness.

Therefore, when Douglas begins to tease apart different ways of thinking through a series of negations, he creates the possibility for Anna to make relevant connections between what he says and her experiences with daydreams, autohypnosis and her presenting problem of painful joints.

For instance, earlier in the session Anna states that when she tried to go into trance, she could not "empty her mind." Instead of trying to control her thinking, Douglas suggests that she might set up a "possibility and not an agenda," and that she could continue to let her thoughts make her healthier (lines 31-36). The implication that her thoughts were already making her healthy, and that they would be doing what they are doing quite "apart" from her "conscious scrutiny," might also imply a change in how she relates to painful joints. Instead of trying to consciously interpret or control the pain (determine its cause; ignore or push it away), Anna might be curious and indifferent at the same time. In other words, Douglas creates a context where Anna could both "closely scrutinize" and "take notes," and "leave it up to the part" she "had no control over" by not worrying "about having to interpret it" (lines 38-50).

In this first canto, Anna introduces the concept of "time" when she remarks that she did not have enough time to daydream. She used to have lots of "idle time" (line 64), but her life was so busy now, and her mind was so full that she did not have time to "wile away" in daydreams. Douglas

responds by ambiguating the notion of "no time." First he connects "no time" with health (lines 61-62) and transforms it into "downtime" (lines 72-73) (which Anna repeats at the end of the first canto [line 77]). Then, in the next canto, he reconfigures "downtime" into "dream time."

Canto II: Dream Time

In the beginning of the second canto, there is a long series of exchanged repetitions between Douglas and Anna. This interactive sequence of repetitions culminates with both of them speaking simultaneously (which is the only time it happens during the session), and it marks the beginning of "dream time" or trance time. As Anna and Douglas take turns repeating a word or phrase the other has said, the patterned repetitions "tie parts of [the] discourse to other parts" (Tannen, pp. 51-52) and connect the two conversants in a "shared universe of discourse" (Tannen, p. 52)--which is named "dream time." The following extract (with its italicized words) highlights this sequence of interactive repetitions, and it signals a significant shift in their talk.

- A *So, I have to admit that as good as the rest of my life might be that stuff is all new and pressure oriented.*
- D *So in the midst of all that, let me add some more pressure for you to organize and schedule dream time.*
- A Yeah, it probably would, but to know that, just to have the realization that I may not have been allowing enough *dream time* . . . when it starts to

happen I may notice it more and just let it happen.

D Well, why don't you let it happen right now? So, I'm going to talk but *this is not like paying bills* (refers to and repeats to what Anna said earlier, lines 18-19).

A *This is not like paying bills*. Good. There's nothing worse than *paying bills*.

D So you don't need to listen to me.

A So, I don't need to listen to you. I can tune you out.

D You can tune me out and you get into your best *dream time* you can manage. Okay. [[Now you don't have to tune me out]], however.

A [[I don't have to tune you out]]. Okay. (lines 79-98)

After their final simultaneous utterances, Anna became verbally silent while Douglas's rhythms of speech dramatically changed. The shift in their conversation from a verbal exchange to a verbal-non-verbal (mind-body) conversation is marked by the hypnotist's words and by how he says them.

D And, what you might do is imagine yourself then at home now with yourself propped up in your bed with a special pillowcase or the special cover, or the special animal, or whatever *dream* [*] marker you're going to use. This is *dream time*. [Italics added] (lines 99-105)

The noticeable pause between Douglas's words "dream" and "marker" is the prelude to a new kind of time--dream time, or trance time.

While Anna remained silent during this and the next canto, her body movements (described parallel with Douglas's

talk) suggested that she was actively engaged with his talk. For instance, her head nodded several times in response to his words (lines 99; 114; 118; 127), and her eyes (which had been focused on his face) looked up to the ceiling when he said the words "free up" (line 171).

Many times during the second canto, Douglas wove Anna's body behavior into the conversation by using a description of her movement to create a context for entering into trance. For example, when Anna's hand makes a fist, Douglas responds,

but that
you hold tightly to the necessity to be able to go
down, or go into a trance by going into a
dream (lines 108-110)[,]

and the hand opens and comes to rest on her leg. In Canto III, Douglas again used the phrase "holding on" when Anna makes a fist.

And I wonder what they would like
to hold onto, that they would like to continue
to hold onto and never let go of. (lines 320-322)

When Anna begins to speak again in Canto IV, the "holding on" metaphor is integrated into her talk.

Earlier in this chapter, I discussed Tannen's interpretation of conversational repetitions between conversants. Poetic scholars have explained repeated words and phrases in relation to the experience within by suggesting that repetitions serve as a "connecting pathway" (Brown, 1991, p. 75) between the here-and-now and active memory (Brown, 1991). In Cantos II and III, the conversation

between the hypnotist and client is a verbal and non-verbal communication. From a poetic point of view, Douglas's repetition of "holding on" metaphors during these two cantos aligns him with Anna's present non-conceptual experiences as well as with her previous talk. At the beginning of the session Anna had described lifting heavy packages, and her uncertainty about whether the weight bearing activities had exacerbated the pain in her fingers. She said that she dealt with the pain by ignoring it until it became too painful to disregard. Her approach to the pain might imply the attempt to separate her mind from painful symptoms. By orienting to and conversing with Anna's body movements, Douglas establishes with Anna a conversational domain that connects mind and body.

Throughout Dream Time (Canto II), Douglas continues to suggest connections between mind and body. Metaphors identified with body behaviors are used to describe processes of the mind, and, in the next canto, mind based metaphors are used to describe body processes. While Anna remains verbally silent and inwardly absorbed, Douglas suggests that she might recollect her ability "as a young girl to have a *thought/a good thought that somehow grabs*" [italics added] her. In a later section of the canto, Douglas very rhythmically says,

That you can carry on
with what you're doing n-o-w and race and consider
everything that's going on in your head
right

now. You could itemize them all.
 You could follow them as they make their course and all
 of the jumps and leaps and wondering where you're
 going to go next. And in the midst of all that
 hustle and bustle and rustle allow that story
 line to develop
 itself. (lines 176-187)

By connecting "thoughts" with "grabs," "jump," and "leap"
 (and later in the canto "imagination" with "tumbles,"
 "turns, "somersaults," and "twirls" [lines 230-232; 237-
 238]), Douglas implies connections between mind and body.
 The relation between thoughts and body behaviors is
 underscored when the rhyming phrase, "hustle and bustle and
 rustle" is used to represent mind. Resonating sounds are
 easier to remember than sounds that do not echo each other
 (Brown, 1991; Ong, 1977, 1982).

As Douglas continues to multiply the associations
 between body and mind, daydream and trance, he
 simultaneously ambiguates the notion of "you."

The nice thing about having a daydream and the nice
 thing about going into
 trance
 is that your conscious mind *doesn't* need to
 be involved, and it can try to be involved
 and you can let it help if it really wants to, I
 guess.
 You can humor it.
 But knowing that
 what really matters is that you
 find your way in-to where you are now. (Italics added)
 (lines 137-147)

If conscious mind does not need to be involved in the
 development of daydreams and trance, who is the "you" that
 "humors" it, and who is the "you" that "find[s] your way in-
 to where you are now"?

Some poets have indicated that ambiguity creates an uncertain feeling that arouses attention and encourages the listener to turn within to search for a way to resolve the uncertainty (Cicardi & Williams, 1975). Douglas develops and intensifies in this canto, an increasing sense of uncertainty about who the "you" is. For instance, in the following passage when he likens "mind" to a "fast car," who or where is the "you" that "follow[s]-along-side-it" and "listen[s] to the racing?"

so if you have

mind

winding up and racing that you then just race with it
 and follow-along-side-it and
 listen for awhile to the racing. And you might even
 see if you can speed it up just a bit more
 so that it's
 racing
 at just the right speed. [Pace increases] And you
 know when you drive quickly
 in a nice car that you can be going very fast and it
 begins to feel like you're going [softly] quite
slow-ly. [*]
 And so as you get in time with racing,
 the car seems to [soft] s-l-o-w way down. It's only
 when you're accelerating and you're a little bit
 behind where the car is that you can feel that
 pull, but once you're there and the two of you,
 the car and you, are at full speed, it's then
 possible for you to just [softly calm-ly
steer your way,
 and that's a good time often to day dream as well.
 [Italics added for the whole passage] (lines 147-167)

This passage, especially poetic in its rhythmical variations and ambiguities, seems to create the experience of moving toward something new and unknown. The perception of slow (or fast) is heightened when Douglas varies the duration and pace in how the words are sounded. The word

"slow" is drawn out, intoned slowly, while phrases that describe speed are voiced at an increased pace.

The metaphor of mind as a racing car which "you" race along side of suddenly changes to "you" inside the car (mind) and finally "you" "calm-ly" steer[ing]" the mind into trance. Not only is the sense of "you" ambiguated but so is the perception of space and time. The image of racing along side of mind, *speeding it up* "so that it's/racing/at just the right speed" quickly changes to a "you" who is driving a "fast car" so that it "begins to feel as if "you" are "going quite/slowly." Fast becomes slow from another point of view, and "racing along side" suddenly shifts to being inside the car.

Poets have proposed that juggling opposing concepts (e.g., fast/slow; inside/outside) creates a dramatic tension that grips the listener's attention and makes thoughts more meaningful (Brown, 1991). In this canto, Douglas creates a context of entwined opposites by continuing to juxtapose ideas: "listening/not listening;" "racing with conscious mind"/watching conscious mind race; "relationship of no relationship;" "inside a dream/you're not even aware that it isn't a dream;" "the same way as last time/yet different in some small or significant way" (lines 185-186; 197; 209; 215; 250).

In a very elegant and poetic way, the potential for perceiving differently than with conscious thought is

created when Douglas introduces at the juncture of opposites the refrain, "story line developing all on its own" (lines 185-186; 197; 209; 215; 250). By juxtaposing two contradictory ideas, he provides the possibility for a third unexpected idea to arise. Just as the "toneless pause between notes makes the rhythm and melody possible" (Hillman 1995, p. 61), the refrain, "story line developing all on its own," made the unexpected relation between thoughts possible, and it creates the opportunity for a new story to unfold.

And that experience can be
 then *three-fold*
 at least.
 But then there is the question of what is the
 relationship between
 the first
 conscious thought you have and the second one in order
 how did you make that leap. And then the
 relationship between
 these two thoughts and the *story line developing all on*
 its own.
 And whatever those have to do
 with each other, [faster] and then
 the *relationship between* the two conscious or
 three conscious thoughts, one after the other,
 the *relationship between* them and the developing
 narrative of the story line, and then that
 with my voice and what I'm saying, that's right. And it
 may even be a relationship of no relationship.
 [Italics added to passage] (lines 200-219)

The relation between Anna's thoughts (and painful symptoms) is reflected in the stories that she tells herself about her aching joints. Douglas illuminated this connection between thoughts and stories when he wrote, "thoughts and stories are one and the same" (Flemons, 1991, p. 64). "In the connections between characters, in the development of

plot and the time of its telling, it weaves a pattern (Flemons, 1991, p. 64). Said differently, the woven pattern is often the "out-of-conscious-awareness connections [that] can become the contexts of conscious choices and actions" (Flemons, 1994a, p. 29).

Thus, when through a series of overlapping ideas (repetitions) Douglas attends to the *patterning* of Anna's thoughts and sensations (highlighting the "relation between" thoughts, his voice and what he was saying), he offers a possibility for Anna to re-story the connections between thoughts and sensations. Her eyes close at this point in the conversation, and they remain closed until near the end of the session. Closing her eyes is a significant transition from the visual perception that separates to the perception of sounds which embrace (Ong, 1977). Refocusing attention to the interior world of rising thoughts, sensations, and sounds has been described by Gary Snyder as "rummaging around in the various places of mind looking at what's there" (Snyder, in Haba [Film], 1995).

When you roam around in the spaces of your mind, you are not forming sentences and reeling our vocabulary, you are just looking. You are looking at the landscape of your mind, and you are solving problems. (Snyder, in Haba [Film], 1995)

When Douglas suggests that Anna's conscious mind might be racing with questions about her "fingers" or any "number of things" (line 195-196), he creates a connection between "fingers" and "numbers" that gradually creates a context for

change. Though the word "numbers" is introduced in Canto II (lines 200-201; 205-206; 212-213), in Canto III, the word "counting" is associated with (and develops in relation to) fingers. As Anna and Douglas continue their verbal-non-verbal conversation, a variety of different connotations connected with "numbers" and "counting" evolve.

Canto III: You Can Count On Your Fingers

I marked the beginning of this canto at the point when Anna's hands began to move (lines 258-263), and when Douglas said, "how nice it is to feel your hands feeling different again" (lines 258-263). As Anna lightly massages her shoulder and adjusts her posture, Douglas adds,

and always move to get comfortable
 **
 and let the fingers talk to one another

 and you can always count
 [softly] *on your fingers.* (lines 264-269)

"Counting on your fingers" denotes counting numbers on your fingers, and it also connotes relying on your fingers. As I examined Douglas's ability to juxtapose numbers in the following lines, Gary Snyder's advice to poets came to mind: "You have to be relaxed with language and goofy with it--loose as a goose and throw away the excess" (Snyder, in *Haba* [Film], 1995). While "numbers" were introduced in the last canto (concomitantly with "first," "second," "one," "two," and "three" (lines 196; 201-213), in this canto, Douglas plays with numbers in a way that is especially free and devoid of excess.

There was a movie once, *Five* [5] *Easy Pieces* [film
title], and
there's nothing easier than just letting
yourself move
where you are and find yourself there
find yourself in your hands. (lines 289-293)
[Italics and bracketed numbers added in this passage]

Of course, if you were to multiply
the *number of hands* [2] you do have by the *number of*
hands that are created by that combination [4]
* . . .
that is *one less than* [6]
the *seven* [7] *Samurai* [from the film *The Seven*
Samurai] that it took to [2]
* * . . .
make such a difference
in that town
* * * . . . (lines 308-317)
(Italics and bracketed numbers added in this passage)

Similar to the richly patterned language of poetic diction, the juxtaposition of numbers and film titles ("*Five Easy Pieces*" and "*The Seven Samurai*") express and evoke multiple, simultaneous associations. For instance, the allusion to the movie "*Five Easy Pieces*" (lines 289; 313) is contextualized by what is said before it: "You can always count/on your fingers" (lines 268-269) and "you don't need to try to do anything at all. In fact, you could even try trying" (lines 281-282).

The number "five" and the word "pieces" alludes to counting on five fingers, while the word "easy," (contiguous with "five"--*Five Easy Pieces*) is contextualized by the paradox of "try trying." The links and associations that connect these diverse images and ideas provide multiple opportunities for Anna to be different with the sensations in her hands. "*Five easy pieces*" brings attention to

feelings, which is reinforced (in the lines that follow this passage) when Douglas says, "there's nothing easier than just letting yourself move/where you are and find yourself there/find yourself in your hands" (lines 290-293). "Easy" (contextualized by try trying) turns back to what was said in the opening dialogue to this session. Douglas had said to Anna that instead of trying to go into trance by trying to empty her mind, she might "figure out" where she is instead of where she had to get to."

The reference to the movie, "The Seven Samurai," continues Douglas's playful "counting numbers" [7], but the image also implies strength and courage. "The Seven Samurai" is a film about seven warriors who restore tranquility to a defenseless town that was taken over by brigands. The notion of re-establishing peace (or "comfort and strength") will reappear near the end of the hypnosis session (Canto V, lines 712-713), when Douglas's asks Anna's fingers, "And do you know/the best way/for Anna to/regain the comfort/*/
relaxed comfort and strength/in you/the ability to be confident in you"?

While "count" on your fingers may denote counting numbers with your fingers, it also connotes relying on your fingers. The idea that Anna can "rely" on her fingers presupposes that fingers can be reliable, responsible, and intelligent. When Douglas remarks, near the beginning of

this canto, "let the fingers talk to one another" (line 266), he introduces a new perspective into the conversation --fingers can and do communicate. He expands the notion that fingers talk and listen when he asks Anna to "allow" her hands

to continue and
to elaborate their own thinking, their own
knowing
because they know how to do so much on their own
how nice to listen to them tell a story. (lines 293-297)

In Canto II, Douglas uses metaphors identified with body behaviors to describe processes of the mind; in this canto he employs mind based metaphors to describe body processes. For instance, in the above passage the implied assumption is that hands can think, know, and communicate their own stories.

In Chapter Four, I described how different poets have said that poetry originates not in abstract thinking (divided mind and body) but in the multiple and diverse exchanges of information within the poet's mind and body (Eliot, 1950; McLure, 1982; Burnshaw, 1970; Kelly, 1991). In other words, the poet assumes that body and mind communicate, and that poetry reflects this conversation. It is my conjecture that during the hypnotherapeutic conversation between Anna and Douglas, there arises a possibility for something similar to happen to Anna. Douglas's assumption that thoughts behave like bodies (Canto II) and bodies think like minds (Canto III) creates with

Anna a context for her to alter her usual way of thinking about and perceiving her fingers. Rather than ignore her fingers or be annoyed with them, she can interact with them in a different way, she can become curious, and listen to the stories they might tell (lines 293-297; 304-306; 327-328; 337-338; 340-341; 360-361; 363-364).

In Canto II, Douglas attends to the pattern of images and thoughts that Anna brought to the session. Concepts of self, time, and space are ambiguated through the use of antithesis. In this canto, the dream time/trance time relationship is ratified, and the notion of fingers communicating is established. In Canto II, Douglas suggests that Anna might notice how the story line spontaneously unfolds from "the relationship between" two thoughts, his voice and what he speaks. In this segment of their conversation, he proposes that Anna might "recognize" what the relation between her two hands can do for her.

and you can always count
 [softly] on your fingers
 * . .
 One way to do that
 is to recognize that you have two hands [* *]
 and yet when they're entwined, it's almost perhaps as
 if there's a third, that is, a combination of the
 two
 * * .
 and what can that third hand reach out and do
 *
 now-for-you.
 * * . (lines 268-280)

Instead of asking Anna to attend to the story line between two thoughts, Douglas suggests that she might perceive the

"third hand" between two hands. Rather than listening to the story that spontaneously unfolds, she might notice what the "third hand" might do for her.

While there are many rhythmical, rhyming passages that could be cited in this hypnosis session, the above extract is exceptionally poetic. The notations (asterisks and dots) between the lines reflect the rhythmical manner in which it is spoken. The patterning of word-sounds in the lines, "and what can that third hand reach out and do/now-for-you," is especially lyrical and harmonious. Rhythmical, rhyming sounds attain and hold the listener's attention, so that "what is transmitted is easier to assimilate" (Brown, 1991, p. 77). Rhythmically phrased words have a "physical effect on the organism--on the blood, on the breathing, on the physical patterns of the brain" (Williams in Sidran, 1971, p. 8).

Douglas continues to illustrate in a variety of ways how Anna's fingers can do something for her. As her fingers lightly rub the inside corner of her eye (lines 317-318), he weaves her body movements into the talk. He notes that her "hands know so much, about how to bring relief/Without thinking they can scratch and move/and hold" (lines 318-320). And later, when Anna's hands are on her lap holding each other, Douglas says, "your hands can cradle each other/and take care of each other" (lines 356-357).

At the end of this canto, Anna's hand again raises up to her face and scratches her forehead. Douglas responds,

You might wonder where the next itch
will be,
anticipate it,
and wonder what your *mind and your hand* is thinking as
it travels up to relieve it

* * *

in what way will it next bring you relief. (lines 368-375) [Italics added]

In this brief passage, Douglas joins "mind" and "hand" and then adds that Anna might wonder what "it" was thinking. Instead of using a plural pronoun and verb to reflect the plural "mind" and "hand," he implies that "mind" and "hand" are one, and he again identifies hands with bringing relief.

Unlike the above examples, not all body behaviors are woven into the hypnotic talk. Anna's hands and fingers are often moving while Douglas speaks, and while there are no apparent interactions between her movements and his words, there is a rhythmical exchange that will be discussed later in this chapter.

Near the end of this canto, Douglas tells a fascinating story. Immediately following the story he returns the idea that hands "know" how to bring "relief." He imbues this refrain with the insinuation that Anna might be curious about how her hands know.

I knew a man once who did his
dissertation on the fact that we are all elegant,
and he did that by photographing people lifting
glasses of water of various weights
and filmed it, and was able to prove that we adjust
the speed at which we lift and the muscles used,
depending on perceived weight,

and so just before your next relief and itch, you
 might want to just wait
 but a moment

 * . .
 in order to consider the trajectory,
 and how does you hand know where to find it?

 * * * * *

(lines 377-390)

This rhythmically presented story offers vivid and engaging images of a man photographing people lifting glasses of different weights. Images, said Octavio Paz (1956/1973) "attack the foundations of . . . [logical] thinking" (Paz, p. 93), by evoking and re-creating other images once perceived. These particular images recall Anna's concerns expressed at the beginning of the session. In the opening dialogue, she said that on the days when she felt better, she worked out and lifted weights at the gym. She recollected that she had also lifted and carried heavy packages like a "normal person." However, when the pain increased, she wondered if she should have been doing so many weight bearing activities. I thought of Anna's concern about lifting these heavy packages, and how her hands and the muscles of her arms might adjust the speed at which she lifted, depending on the perceived weight.

Co-arising with the increase in Anna's body movements during this canto are longer pauses and silences. The second longest silence, for example (45 seconds, line 390), follows the story of the man photographing people lifting glasses. In poetic traditions, attention to body rhythms and the silences between words awakens poetic sensibilities

(Burnshaw, 1970; Eliot, 1959; Johnson, 1987; Kelly, 1991; McLure, 1982). In a hypnotic conversation, poetic sensibilities might be said to arise when the client's and hypnotist's minds and bodies are engaged in rhythmical phrasing and imagistic words that connote associative and multiple meanings.

When Anna speaks after being silent, she brings her own vivid images to the hypnotic conversation. Douglas, in turn, transforms these images into metaphors that provide opportunities for change. I demarcated the end of Canto III (You Can Count on Your Fingers) when Douglas invites Anna's "conscious mind" to "wonder about" what she is "feeling" in her hands. I marked the beginning of Canto IV with Anna's response that she is holding a "crystal ball," the name given to the next canto.

Canto IV: Crystal Ball

At the beginning of this canto, Douglas requests that Anna continue to feel her hands, while her "unconscious mind" can "begin or continue to make/changes." The implication that change had already occurred presages several changes that Anna will soon confirm.

As I discuss this canto, I will describe how Douglas and Anna turn the "crystal ball" into a metaphor that enables Anna to see and feel her hands in different ways. When viewed from a poetic orientation, Anna's and Douglas's hypnotic conversation is reminiscent of *renga* poets who

converse in poetry. Renga poets take turns juxtaposing spontaneous verses that reflect their shared visual and sensory experiences. This form of aesthetic exchange occurs while they remain keenly attentive to the integrity of the poem's creation. The analysis of Anna and Douglas's hypnotic conversations intimates something similar. Although they do not conceptualize themselves as poets, a poetic analysis of their mind-body conversation accentuates the spontaneous creation of lucid images, and the graceful, rhythmical fluidity of their talk.

There is an apparent correlation between the story of a man photographing people "lifting glasses of water of different weights," and Anna's description of being photographed holding a heavy, crystal globe. Surprisingly, during the second follow up interview when Anna watched the video recording of this session, she could neither recall this hypnosis session, nor could she remember being photographed holding a crystal ball.

I don't remember the crystal ball I held one time for a picture. . . . I'm trying to think what crystal ball I was holding for what picture. I don't even know if it's true, to tell you the truth. I don't remember it. I don't remember it. . . . I don't know if this is real or this is some sort of symbol or metaphor or something else. Crystal balls have always had a fascination for me though. Probably since I was very little and the Wizard of Oz was my favorite movie, and the crystal ball, that ominous crystal ball with all the things happening in that crystal ball. So honestly, I don't know if this is concocted in my memory or if it really happened. I absolutely do not have in my portfolio any pictures of me holding a crystal ball, and I can't think of what ad I would have been working for. I have a pretty good memory for my jobs when I modeled

. . . . I don't remember this. It doesn't mean that it didn't happen, it's just that I don't remember it. This may be my imagination or some association with something.

Perhaps Anna's vivid description of holding a crystal need not be explained in terms of memory, but rather as a creative "leap" (Bly in Myers & Simms, 1989, p. 159) of association. In poetic traditions, the poet's quick and sometimes surprising "leaps" from "one topic, domain of imagery, mode of thought, or level of consciousness to another" (Myers & Simms, 1989, p. 159) is said to reflect an "associational logic [or an] intuitive process of reasoning" (Myers & Simms, p. 26). Literary critics have suggested that this "associational quality of the poet's imagination continually transforms . . . objects . . . so that an ongoing sense of surprise is experienced" (Myers & Simms, 1989, p. 159). Anna's leap of association could be likened to the poetic quality of mind that "leap[s] from the conscious to the unconscious and back again, leap[s] from the known part of mind to the unknown part and back to the known" [Bly in Myers & Simms, 1989, p. 159]).

In earlier cantos, Douglas several times connects Anna's hand movements to the refrain, "and I wonder what they would like to hold onto." In the beginning of this canto, Anna describes the crystal ball as "heavy and smooth and hard to hold" (lines 417-418). Her absorption in the imaginative experience of holding the crystal ball is emphasized when Douglas asks her, "And can you hold that

now?" Anna's response to the meaning of "now" did not reflect her immediate environment, rather a different time and place (lines 410-420). When Douglas asks what she sees if she looks into the crystal ball "right now" (meaning at this moment), Anna replies, "a lens on the other side of the camera, and my face/* */a flash" (lines 425-427). Similar to the *renga* poet who remains attentive to how the verses connect, Douglas builds on Anna's vision of a camera, her face, and a flash with images that offer multiple possibilities for recollecting multiple sensations.

And with that flash, de-focus
and let the image in the crystal ball go blurry for a moment.
And now when you're looking again, look at your hands
through the crystal ball,
and what do you see? (lines 428-433)

The image of a camera bulb flashing (which causes the eyes to lose focus) evolves into a metaphoric refrain--"de-focus, refocus." This refrain gradually builds a linguistic "bridge" from Anna's known experience of painful, swollen joints to a new perception of strong hands. The repetition of "defocus--refocus" has a cumulative, echoing effect that creates a context for Anna to "steer" her way through (line 167) fixed and rigid patterns of thinking and perceiving.

The crystal ball allows Anna to first visualize her fingers with "red nails," and then, with a fascinating leap of imagination, to observe her "frail" and "knobby" bones "through the skin" (lines 435-438). When Douglas questions what she sees when she looks at the "muscles on the bones,"

she replies that there are no muscles but just "skin and bone" (lines 448-451). He then suggests that she use her vision through the crystal ball to strengthen the fragile bones, to make them "strong" bones by adding blood vessels, muscles, and nerves (lines 452-467).

During my Interpersonal Process Recall (IPR) interview with Anna, she said that what came to mind as she watched the video were images from a book "on birth and fetuses and pregnancy" that was given to her when she was pregnant. She mentioned that while watching this segment of their conversation, she "got the feeling of growth and development in a kind of fetal stage." She continued,

Of course, I'm making muscles and blood vessels, and I guess that's what you do--as a fetus. But I'm flashing on beautiful portraits, pictures, photographs of inside a womb from this book I have . . . I don't know if I had those images while I was under [in hypnotic trance] or not.

Whether Anna was thinking of these images during the hypnotic session or not, Douglas continues to turn her descriptions of what she sees into opportunities for change. After Anna says that she "made it [the bone] better," Douglas asks, "so how does that finger now look different than the other ones?" Anna's response to his query and to many of the questions that follows suggests a poetic sensibility.

A Now, it's more alive. It's not like a skeleton.

D Um, more alive
not like a skeleton.

*

A It breathes. (lines 471-475)

After inviting her to let the "breathing finger's" "partner" breathe as well by adding blood vessels, muscles, and nerves to the skin and bones, Douglas asks if these two fingers felt "heavier or lighter than the others?" What Anna has seen through the crystal ball as "knobby" and "frail" just a moment ago, she now describes as "heavier and stronger" (which suggests "heavy" has become a sign of health). In the earlier cantos, Douglas's assumption that fingers can communicate yielded "visual chords" (Hume, 1924, p. 84) that connected mind and body. In this canto, the strengthened fingers are invited to communicate with the other fingers by bringing them "life and blood vessels and breath and nerves" (lines 496-500).

Throughout this canto, Anna's hands are in almost perpetual movement. During the conversation, the finger tips of one hand touch the finger tips of the opposite hand, while the palms curve out so that it appears as if the hands are holding a large ball. In the follow up IPR interview with Anna, she said that there were times during some of the sessions that she was aware that her hands were moving. She did not know, however, if she was being asked to feel them or whether her experience of them moving indicated that she was in either a "light" or "deep trance."

Using the transformative "defocus-refocus" refrain, Douglas asks Anna to focus on "however long ago." Anna again envisions "red nail polish," but this time the red nails are on her four year old hands. During the IPR interview, Anna remarked that "nail polish and things put on my fingers" was something she remembers being part of her past. Unlike the crystal ball which was "lost" to her memory, the experience of red nails, said Anna, could be recalled. From a poetic perspective the image of "red nails," "summon[s] . . . evoke[s], resuscitate[s], awaken[s], [and] re-create[s] moments of perceptions" (Paz, 1956/1973, p. 94), sensations that were once perceived.

Anna said during our second interview that when she began using auto-hypnosis [after the five sessions with Douglas] that many of the "themes" from this earlier period of her life returned.

Very vividly. There were a lot of images and smells. More smells and feelings even than images. Like I wasn't seeing the people, I was just feeling the people and smelling the people . . . I really wasn't seeing faces or body parts. I might see a leg or [hear] a voice--or [see] a flash of a cheek, or something, but it was more smells and feeling the coolness of the breeze on my body, and the sunlight. . . . Things like that.

What Anna describes could be interpreted from a poetic orientation as imagined pictures that present an "intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time" (Ezra Pound in Packard, 1989, p. 93). Poetic images are not simply visual, they are, as Anna describes, felt, heard, and

smelled (and sometimes tasted). In this canto, Anna and Douglas's conversation evokes multiple sensations. Anna describes her four year old hands with visual ("red nails") and tactile images ("sweaty" vis-a-vis the kitchen table-- "smooth," "cool" and "sticky"). Several times during their conversation together, Douglas connects visual and tactile experiences in the same phrase.

and when you see and feel that in your hands (line 529)

And what does that bring your hands in order to see
and feel that? (lines 634-635) [Italics added]

What does that change in the feeling of your hands in
order to be able to see and to feel that? (lines
638-639) [Italics added]

Poetic scholars have noted that when poets and listeners are "bound together by much repetition, a flowing rhythm, and a constant reference to shared experience, the result is a matrix of words, memories and feelings, each element supporting the others" (Brown, 1991, p. 77). It could be said that in a similar way, Anna and Douglas are "bound together" in the rhythms of their visual and tactile images.

When Douglas invites Anna to "de-focus into the crystal ball" and take what she saw and felt as "cute," "little," "dimpled" four-year-old hands "forward" until she sees and feels fifty, and then seventy-year-old hands (lines 563-567; 594-595) Anna describes what she sees and feels in terminology of multiple dimensions. Looking through the crystal ball, she "sees" both the outside and inside of the

fifty and seventy year old women's hands. Anna describes the outside as "ladies hands," "hard and brittle," and the inside as "dimples" full of "life and softness," like "clams." The rhythmical conversational exchange between Anna and Douglas has created the possibility for her to "see," "feel," and connect different dimensions simultaneously.

Douglas asks Anna to "once more" look into the crystal ball and to "de-focus and re-focus back to now."

D And locate those internal
 dimples that source of life and movement
 * *
 and holding tightly to that, tell me what you see?

A My hands are baby hands inside. . . .

D And how do they feel?

A Hot.

D Hotter or harder?

A Hot.

D And that heat's bringing them what?

A Cooking blood vessels.
 *
 makes them more comfortable. (lines 626-654)

While divisions in the grammar and linear syntax of prose might cause us to think that experiences are divided into "discrete and ordered entities" (M.C. Bateson, 1989, p. 132), poetic diction is different than prose in terms of its structure and experience. For instance, in the above passage, Douglas pauses for a moment between the words "internal" and "dimples," and then in one breath connects "dimples" with "that source of life and movement." After an

8 second silence, he continues, "and holding tightly to that, tell me what you see?" The pauses and silences between "internal" and "dimples," "movement" and "and holding tightly," leaves room for Anna to *experience* (see and feel) multiple, simultaneous associations and complementarities. Thus, Anna describes what she sees and feels both on the surface and under the skin ("hard and brittle"/"life and softness," "baby hands inside"; "smooth," "sticky,"/"dimples inside"; "stronger, straighter"/"hot," "cooking blood vessels" inside) (lines 603-606; 560-562; 644-652).

Near the end of this canto, Douglas asks Anna to take the "warmth" (the "hot cooking blood vessels") to all the other joints in her body. After approximately 2 1/2 minutes of silence, Anna's head slightly raises, the lips tighten for a moment and then loosen in a relaxed expression. When Douglas inquires about what "difference" it has made, Anna replies, "I have my little baby body in me . . . and I have more supple muscles." Anna's response intimates change. In the opening dialogue to this session, Anna had described wanting to be able to lift things and to move without having to think about it. Now she says, "I can run without thinking about it. . . . Everything just moves. I don't have to pay attention" (lines 677-679).

I demarcated the conclusion of this canto and the beginning of the next when Anna again becomes verbally silent. However, unlike the second and third cantos where

only Douglas's voice is heard, in Canto V, Anna's fingers have a voice of their own.

Canto V: Talking Fingers

This canto reflects an overlapping of ideas, a recursive looping back to earlier cantos. In poetic diction the associations and links between the various elements that compose a poem turn thought back on itself in a self-reflexive manner. The recursiveness in poetry has a cumulative, echoing effect that often gives rise to new meanings and understandings. Something similar to this description of poetry happens in this canto. Examining this canto in relation to earlier cantos will illustrate what I mean.

Through a series of negations in Cantos I, II, and III, Douglas teased apart conscious and unconscious mind. In Cantos II, III, and IV, the notion of self was ambiguated, while mind and body were woven together; body-based metaphors were used to describe mind; mind-based metaphors were used to describe body; and body movements were woven into Douglas's talk. In this canto, Douglas speaks as if a differentiation between Anna and her fingers has been established, but also as if mind is embodied--the fingers are imbued with mind. Instead of talking to Anna about her fingers, he talks to the fingers about Anna.

In Canto III (*You Can Count On Your Fingers*), Douglas implied that Anna could count on (or rely on) her fingers.

In this canto he speaks directly to the fingers, and asks if they can rely on Anna (lines 717; 740; 744). After determining which fingers are the "yes" and "no" fingers, he inquires if they know

the best way
for Anna to
regain
the comfort

*

relaxed comfort and strength
in you
the ability to be confident in you
knowing that the responsibility will be shared

*

[softly] *equally*. (lines 709-720)

Douglas does not ask the fingers how they (or Anna) can get rid of the pain, but rather how "she" (Anna) might "regain the comfort/*relaxed comfort and strength" in them. In previous sessions, Anna had said that she dealt with the painful joints by trying to ignore them. She had tried, in other words, to separate body from mind by ignoring the painful symptoms. Instead of positing a pain/no pain relationship between Anna and her fingers, Douglas implies that the fingers can repossess the comfort and strength that they and Anna once knew.

In Canto IV, Anna communicates with her fingers through the crystal ball. In this canto, the fingers communicate with Anna through their conversation with Douglas. When the hypnotist asks the fingers, "do you think it would be wise for her [Anna] to give you a chance to heal?," the fingers on both hands move slightly, and then the right index finger

[the "yes" finger] raises and lowers (lines 733-736). Douglas continues to talk to the fingers about their relationship with Anna. "Are you willing to feel more comfortable if you're trusting that she won't overtax you?" The "yes" finger raises up and down (lines 743-745).

While in trance during the third session, Anna had been a spokesperson for her fingers. During that session, she had said that her fingers needed to "trust" that the other fingers would be able to "do a good job." In this canto, the fingers are asked whether they can trust Anna. By conversing directly with the fingers in a respectful and thoughtful way, Douglas communicates to Anna their intelligence; he requests that they "memorize" what they have learned, and utilize their learning by spreading and communicating their knowledge (lines 693; 787-798).

In the first canto, Douglas proposed that Anna set up a "possibility" for auto-hypnosis and "not an agenda." In this canto, he returns to that suggestion, but from a different point of view. He asks the fingers, "and so it would be a good way, wouldn't it" for Anna to protect them if she would "set aside time for trance/and simply not have to try to figure anything out but simply allow the time for . . . daydream" (lines 756-763). Douglas concludes that the fingers could "take care of the rest" (line 764).

Each time Douglas asks the fingers a direct question, the "yes" finger raises and lowers. Near the end of their

conversation, however, during a particularly rhythmical passage, the "yes" finger raises and remains raised for almost one minute (lines 776-799).

D And are you willing to take this knowledge and spread it throughout the other joints in her [Anna's] body?

* *
[Softly] *That's good. Thank you*

* * . .
So you can continue, hands, in that way

* *
allowing Anna to
take care of you in this new way?

A [Right index [yes] finger raises and remains raised]

[Softly] *Yes.*

* * *

D You can memorize that and use that learning in the coming hours

*
and days

* .
[softly] *that's right, and weeks, that's right, that's right, and months to come, and years, and decades, to continue*

[softly] *that's right, that important learning. [Softly] That's right.*

A [Right index finger lowers down]. (lines 776-799)

I marked the end of this canto and the beginning of the last canto once Douglas invites Anna to return to the room. When Anna speaks in the last canto, and briefly describes her experience as "two dimensions at the same time," she returns to what was said just before Douglas began speaking in time with her body rhythms and she became verbally silent (Canto II, lines 93-98).

Canto VI: Two Dimensions At the Same Time

Reaching the end of a poem usually suggests going back to its beginning to revisit its opening lines. "Once the end is reached, we can see the whole design of the work as a unity . . . a pattern" (Frye in Oliver, 1989, p. 6)

In the few lines before the beginning of their "trance time" together (Canto II, lines 93-98), when Anna became silent and Douglas's rhythms of speech changed, there was a series of patterned repetitions between them.

D *So you don't need to listen to me.*

A *So, I don't need to listen to you. I can tune you out.*

D *You can tune me out and you get into your best dream time you can manage. Okay. [[Now you don't have to tune me out]], however.*

A [[*I don't have to tune you out*]]. *Okay.* (lines 93-98) [Italics added to this passage]

In this last canto, after Anna "returns" in her "own time" from "trance time," she reports that she "could listen" to Douglas and "still daydream." "It was comfortable to do two things at once. . . . It was like two dimensions at the same time." Their "shared universe of discourse" (Tannen, p. 52)--named "dream time" has come to an end.

Now that I have completed the poetic analysis of the transcribed hypnotic conversation by dividing it into six

cantos, I will examine the text (or long poem) as a whole by tracking variations in poetic distinctions and body movements through the entire transcribed hypnotic conversation.

The Relation Between the Cantos

The moment it is acknowledged that distinctions join what they divide, it becomes impossible to speak of anything in isolation.

--Douglas Flemons

I began my analysis of the lengthy hypnosis session by scoring it for pauses, silences, intonations, and by dividing it into shorter units (or cantos) for study. While I was keenly aware that the text was constructed and the divisions were imposed, dividing the text into smaller segments allowed me to attend to patterns of communication that I may not have otherwise seen. However, as Douglas (1991) notes in the opening quote, "it is impossible to speak of anything in isolation" (pp. 31-32) once it is acknowledged that "distinctions join what they divide" (p. 31). Thus, after analyzing the text's particularities, I will now treat the text as a whole by tracking specific images and metaphors as they appear in different moments of the conversation. I will also trace patterns of silence, word sounds, and body movements through the session.

I investigated the transcribed text as a whole by following the images "day dream" and "holding on" through a "series of metaphorical transformations" (Myers & Simms, 1989, p. 159). In poetic traditions, the "associational

quality of the poet's imagination continually transforms the objects [and] the development of thought . . . so that an ongoing sense of surprise . . . is experienced" (Myers & Simms, p. 159). Examining this hypnosis session by tracking images and their metaphorical transformations, along with sounds, silences, and body movements, highlighted unpredictable turns in Anna's and Douglas's hypnotherapeutic mind-body conversations.

Tracking daydream.

The image "daydream" was introduced by Anna in the opening dialogue to the fourth session. As I discussed earlier in this chapter, Anna responded to Douglas's description of autohypnosis by remarking that it sounded like daydreaming. In the analysis of Cantos I and II, I described how Douglas connected daydream with trance by maintaining that both were a way of becoming "inwardly absorbed." While Anna thought daydreams were a "waste of time" and disturbed trance (lines 16-17, 27-28), Douglas associated daydreams with health (line 36) and the unconscious (lines 35-50).

Anna reflects a change in her view of daydream when she remarks,

Well, maybe I haven't even done enough daydreaming lately, cause I've been too busy. That could be a problem in life, [laughing] cause it's really, I loved it in my daydreamings. (lines 51-53)

Douglas reinforces Anna's observation, strengthening the association between daydreams and health, when he says that not doing "healthy things like daydream" can tax her body (lines 60-62). Douglas then transforms "daydream" into "down time" (lines 72-73) and back into "dream time" (line 84). A change in Anna's understanding about day dreams and dream time may be recognized when she says, "just to have the realization that I may not have been allowing enough dream time . . . when it starts to happen I may notice it more and just let it happen" (lines 85-88).

Anna depicts the development of her daydreams as having time to play with a thought until it evolves into a story (lines 4-5, 10-12). When she becomes verbally silent and Douglas begins speaking in time with her body rhythms, he invites Anna into dream time or trance time. After he connects "day dreams" and "trance," he describes both as mind "wandering" or "meandering," and he reminds her that both are good ways to become "absorbed" in her "own experience" (110-116). The image daydream is compounded by connecting "dream" (line 121) with "good dream" (line 127) and "good dream" with Anna's "ability as a young girl" to "play with" a thought "until it develops into a story" (lines 127-131). Reinforcing the relation between "daydream" and "trance" (lines 137-139), Douglas associates them both with becoming experientially absorbed (line 172) in "where you are now" (line 147).

Connecting daydream and being inwardly absorbed gives rise to the metaphor of "story lines" that "develop" all on their own (lines 185-186, 197, 209-210, 215). After associating "dream" with "dream time," and "dream time" with "story" (lines 242-250), Douglas discontinues using "dream" and "dream time," while he proceeds to develop the metaphor "story." "The story line" that "unfolds all on their own," originally associated with mind, is now associated with the body which also has stories to tell (lines 305, 337).

"Story" is re-visioned from Anna's "listening" to the stories that her mind and body tell to both Douglas and Anna either referring to stories ("Five Easy Pieces" & "The Seven Samurai" [lines 289, 313-316]) or telling stories (man photographing lifting glasses; Anna's story of being photographed as a model, and as a young child in her aunt's house [lines 377-383; 412-420; 533-551]).

During the conversation between Anna's fingers and Douglas, the image day dream reappears. At the beginning of the transcription, daydream was associated with health. In his conversation with the fingers, Douglas connects daydream with the finger's "process of regaining" (line 753) "relaxed comfort and strength" (line 715) and "protection" (lines 759-763). In Anna's concluding remarks, she reflects a change in her initial assumption that daydreams prevent trance. She now describes her trance experience as daydream.

This one was a lot brighter. I mean, I saw things very clearly, and, ah, I could listen to you and still daydream. I didn't have to do everything you said, either. Sometimes you were saying something and I was somewhere else. (lines 822-827)

Tracking "holding on."

In the second and third sessions, Anna associates "holding on" with pain when she described the difficulties she was having holding onto objects. The pain in her fingers, for instance, would make her aware of how hard it was to hold a knife and cut food. In the opening dialogue of session IV, Anna, once again, couples holding heavy packages and lifting weights with re-occurring pain.

Douglas begins a process of deconstructing the metaphor that identifies "holding on" with pain when he connects Anna's hand making a fist (lines 104-109) with "holding on" to something "special" (a cover, a stuffed animal), or "whatever dream/marker" that signals going into trance. Douglas continues to build the linkage between "holding on" and "trance" by joining the notion "holding on" to a "good thought" that somehow "grabs you" (line 129). By associating body based descriptions ("holding on" and "grabs") with mind ("thought"), "holding on" is re-configured. By teasing apart "holding on" and "pain," he will be able to later connect "holding on" with "dream time" and "trance time."

When Anna's hand rubs the corner of her eye, returns to her lap, and again makes a fist, Douglas weaves the hands' movements into his talk. He links the hands with knowing how

to "bring relief," and then asks Anna to listen to the story her fingers might tell her about "what matters to them," what they "hold onto tightly," "what-they-hold-dear." (lines 318-328).

"Holding on" is recast as Douglas tells the story of a man photographing people (holding and) lifting glasses of water. Soon after, Anna describes "holding" a crystal ball that is "heavy" and "hard to hold" (lines 409, 417-419). While Anna at first relates "holding" with "heavy" and "hard to hold," her conversation with Douglas brings about a shift in what she associates with "hold." When Anna describes the hands of the seventy-year-old woman seen through the crystal ball, she simultaneously experiences them as "hard and brittle" and "holding the/life and the softness inside." Anna's description is a change from her earlier experiences that associated "holding" with pain. Douglas reinforces Anna's change by asking her to "hold tightly" to the "source of life and movement" (line 629).

Tracking silence and body movements.

In this concluding section of the analysis, I will trace patterns of sound and silence in relation to Anna's body movements. In my previous discussion of the cantos, I pointed to particularly rhythmical passages. In this part of the analysis, I examine patterns of rhythms that arise when the hypnotic conversation is considered as a whole.

I began to score the text with timed pauses and silences once Anna became verbally silent and Douglas's rhythms of speech significantly changed (line 99). I began to describe Anna's body movements a few moments before she stops talking (line 91). While her hands and fingers remain relatively still as Douglas speaks (lines 99-258), there is a significant change in her patterns of movements when he says, "how nice it is to feel your hands feeling different again" (lines 259-260).

Co-arising with the increase in Anna's body movements are longer pauses in Douglas's speech patterns (lines 263, 265, 267, 270 and so forth). Until now, the predominating metaphors in the hypnotist's speech were body based descriptions of mind (see discussion of Canto II). Concomitant with the increase in Anna's body movements and longer periods of silence in Douglas's verbal rhythms is his use of mind based metaphors to describe body behaviors (see Canto III). Anna's arms, hands, and finger movements increase when Douglas asks her to "consciously check" them out (her fingers) "for . . . changes" (lines 339-342). With this question, Anna's arms, hands, and fingers begin to continuously move.

As her fingers and hands began to continuously move, Douglas juxtaposes right hand/left hand; right brain/left brain (lines 343-355), creating a confusing and ambiguous series of relationships. The pace of his speaking increases

during this passage, and then after 16 seconds of silence he says, "your hands can cradle each other/and take care of each other." As he speaks, Anna's entwined hands dis-entwine and the left hand embraces and holds the right fingers. Her body is very still for 28 seconds, while Douglas remains silent. When she begins to move again, he begins to speak. As Douglas tells the story of the man photographing people lifting glasses, Anna's body continues to remain still. After the story, however, her body movements will increase and remain in motion until Douglas begins to converse directly with the fingers near the end of the session.

Once Anna begins to speak (Canto IV, line 407), the interactive pauses and silences between Anna's and Douglas's talk are shorter. Longer periods of silence occur, however, when Anna is asked to strengthen her fingers (lines 490; 506; 531; 640; 658; 664). The longest silence in the session arises when Douglas requests Anna to take "the internal dimples to every joint" in her body (2 1/2 minutes, line 664). During this silence, there are loud noises in the hallway outside the room, but Anna remains deeply absorbed and undisturbed by the sounds.

When Douglas engages directly in a conversation with the fingers (Canto V, line 696), the silences decrease (no longer than 12 seconds). Douglas's rhythm of speech gradually increases (the pauses become shorter) as the

conversation with the fingers and the session comes to a close.

To summarize these observations: The rhythmical pattern of sounds and silences became slower when Douglas began speaking in time with Anna's body rhythms and Anna became verbally silent. When attention was focused on the hands, the rhythm changed again as longer silences were introduced. When Anna began to speak again, the rhythmical verbal exchange between Douglas and Anna increased (shorter pauses between what she said and his response). The rhythmical patterns of sounds and silences also slowed considerably with the introduction of longer silences once Anna was invited to effect some kind of change in her hands. Coupled with the slowing down of the rhythm of sounds and silences was an increase in body movements.

Aesthetic Access to The Conversation Between

Now that I have completed this detailed poetic investigation of the transcription, I will return to the two questions that guided my investigation. How did a poetic analysis of the conversation between Douglas and Anna provide an aesthetic access to hypnotherapeutic processes of change? And how did the conversation *between* them alter the conversation Anna had *within*?

Several times in the analysis, I focused on the shift in Douglas's rhythm of speech as he began speaking in time with Anna's body rhythms. The hypnotist's attention to body

rhythms (reflected in his speech) gave rise to a rhythmical diction that is reminiscent of poetry. In Chapter Four, I cited several poets who said that poetry does not originate in abstract thinking (divided mind and body) but in the multiple and diverse exchanges of information within the poet's mind and body. While poetry begins as a mind-body conversation within, it also arises from the poet's conversation with words and the world. (Levertov, 1973; Nye, 1995; Snyder, 1991). In hypnotic interactions, the change from discursive prose to poetic diction begins in the rhythmically phrased words *between* the hypnotist and client; the connection between mind and body is reflected in their rhythmical, hypnotic talk. The mind-body conversations *between* them, in turn, facilitate mind-body conversations *within* the hypnotist and client. Just as poetry arises from the poet's mind-body conversations within and with the world, hypnotic experiences arise from the mind-body conversations *between* and *within* hypnotists and clients.

Douglas's attention to the interface between Anna's thoughts (images suggested in the opening dialogue and during their hypnotic talk) and body rhythms (breath patterns, body movements) introduced into his sounded words the elements of time which altered the syntax and grammar of his speech. A change in the syntax and grammar from ordinary prose to poetic diction could be likened to a change in the "rules" that govern habitual thoughts and behaviors. Poet

Robert Kelly has suggested that patterned thoughts are the syntax that connects and orders the sum total of how people describe themselves, "not just out loud, but in the ceaseless discourse of the[ir] head[s]" (Kelly, 1991, p. 163).

The linguistic "rules" that organize prose in discrete units and linear progress (what is said second depends on what is said first) order and reflect abstract thought (see Chapter Four). Changing the syntax that organizes language facilitates a change in the rules that govern thinking and perceiving. In poetic experiences, the change in thought and perception that gives birth to meaningful poetic associations could be explained, as Robert Bly suggested, as creative leaps of association between "the known part of mind to the unknown part and back to the known" (Bly in Myers & Simms, 1989, p. 159).

While poets and hypnotists share in their intentions to create meaningful experiences, the hypnotist's use of language offers a possibility to change the client's relational patterns of mind-body behaviors. Douglas's careful attention to Anna's body movements, coupled with his imaginative agility with language, and his ability to integrate the ideas and images Anna brought to the conversation, provided a context for Anna to change the way she thought about and perceived her hands.

The variations in Douglas's rhythmical patterns of speech, together with images, metaphors, ambiguities, antitheses, and rhymes created a possibility for Anna to dislodge her ordinary perceptions of time, space, and self. Poetic refrains ("day dream," "dream time," "holding on)," which, according to poets, furnish a "connecting pathway" (Brown, 1991, p. 75) between memory and immediate experiences, rendered opportunities for Anna to alter her approach to auto-hypnosis, and the relationship she had with her fingers and painful joints.

In Chapter Two of this dissertation, I discussed how many theories of hypnosis are grounded in Cartesian assumptions that posit divisions between mind and body, and noted that hypnosis is often described in either psychological or physiological terms. Douglas's approach to this hypnotic conversation reflected the relational assumption that mind and body are connected. He used metaphors that intimated that thoughts can run, jump, and turn somersaults, and fingers can remember ("memorize") what they learn, utilize their learning, and can communicate their knowledge and wisdom. By orienting to the hypnotic relationship with these assumptions, Douglas *embraced one language* to speak about mind and body (see Chapter Two for further discussion). His hypnotic conversation with Anna reflects his associational therapeutic model that connects therapists and clients, mind and body in an epistemology of

communication (see Chapter Two for more discussion about Douglas's theory of hypnosis).

In the concluding section of this analysis, I have examined subjective changes in Anna's conversation within. In Chapter Seven, I have re-visited some Buddhist ideas that were introduced in Chapter Three by theoretically discussing Anna's intrapersonal process in terms of Buddhist notions of change.

The Conversation Within

Now that I have discussed how the language of hypnosis provided an aesthetic access to the hypnotherapeutic process of change, I will examine how the changes in the conversation between Anna and Douglas were reflected in Anna's conversation within. My investigation of the changes in Anna's conversation were guided by the ideas of process oriented researchers who examine therapeutic change by attending to the interactive communications between therapists and clients (Greenberg & Pinsof, 1986; Rennie & Toukmanian, 1992), and by noting "complex network[s] of relations" (Greenberg, 1986, p. 715) that arise during their "communicative acts" (Greenberg, p. 715).

In the analysis of each canto, I noted many instances of change. For instance, at the very beginning of the conversation Anna believes that daydreams and trance are not only different, but they are in opposition to each other. Her remarks at the end of the hypnosis session suggest that

this conceptualization has changed as she describes her trance experience as daydream.

My descriptions of Douglas's proficiency with language might suggest that his diction was poetic while Anna's was not. During the analysis, I discovered that when Anna began to speak, her speech reflected images that suggested poetic leaps of imagination (e.g., "crystal ball," "cooking blood vessels," "hard and brittle on the outside, soft like a clam on the inside"). Her conversation with Douglas through the "crystal ball" transformed her "knobby," "skin and bone" fingers into "straight, strong," "full of life" fingers, with "softness" and "dimples" inside. The unexpected turns in their hypnotic conversation, which was facilitated by the "de-focus, re-focus" refrain, reflected a logic similar to the poet's "associational logic [that] continually transforms objects [and creates] an ongoing sense of surprise" (Myers & Simms, p. 159). The "crystal ball," which became a metaphor of change, allowed Anna, together with Douglas, to give "warmth" and "life and breath" to all the joints in her body.

Perhaps the most significant change in Anna's presenting problem of painful joints was signaled during the fifth session when she reported that she felt considerably better, and that the pain in her fingers had "subsided to a tolerable level." In my first follow up interview with Anna, she recounted that during the eight months that followed the

last session she had continued to feel better. She said that recently she had noticed that she was able to "grip the covers [on her bed] "and pull them up" which she had not been able to do previously. Reflecting on her post hypnotic experiences, Anna said,

I guess I consciously made an effort to exercise more, and consciously made an effort not to let it [the discomfort in her joints] restrict me. Once I got into that mode, that just kind of took over automatically, and things just moved on from there. I don't think I changed any of my habits . . . at that time. But I was beginning to think about doing things differently. I was beginning to think about strengthening muscles around my fingers. . . . I began to think about doing things like . . . exercising my arm . . . walking more, and swimming. Even in just the movements that I was making that weren't under the heading of physical exercise, I was tuning into those muscles. If I was washing dishes, I would try and do something with my arms that felt like my arms were getting some sort of work out. If I was walking upstairs, I would try to utilize the muscles in my legs so that I got the maximum level of exercise walking up stairs. So maybe tuning into those kinds of things [was helping], even though I wasn't doing anything aggressively.

When Anna had first consulted with Douglas about the pain in her joints, she said that she tried to ignore the pain by telling herself that "any day now, it will go away." The pain which was preventing her from lifting packages, and pulling covers up on her bed was preventing her from functioning "like a normal person." From the description of her post-hypnotic experiences, it seems that Anna's thoughts were connected with body sensations in a very different way than her pre-hypnosis experiences.

In the second follow up interview with Anna (eight months after the first interview), Anna related that while

she had recently had a "flare-up" of painful joints, she was established in a regular practice of auto-hypnosis. She described the experience and how she responded to it in the following way.

The first place[s] I was feeling it again were the hands and hip. . . . What concerned me was that I think I kicked back into patterns of responding to it in the same way. And I didn't necessarily know how to respond to it differently. . . . I had expected myself to just automatically respond to it differently. . . . To have my conscious behaviors manifest differently because something was happening automatically from unconscious developments, and that didn't happen. If it was happening, it wasn't obvious enough to me. . . . My first response was to ignore it, it'll go away. . . . I thought I would find something else to do after the ignoring part wasn't working. Either it would work or I would do something else. But I was still in a control mode. I can control this if I ignore it. It will go away if I ignore it.

Anna said that she was doing auto-hypnosis on a regular daily basis. She added that at first she "was kind of mad that this could happen" when she was getting healthier. When I asked her about her approach to self-hypnosis she responded that she would "just do it for relaxation, or whatever else was coming up."

But on occasion, like maybe once or twice [a] week, I would go into trance with that [pain in her hands and hips] on my mind. You know, with a global sort of question like, how can I connect to what's happening here? What do my fingers have to say? Or what do my hips have to say to me?, or just some sort of question that would directly relate to it. . . . Basically I thought there might be other things going on that if I dealt with that, those things--the other things were just symptoms that would subside naturally.

She concluded that the symptoms had not completely gone away at the time of our meeting, but they were "subsiding" and "minor now."

It is not necessary to try and pinpoint the precise words that made a difference for Anna, or to try and localize the specific factors that reduced her reoccurring bout with painful body symptoms and altered how she approached the pain. In the analysis, while I distinguished the "crystal ball" portion of Anna's and Douglas's conversation (Canto IV) as a significant turning point for Anna, the "crystal ball" metaphor can not be understood in isolation. Three previous sessions, and the hypnotic interactions that preceded Canto IV contextualized the changes that seemed to arise during the fourth canto. Thus, rather than examining Douglas's intentions and what Anna's remarks meant, I have focused my analysis on how the language of hypnosis created a change in the conversation between them and *within* Anna.

In Chapter Seven, I theoretically explore Anna's intrapersonal process from a Buddhist perspective. I also discuss some of the limitations of this study, and issues of transferability. Directions for future research are offered, and, in conclusion, I return to a question that was posed at the beginning of this dissertation.

CHAPTER SEVEN

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THIS STUDY

In the previous chapter, I analyzed the interpersonal conversation between Anna and Douglas with ideas developed from poetic traditions. By examining the client's and hypnotist's talk from a poetic point of view, and their interactive patterns of conversation from a qualitative analyst's perspective, I was able to track variations in their mind-body conversation that co-arose with changes in the client's conversation within.

In this chapter, I return to some of the ideas introduced in Chapter Three in order to make a theoretical conjecture about Anna's intrapersonal conversation from a Buddhist perspective. Buddhist concepts about altering fixed and rigid patterns of behaviors will be used to theoretically understand how changes might have originated in Anna's thoughts and perceptions during the hypnotic process. I will also discuss in this chapter transferability, limitations, implications, and applications of this study, and recommendations for future research. In the concluding section of this chapter, I will discuss some of the ideas that inspired this investigation of hypnosis.

The Intrapersonal Conversation From a Buddhist Perspective

In Chapter Three, I presented a theoretical conjecture about the intrapersonal process of hypnosis from a Buddhist orientation. In this chapter, I will draw on this conjecture to provide a theoretical explanation of the changes in

Anna's intrapersonal process. Considering Anna's hypnotic process from a Buddhist standpoint does not imply that Anna or Douglas conceptualized their hypnosis experiences in Buddhist terms. While Buddhist concepts were not used as research categories to analyze the hypnotherapeutic interaction (see Chapter Three for further discussion), they can be used to theoretically discuss intrapersonal processes of change (in terms of altering fixed and rigid patterns of thoughts and perceptions).

According to a Buddhist point of view, habitual, reactive, discursive mind sets itself apart from the rest of phenomena. Buddhist meditators focus on the interface between thoughts and sensations in order to alter their ordinary ways of thinking and perceiving that divide and separate body from mind, self from other.

Anna's usual way of dealing with painful bodily symptoms was to disregard them. She said that when she experienced painful joints, she went "through a whole process of trying to ignore" them until they went away. While her attempts to disregard the symptoms might have worked for her at other times, this time it was not effective. The pain did not go away, it increased. During hypnosis, when Douglas focused on the relation between Anna's thoughts and sensations (weaving her breath patterns and body movements into his talk; using metaphors that connected body and mind), he and Anna created a context

similar to the Buddhist meditator who attends to the relational patterns between thinking and sensing.

In some Buddhist traditions, meditators begin their meditative practices by cultivating radical doubt (Batchelor, 1990). The 17th century Japanese Zen Buddhist teacher Takasui said,

You must doubt deeply, again and again, asking yourself what the subject of hearing could be. Pay no attention to the various illusory thoughts and ideas that may occur to you. Only doubt more and more deeply, gathering together in yourself all the strength that is in you, without aiming at anything or expecting anything in advance. (Takasui in Batchelor, 1990, p. 15)

Meditative doubting (or unknowing) frees the meditator from "insisting that things exist in a certain way [by] loosen[ing] [his or her] hold on the immutability of the familiar" (Batchelor, p. 44). While this attitude of doubt is indispensable to a meditator, it is contextualized by a profound sense of trust in the inner experience of uncertainty.

Unlike the meditator who cultivates the experience of trust through meditative practices within, the hypnosis client develops a sense of trust through the hypnotherapeutic relationship with the hypnotist (see Chapter Six and the transcript [lines 168-172]). Anna expressed in my first follow up interview with her that she "trusted" the hypnotist's "competence," and that he had her "best interests at heart." She said that once she was able to "have the feeling of safety," and "the feeling of

understanding the process," she was freed up to "let go and experiment more." She said,

I think I gave myself some general permission [to] let go [and not try] to scrutinize too much . . . to let things happen automatically. . . . It's a feeling of being freer. It's a sense that I know judgement will be suspended, that judgment isn't an issue. . . . It's a sense of being in the body and without the body at the same time, like being at the edge. . . . It's a paradox, but also at the same time being more aware of my body as well. . . . I'm not just constrained in my body.

Once Douglas and Anna had established a context of safety and trust (lines 168-172), Anna's awareness of her thoughts and bodily sensations changed. Her confidence in the hypnotherapeutic relationship allowed her to trust the uncertainty of her inner experiences during hypnosis (e.g., "being in the body and without the body at the same time"). From a Buddhist perspective, Anna's attitude of uncertainty (contextualized by trust) freed her to assume a more non-reactive stance that neither pushed away the unpleasant thoughts and sensations, nor held on to them. In Buddhist mindful meditation traditions, the practice of neither pushing away nor holding on connects a person with his or her fixed and rigid patterns of thinking and sensing in a new way. This non-reactive attention, in turn, cuts at the "chain of habitual thought patterns" and promotes a new kind of awareness, a more "panoramic perspective" (Varela et al., 1991, p. 26).

At the end of the session, Anna recounted her experience to Douglas as being "a lot brighter," where she

could do "two things at once. . . . It was like two dimensions at the same time" (lines 822-833). Anna's description of her experience reflects a type of awareness that Buddhists might describe as "consciousness that is not linear and sequential" (Loori, 1994, p. xxvii).

According to the Buddha, most people conceive the opposite of how things are (Gyatso, 1992). Instead of recognizing the nature of interdependence, most people behave as if mind and body are divided, and mind is the only knowing agent or self. From a Buddhist orientation, when Douglas ambiguated time, space, and self, he provided a possibility for Anna to re-condition her usual ways of thinking about and perceiving "self."

The Buddhist image of "The Cycle of Ignorance" (see Chapter Three, Figure 1) vividly depicts how actions embedded in false assumptions (divided mind and body; mind [self] knows and body is ignorant) cause and condition each successive action. "The Cycle of Ignorance" also portrays the "links" where the pattern of habitual, conditioned actions can be interrupted. Conditioned actions can be disrupted at the "link" of "name and form." In other words, at the moment of the co-arising of thoughts and sensations, when forming distinctions and naming take place, the fixed and rigid patterns of thoughts and perceptions can be interrupted, and change can be introduced.

The "crystal ball" metaphor (See Chapter Six, Canto IV) became an opportunity for Anna to interrupt her usual way of "naming" and "perceiving" her hands. While the hypnotic conversations that preceded the "crystal ball" image ambiguated Anna's ordinary perceptions of time, space, and self, the "crystal ball" enabled her to assume a non-reactive stance. She could now "see" and "feel" her hands in a different way. A turning point in the hypnotherapeutic conversation is when Anna "de-focused" her fixed and rigid assumptions and "re-focused," re-named, and re-formed, her "knobby," "skin and bone" fingers by adding blood vessels, nerves, and muscles to the bones. The change in Anna's patterned assumptions at "name and form" is reflected in her description of the transformation of "frail" to "full of life and softness" fingers, from being unable to move and act like a normal person (as she described in the opening dialogue) to being able to "run without having to think about it" (line 677), and move without having "to pay attention" (lines 679-680).

Now that I have concluded my theoretical conjectures about Anna's intrapersonal process during hypnosis from a Buddhist perspective, I will discuss the issue of transferability in terms of this study.

Transferability

Patton (1990) maintained that using a single critical case study for analysis raises concerns about its

generalizability to other cases. Guba and Lincoln (1985), however, described the limits of generalizability by contending that researchers and analysts do not know the specific contexts to which their studies will be applied. Thus, according to Guba and Lincoln (1985), researchers are not responsible for suggesting how their investigations can be transferred to other contexts, but they are accountable for providing their readers with "the widest possible range of information" (Guba & Lincoln, p. 316) about their studies. Furnishing readers with rich descriptions will enable persons "seeking to make an application elsewhere" (p. 298) to have "sufficient descriptive data to make similarity . . . judgements" (p. 300).

With Guba and Lincoln's (1985) descriptions of transferability in mind, I have attempted to provide readers with enough information so they may deduce for themselves what can be logically transferred to other cases. In the section that follows, I will discuss some of the limitations, implications, and possible applications of this study by re-visiting ideas that were developed in previous chapters.

Limitations, Implications, and Applications

The most distinctive characteristics of this study are the unique attributes that Anna and Douglas brought to their hypnotherapeutic conversation. Anna's keen intelligence, ability to thoughtfully consider and reflect on her

experiences, and her facility to clearly describe her thoughts and feelings were most articulate, and, at times poetic. Douglas's theoretical grounding in systems theory and Taoism (reflected in his associational theory of hypnosis), and his skillful dexterity with language and rhythms offered a unique relational orientation that is idiosyncratic to him. If Anna had worked with another hypnotist, and Douglas with a different client their hypnotic conversations would have been significantly different. Thus, Anna's and Douglas's distinctive backgrounds and attributes shaped how they interacted with Anna's presenting symptoms and framed their hypnotic dialogue in ways that were unique to their hypnotherapeutic relationship.

While specific attributes gave this hypnosis case its "unique flavor" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 201), there are some ideas from this study that could be utilized by qualitative researchers, hypnotists, and psychotherapists who are not hypnotists. In the sections that follow, I will focus on some of the limitations and implications of this dissertation by examining my methods of investigation, preparations for the analysis, and possible training applications.

Methods of Analysis

In Chapter Two, I noted that in spite of a wide range of theoretical differences, most hypnotists have agreed that

hypnosis has to do with how ideas are exemplified in changing body behaviors. I also suggested that many theories of hypnosis are rooted in Western psychological and medical science traditions which are steeped in Cartesian assumptions (e.g., the certainty of scientific or analytically derived knowledge; mind and body as separate and essentially different; the identification of mind with self).

In this study, I adopted Francisco Varela's (1976) advice, which was to avoid Cartesian assumptions by changing the context in which the problem is seen to arise. Thus, in my investigation of the hypnosis session, I employed descriptions of mind, body, and self which reflected epistemologies that do not adhere to Cartesian presuppositions. I also utilized analytical traditions that reflected constructionist assumptions, and which challenged the certainty of positivist perspectives.

Once the context of the analysis was changed (Varela, 1976), and some of the separative assumptions inherent in the study of mind, body, and self were removed, I was able to investigate interactive patterns of communication with analytical strategies that were less constrained by dualistic assumptions. The methods used in this study to analyze the mind-body conversations during hypnosis could be used to examine any hypnotic interaction regardless of the hypnotist's theoretical orientation.

When time was introduced to the transcript by scoring the text to reflect the hypnotist's and client's pauses and silences, it offered a better representation of the body's rhythms in the hypnotic talk. The scored text was less influenced by the separations and linear progressions imposed by the syntax of prose.

The focus of my analysis was to examine the hypnotist's rhythmical patterns of speech (which were reflected in the scored text) in relation to the client's body movements and talk. Similar to conversation analysts, I assumed that Anna and Douglas organized their patterned behaviors in ways that were unique to them. Like discourse analysts who are interested in examining "language beyond the sentence" (Tannen, 1989, p. 6), I studied sequences of communication between Anna and Douglas. Attending to their patterned communications allowed me to conceive of the mind-body relationship in communicative or conversational terms. It also freed me from having to posit mind as psychological and body as physiological (or mind and body as two different entities).

Unlike conversation analysts, however, I did not assume that there was an "orderliness" (Psathas, 1995, p. 45) to the hypnotic dialogue that I needed to discover. Rather, I took the perspective that hypnotic interactions are a different kind of communication than the ordered, logical, turn-taking of ordinary conversations.

In Chapter Two, I discussed how many hypnotists have suggested that hypnosis is a non-logical form of communication. Instead of examining the hypnosis session as a discourse analyst who looks for rules of discourse (Labov & Fanshel, 1977), I sought to describe the non-logical attributes of hypnosis with distinctions rooted in the non-logical traditions of poetry and Buddhist meditation.

Everyday conversational exchanges mirror the conversant's abstract, logical thinking. Hypnotic interactions reflect non-logical and recursive ways of thinking and perceiving. By analyzing the hypnotherapeutic conversation with methods that fit the non-logical, recursive patterned language of hypnotic dialogue, I was able to investigate the hypnosis session without having to rely on a theory of hypnosis.

In Chapter Two, I noted that most hypnotists have agreed that hypnosis is a phenomenological experience. By using poetic analysis rather than a theory of hypnosis to describe hypnotic interactions, the phenomenological experience of hypnosis was accentuated. Poetry often reflects perceptions of the "world as is . . . in its felt immediacy" (Abrams, 1996, p. 35). A poetic investigation of the transcribed hypnotherapeutic conversation underscores its phenomenological qualities. For instance, while Anna's descriptions of what she saw and felt through the "crystal ball" were unique, a poetic investigation of her talk

highlighted the phenomenological "image-based" and "sensory" (Gilligan, 1987, p. 49) aspects of her experiences.

In this dissertation, I examined the hypnotist's and client's interactive patterns of communication by tracking changes in their hypnotic conversation, and, in turn, variations in the client's conversation within. Informed by my study of poetic traditions and my interest in the relation between language and thinking, my analysis suggested that co-arising with changes in the hypnotist's rhythmical patterns of speech (reflecting the client's breath patterns and body movements)--metaphors, ambiguities, antithesis, and rhymes--were transformations in the client's thoughts and perceptions. Tracking variations in hypnotic conversations does not presuppose a particular theoretical orientation about change. Because I did not focus on a theory of therapeutic change but rather how the language of hypnosis makes possible hypnotherapeutic processes of change, the analytical methods that were formulated in this study could be applied to the investigation of other hypnosis cases regardless of the hypnotist's theory of change. This does not imply, however, that the hypnotist's theory of therapeutic change does not influence the hypnotic talk. It simply suggests that different theories of change will not interfere with a poetic analysis of a transcribed hypnosis session.

In my study of different theories of hypnosis, I concluded that most theoreticians imply a notion of self (e.g., "actor," "ego," "executive ego," "hidden observer"). In the discussions of Descartes and Buddhism (see Chapters Two and Three), I proposed that most ideas about self reflect the identification of self with thinking processes (the experience of an autonomous self is concomitant with a particular way of thinking and perceiving). Haley (1965) maintained that hypnosis "distorts" the perception of self. In Flemons's (1994a) associational theory of hypnosis, he described the "intense rapport" (p. 15) between the hypnotist and client as "alter[ing] the boundaries that ordinarily separate the experience of self from others" (p. 15). My investigation of hypnosis was not influenced by a particular Western, psychological theory of personality. Informed by my study of self, and Buddhist notions of self in particular, I approached the analysis with a sense of curiosity, and openness to discovery. I was interested in noting how ordinary perceptions of self are ambiguated ("distorted" [Haley, 1965]) or "altered" [Flemons, 1995] during the hypnotic interaction.

In Chapter Six, I described how Douglas's associational orientation to the hypnotic conversation, and his skillful juxtaposition of ambiguities (mind/body; time; space) created multiple uncertainties about who or what is self (Is Anna the self listening to the fingers? Or are the fingers

the selves listening to Anna?). Because of my interest in tracking intrapersonal processes of change during the hypnotherapeutic conversation, I was attentive to how the hypnotist's language altered Anna's everyday perceptions of time, space, and self. While my analytical perspective was influenced by my biases and curiosities, the methods of analysis used in this study could be applied to other investigations of hypnosis regardless of the hypnotist's or analyst's theory of human personality.

Preparations Before Beginning

In Chapter Six, I described how I prepared myself for the analysis by immersing myself in either poetry or Buddhist mindful meditation for the hour before I interacted with the text. I presumed that my interpretive perspective would be influenced by how I spent the hour before the analysis of the transcript (see Chapter Six for further discussion). In order to effectively "resonate" with their data, clients, and supervisees, researchers, psychotherapists, and clinical supervisors might find different ways to prepare themselves before beginning their work. While I employed two specific traditions to focus my interpretive point of view for the purpose of analysis, there are other practices that might also be used (e.g., Yoga, listening to music, self-hypnosis, and so forth). This idea of "tuning" oneself is similar to Milton Erickson's description of going into trance before meeting his patients

(when he wanted to be certain not to miss important information).

One problem with persons preparing themselves prior to encountering data, clients, and/or supervisees is that most work schedules are so full that people have limited time to prepare. Perhaps one way of addressing the very real issue of "no time" is to draw on some of the methods developed by meditators. Meditation traditions offer various techniques that promote concentration so that the amount of time is not as important as the ability to focus one's mind.

Training Applications

Buddhist meditation traditions have established different exercises for persons interested in learning how to develop concentration and expand awareness. For instance, mindful meditation does not require a person to be seated or withdrawn from the hustle and bustle of everyday life; it can be practiced at any time (while standing, walking, talking, and eating). One exercise that helps to develop concentration is attention to the breath which is "available . . . at any time of day and in any circumstance" (Kornfield, 1993, p. 60). Exercises that expand awareness through cultivating moment-to-moment attention might be valuable to hypnotherapists and psychotherapists who wish to enhance their abilities to focus on the "world as is . . . in its felt immediacy" (Abrams, 1996, p. 35).

Poets have developed a variety of exercises for those who wish to cultivate their linguistic skills and abilities to think poetically (Behn & Twichell, 1992). For example, one exercise that interrupts a person's tendency to analytically think is to allow a free flow of associative images to arise, one after another. The second part of the exercise is to write down the images that come to mind without trying to logically connect them. Another exercise that was developed for the purpose of "defamiliarizing" poets with their ordinary ways of thinking and using language, is to select a pair of words that have opposite meanings, and to make a list of associations of images for each word. The second part of the exercise is to write a poem or story based on the list of associative words, and then to examine how the two poems or stories are similar and different.

Hypnotists and psychotherapists who are interested in increasing their agility with language might utilize some of the exercises developed by poets. The notion of therapists cultivating their flexibility with language through writing is reminiscent of Milton Erickson's remark that he acquired his skill with language by writing trance inductions before meeting with his patients (Zeig, 1985).

Now that I have examined the implications and limitations of this study, and how ideas from this dissertation might be utilized by hypnotists,

psychotherapists, and/or supervisors, I will discuss some possibilities for future research.

Future Research

A specific issue that surfaced during the analysis of Anna's and Douglas's hypnotic conversation was their co-creation of experiences that could be mistaken for actual events. In the examination of Canto V, I discussed how Anna's description of being photographed holding a crystal ball was closely associated with Douglas's story of a man photographing people lifting glasses. Later in the analysis, I described how Douglas wove Anna's body movements into the refrain "holding on." I also noted that during the IPR interview, Anna remarked that she had no memory, nor evidence (photograph) to suggest that she was photographed holding a crystal ball. There are recent discussions among hypnotherapists and psychotherapists about false memory syndrome (Hammond, et al., 1994; Hillman & Ventura, 1992; Yapko, 1994). The analysis in this study could be useful to hypnotists and psychotherapists who wish to understand how their conceptualizations and use of language create a context for the types of experiences their clients have.

This study of hypnosis highlighted the interdependent relation between language, thoughts, and perceptions. It examined how the talk of hypnosis provides opportunities for changing patterns of thinking and perceiving. A researcher who is interested in examining how therapeutic interactions

establish contexts for "false" memories, might examine patterns of linguistic interactions in transcribed therapy sessions. For instance, tracking images, metaphors, and refrains might accentuate how the therapist's and client's language produces a context for the client to make creative leaps of associations that could be mistaken for actual events.

While the hypnosis case examined in this dissertation was composed of five sessions, I chose only one to analyze. A future study might investigate all five sessions, scoring each one with timed pauses and silences, and using poetic analysis to focus on the linguistic patterns within each session. Once completed, the whole case could be analyzed to delineate patterned relations among all the sessions.

Another study might employ notations from conversation analysis to examine a hypnosis session. Because conversation analysis is used in the investigation of ordinary talk, the researcher who uses this analytical strategy would have to account for the non-ordinary characteristics of hypnotic conversations. A qualitative researcher could assess how different analytical methods (poetic, conversation, and discourse) applied to the same hypnotic conversation emphasize different aspects of the talk.

Qualitative researchers have not discussed the implications that might arise when researchers and/or analysts "tune" themselves to resonate in different ways by

consciously preparing themselves for their research and/or analysis. An inquiry that focused on tracking the relation between the researcher/analyst's conscious preparation and that which they study might prove useful for furthering discussions about constructionist assumptions and participant/observer perspectives.

Researchers who are interested in exploring what Interpersonal Process Recall (IPR) offers to the study of hypnosis might interview the client and/or hypnotist immediately following each hypnotic interaction. However, one disadvantage of using this methodology is that it requires the client and hypnotist to consciously recall and logically describe experiences originating in non-logical unconscious processes. Thus, the researcher would need to account for this kind of limitation when designing the project.

Another project could examine either a transcribed hypnosis or therapy session with the intention of applying Buddhist theories of change. If Buddhist concepts were to be used in a research context, analysts would need to develop research categories that highlight changes in the client's conditioned actions. One way of doing this might be to investigate the therapeutic conversation for instances of change that reflect non-reactive stances, conceptual and perceptual re-namings and re-formings.

I have examined ideas that were developed in this study in terms of their limitations, implications, applications, and possibilities for future research. I will now end this investigation of hypnosis by addressing two intriguing questions that were posed by my dissertation committee member Dr. Shelley Green, several months before the end of this study. The questions posed by Dr. Green, encouraged me to return to the ideas that began this study, and, in turn, they prompted me to reflect on my present state of mind. She asked: "What have you learned about hypnotic conversations through the study of meditation and poetry? And what have you learned about poetry, meditation, and yourself through this investigation of hypnosis?"

Concluding Thoughts

This study of hypnosis, meditation, and poetry began with the question that was inspired by Gregory Bateson's (1979) intriguing inquiry about connecting different vantage points: "What bonus or increment of knowing follows from *combining* information from two or more sources?" (p. 79). As I explored Bateson's writings, I became fascinated with his methods of abduction, and with the possibilities that "bonuses of understanding" could arise when different disciplines and perspectives were combined. My studies with Dr. Douglas Flemons encouraged me to make leaps of associations between diverse ideas and different traditions, and to examine the relations between them. Guided by my love

of literature and language, my interest in Asian philosophy and meditation, and my curiosity about the nature of mind, body, and self, I posed a question in this dissertation similar to Bateson's inquiry: What new understanding about hypnosis would follow from juxtaposing a discussion about the intrapersonal, mind-body conversations within a hypnotized person with the interpersonal, mind-body conversations between a hypnotist and client?

Investigating the interpersonal conversation between the hypnotist and client with poetic distinctions, and theoretically exploring the client's intrapersonal conversation with Buddhist concepts provided a description of hypnotic conversations that focused on the interaction between the hypnotist and client, mind and body. While Bateson's question and methods of abduction inspired the direction of this study, Flemons's ideas formed the background of thought that guided my inquiry into the intra- and interpersonal processes of hypnosis. He poetically articulated what influenced the analysis when he underscored the value of juxtaposing the particular and the whole.

When a constellated relationship--be it wildflower, sonata, idea, poem, or conversation--is encountered in context as a composed whole, it comes alive. Analytically explicated, the connections are severed and it dies. (Flemons, 1991, p. 123)

Flemons's ideas about maintaining the aliveness of an investigation by contextualizing the particular in terms of the whole frequently dislodged my own habitual ways of

thinking, which, in turn, gave rise to a sense of uncertainty.

When I analyzed the mind-body conversation between Anna and Douglas vis-a-vis the changes in Anna's conversation within, the interdependent, co-arising aspects of their conversation came alive. However, as I examined the patterned relations between images, metaphors, sounds, and silences and Anna's altered perceptions of time, space, mind and body, I became aware of how hypnotic interactions ambiguate the sense of certainty that is concomitant with ordinary ways of perceiving and knowing.

In Buddhist meditation traditions there is a practice called radical doubt. This kind of doubting or unknowing frees meditators from insisting that things exist or happen in a certain way. As one Buddhist teacher said, the practice of radical doubt helps meditators to loosen their hold on the "immutability of the familiar" (Batchelor, 1990, p. 44). Systems thinker and Buddhist teacher Joanna Macy (1991a, 1991b) wrote that the familiar way of distinguishing ourselves as separate from everything else is not, necessarily, the only way to know ourselves. Macy (1991b) wrote,

the way we define and delimit the self is arbitrary. We can place it between our ears and have it looking out from our eyes, or we can widen it to include the air we breathe, or, at other moments, we can cast its boundaries farther to include the oxygen-giving trees and plankton, our external lungs, and beyond them the web of life in which they are sustained. (Macy, pp. 12-13)

Letting go of our familiar sense of self, however, engenders a sense of not knowing, and as Buddhist meditators soon find out, it is not so easy to loosen the grip on our perception of a separate and autonomous self.

My study of poetic diction forced me to recognize that the allurements of certainty can be deconstructed in language as well--for poetry and prose are both constructed. While poetry better represents human experience in its simultaneousness, multiplicity, and recursiveness, the separative assumptions imposed by the syntax of prose, misrepresents experience. And, yet, as linguistic scholars have suggested, the structure of language has a tremendous hold on what we are able to perceive.

Inspired by Dr. Green's questions, I continued to juxtapose the ideas that began this study with the insights that came from the analysis. And then I thought of something that Anna said in one of our conversations, when I asked her to discuss how she experienced hypnosis. She described her hypnotic experience as "kind of a paradox," which she said was like "being in the body and without the body . . . like being at the edge." Anna's insightful description brought to light what I am experiencing at the close of this dissertation.

Concomitant with my investigation of different traditions that seem to dislodge the perception of certainty--the grip on the "immutability of the familiar" in

language, mind, body, and self is my own paradoxical sense of having completed a rather exhaustive study, without attaining a greater sense of certainty than when I began. However, like the Buddhist meditator whose practice of radical doubt is contextualized by trust in the meditative process, I acquired through the process of writing this dissertation a bit more trust in the "not knowing" than when I started.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Sandra Roscoe was born in Michigan and spent her formative years living in Ohio and Pennsylvania. Shortly after she began her undergraduate education in literature at Boston University, she started what was to become a life-long study and practice of Asian philosophy (first Hinduism, and then Buddhism). She continued to develop her love of literature and artistic expression as the curator for the Gotham Book Mart Gallery in New York City.

Interested in exploring the relation between Western psychology and Eastern philosophy, Sandra finished her undergraduate education in psychology at Nova Southeastern University. While completing her undergraduate studies, she was the Director of Adult Community Based Programs at the Mental Health Association of Broward County. During this time she was also a counselor and administrator for a psychological clinic in Broward County.

While finishing her masters and doctorate degrees in family therapy at Nova Southeastern University, School of Social and Systemic Studies, Sandra worked as a therapist for Family Therapy Associates. She provided home based crisis intervention and family therapy to families with dependency related issues (e.g., status offense, abuse, and neglect), and when there was imminent danger of children being removed from the home by HRS. At present, Sandra is a licensed marriage and family therapist, who maintains a

private practice in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. She is an adjunct professor at the Farquhar Center, Nova Southeastern University. She has taught undergraduate and graduate courses in Asian philosophy, multiculturalism, and women's studies. She has also presented at the Ericksonian International Congresses on hypnosis.